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The American military personnel assigned to advise and assist China's armed forces, from the 
most senior officers to junior enlisted servicemen, endured, persevered, and despite tremendous 
obstacles, made steady progress in their efforts to improve the operational capabilities of that 
nation's military. This dissertation examines the United States military’s advise and assist effort 
in China beginning just before America’s entrance into World War II through the re-
establishment of a security assistance mission to the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan. 
This narrative history examines the complex relationship between the American military 
advisors and their Chinese counterparts during a dynamic decade of international war and 
internal conflict. While providing the overarching strategic, political, and diplomatic context, this 
study focuses on the successful rebuilding of selected elements of the Chinese armed forces by 
American advisors after its series of costly and humiliating defeats by the Japanese military 
before the United States officially entered the war. This program of training, equipping, and 
advising these forces not only contributed to their successful participation in the campaign to 
retake Burma, but also enabled their defense of the Nationalist wartime capital, and facilitated 
their planned offensive against the Japanese at the end of the war. These American sponsored 
units went on to conduct extended operations against the Communists in the eastern and 
northeastern China until nearly the end of the Chinese Civil War. This study also discusses 
American military support to the post-WW II reoccupation of eastern China, repatriation of 
Japanese military and civilian personnel, and national reconciliation efforts between the 
Nationalists and the Communists. The narrative concludes by examining the reduced post-
negotiation American military advisory efforts during the expanded civil conflict beginning in 
early 1947 through the defeat and retreat of the Nationalist government and military. This study 
concludes with a brief discussion of the May 1951 reestablishment of the United States Military 
Assistance Advisory Group to Taiwan.  
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Preface  
 
 One of the decisions for anyone writing about China is what Romanization system to use. 
Most current works on China written in the United States use the widely accepted People's 
Republic of China's system called Pinyin, and this study is no exception. However, because this 
study covers the period from 1941-1951, before the Pinyin system was implemented, there are 
many references in documents, maps and sources in earlier Romanization systems. The author 
will make every attempt to aid the reader in being able to locate place names mentioned on maps 
(generated both during the period of the study and subsequently) and keep the key historical 
personages names consistent. Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) and Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai) are not 
a problem as the spellings are not significantly different. However, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang 
Jieshi) is significantly different in Pinyin. To mitigate this problem the first time a name or place 
is used the Pinyin will be given in parenthesis immediately following the original Chinese name, 
title, or geographic location as above. Thereafter, in the remainder of the text the Pinyin is used.   
 The second issue in this study is the ambiguous meaning of the term "military advisor." 
The current Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-
02, 15 Nov 2011) does not include a definition of advisor or military advisor. This study 
generally uses the description found in Chapter 2 of the United States Army May 2009 Field 
Manual Security Force Assistance (FM 3-07.1). For the purpose of this study, advisors are those 
personnel assigned to work with "foreign security forces" to perform the five basic functions 
outlined in detail in the manual. Military advisors are responsible for the following tasks in 
helping a foreign nation build and employ its military: (1) Organize, which includes such 
activities as recruiting, pay and benefits, and selecting leaders; (2) Train, which includes 
educating and training the foreign forces including helping to establish facilities and programs to 
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produce competent individual servicemen and units; (3) Equip, which includes procuring, 
maintaining, and operating weapons and equipment; (4) Rebuild and Build, which includes 
assessing, upgrading or establishing new facilities and infrastructure; and finally (5), Advise and 
Assist, which is characterized by the integration of American personnel into foreign units where 
they are directed to work with, by, and through the host nation forces and leaders to improve the 
capabilities of those elements.  This includes serving with and accompanying the host nation's 
forces into combat if required. 
 This study of American military advisors to China, specifically from 1941 to 1951, uses 
this broad definition of the tasks, responsibilities, and expectations for those personnel who 
worked directly with, and were embedded in, Chinese military units and headquarters. In the 
broadest definition of Security Force Assistance in the manual cited above, American military 
units also "partner" with foreign security forces. While not advisors in the truest sense, those 
units that provide direct support to, or work alongside, or within the formations of allied units, 
are part of the broad task of assisting foreign security forces. While this study focuses on the 
advisors, those Americans that worked alongside and directly supported Chinese units in combat 
are also integral part of this narrative.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 "Be American but not too American, let the Chinese be Chinese but never too Chinese."
1
 
       Colonel Haydon. L. Boatner, United States Army Ramgarh, India, 1942 
 
Overview 
The ancient Chinese terms yin and yang are often perceived in the West as the 
interactions of opposites, day and night or feminine and masculine. However, as Herrlee G. Creel 
outlines in Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung, "this was not the dualism of 
good and evil or spirit and matter. On the contrary, yin and yang complemented each other to 
maintain the cosmic harmony, and might transform each other; thus winter, which is yin, 
changes into summer which is yang."
2
 The Harmony of Yin and Yank is a study of the 
complementary efforts of American military advisors and their Chinese counterparts to aid in the 
achievement of mutually supporting national goals in a great global conflict, and in its turbulent 
aftermath, in the middle of the twentieth century. Much has been written about the political, 
diplomatic, social, economic, and military aspects of How the Far East Was Lost
3
 (Anthony 
Kubek) and the Lost Chance in China.
4
 (Joseph Esherick). This study, while fully mindful of the 
ultimate outcome, attempts to focus more narrowly on this one aspect of the military dynamics of 
this relationship in terms of what was accomplished and how this effort transformed the 
complementary opposites over time.   
From 1941 through 1951, the United States armed forces conducted a very complex and 
extraordinary effort to build a Chinese military capable of defeating Japan, recovering its lost 
territory, and protecting China’s sovereignty. The United States began its active participation in 
the war over four years after major combat had broken out between China and Japan in July of 
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1937. During this period of conflict in China, before a state of war existed between Japan and 
America, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration pursued a predominantly diplomatic 
and economic strategy against Japan's aggression on the Asia mainland. America watched in the 
late 1930s as China suffered a series of disastrous military defeats where it lost many of its most 
well equipped and best-trained units. Driven from the industrial and agricultural heartland of 
eastern China, the seat of government was reestablished far to the west in the city of Chungking 
(Chongqing). The United States had barely begun a modest program to advise and assist the 
beleaguered Nationalist armed forces in the fall of 1941 under the provisions of the newly 
enacted Lend Lease program when Japan attacked the American fleet and key bases in Hawaii. 
Near simultaneously, Japan began its offensives against American forces in the Philippines and 
the colonial possessions of the European powers in Southeast Asia. The American military effort 
to support China began at the height of Japanese military power as it surged to extend its 
domination over the Asia-Pacific region.  
Despite the inauspicious beginnings, over the next three years with American assistance a 
Chinese military began to emerge much more capable of conducting modern warfare against a 
sophisticated and well-armed foe. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the American 
military's mandate changed significantly. The new goal was to assist in the unification of China 
in order to create a strong and capable power in Asia to replace Japan and serve as a bulwark 
against potential Soviet expansion. Expressly forbidden from becoming directly involved in 
combat operations in China's civil war, over the next four years American military personnel 
were required to conduct a diverse set of tasks, from ceasefire monitor, to liaison officer, to 
operational planner and advisor. American military advisors played a key role from the early 
beginnings just before America’s entrance into the war with Japan, through May of 1951 when a 
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formal military assistance program was reestablished on Taiwan. From war with Japan, through 
the Chinese civil war, and as American forces were once again committed to combat in Asia on 
the Korea peninsula, the military assistance effort continually adapted to difficult and changing 
circumstances at home, in China, and in the region. 
Thesis 
The American military personnel, from the most senior officers to junior enlisted 
servicemen, endured, persevered, and despite tremendous obstacles, made steady progress in 
their efforts to improve the operational capabilities of China's armed forces. The Chinese armed 
forces in the first half of the twentieth century were a complex political-military institution with 
a very different national culture and historical tradition. This improvement took place in an 
operational environment of formidable opposing enemy forces, forbidding geography and 
terrain, and conflicting and dynamic international, alliance, and national strategic policies and 
politics. The very real accomplishments of these American military personnel and the lessons of 
their successes, shortcoming, and failures have been obscured by the circumstances of the 
Japanese surrender and the Nationalist military's ultimate defeat in the civil war that followed. 
The value of their contributions has also been tainted by the partisan political recriminations and 
the search for blame in the aftermath of the Communist victory and the October 1949 
announcement of the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The achievements 
and contributions of these American men and women was also pushed into the background with 
the early onset of the Cold War in Asia and the conflict on the Korea peninsula that would 
eventually bring the armed forces of the United States into direct combat with China's military. 
This decade long effort merits a closer examination from the perspective of the American 
military personnel who served in China as combat advisors, combined staff officers, operational 
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and logistics planners, technical experts and trainers, and liaison officers--collectively called 
"advisors" in this study. Their primary role was not to serve in direct combat within American 
units or organizations, but rather to serve and work alongside and support their Chinese 
counterparts.
5
 
America's commitment to China was not surprising given the military, diplomatic, 
economic, and missionary backdrop of the previous hundred years. The United States military 
had been involved on the ground in China continuously since the turn of the century with its 
participation in the Boxer Rebellion and the subsequent occupation and garrisoning of Tientsin 
(Tianjin). While China's war with Japan had been going on since July of 1937, the official 
American military program to build up the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) 
only started in 1941 with a small and politically circumscribed effort to provide limited ground 
and air force equipment. At its peak in 1943, there was a plan to train, equip, and advise ninety 
divisions with supporting headquarters elements and a robust air combat and transport arm. At 
the end of the war with Japan, nearly forty of these divisions had been trained and equipped. In 
addition, hundreds of aircraft had been delivered and thousands of pilots, crews, and support 
personnel had been trained in the United States and China. However, despite the often heroic and 
herculean efforts of the men and women of the American military forces deployed to the region 
and their Chinese counterparts, the China-Burma-India Theater ultimately became a sideshow in 
the war against Japan. America's nearly unilateral campaigns driving through the Pacific and 
Southwest Asia became the main effort to defeat Japan. This is despite the fact that more than 
three million well-equipped and capable Japanese military and civilian personnel were still 
serving in China and Manchuria at the end of the war. 
5 
 
In August of 1945, the Japanese surrendered just as Chinese forces trained, advised, and 
equipped by American military personnel were preparing to go on the offensive in support of the 
overall Allied effort. However, the dropping of the atomic bombs by planes from bases in the 
Marianas, the large scale Soviet involvement in Manchuria after the victory in Europe, and the 
cumulative effects of the isolation of Japan from its sources of supplies through strategic 
bombing and control of the seas changed the strategic calculus in Asia and significantly 
complicated the post-war situation. The road to American military involvement in Korea and 
Vietnam began in 1945 with the reemergence of conflict between the Communists and the 
Nationalists in China. In August of 1945, the Allies most immediate requirement was to occupy 
and demilitarize Japan. This included a major ancillary effort to repatriate millions of Japanese 
military and civilian personnel from China. In addition, American forces were also sent to 
occupy Korea, a mission that later evolved into a military advisory mission, and eventually into 
the first hot conflict of the Cold War.  
All this was taking place, as the American people demanded the fastest possible return of 
military personnel to the United States and their families. This directly conflicted with the 
emerging requirements of the post war world that had to be immediately dealt with by the 
administration of President Harry S. Truman. While the Second World War was over, significant 
tasks that only the military could perform or support remained to be accomplished in China and 
Asia. In September 1945, in addition to the advisors, airmen, and logistics personnel serving in 
China, nearly fifty thousand additional American ground troops of the Third Marine Amphibious 
Corps (IIIAC) deployed to key ports in the northeast. This effort, while ostensibly in support of 
post war Japanese demobilization and repatriation, was a form of military occupation intended to 
provide President Truman options as the post war situation developed. For those opposed to 
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Jiang's government in China, this support was also overwhelmingly committed to his Nationalist 
forces. This significantly complicated the American effort to bring about a politically and 
militarily unified China through diplomacy with the Soviet Union, and especially, in the conduct 
of negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists. This obvious favoritism was no 
more apparent than in the effort to redeploy Nationalist forces in the immediate aftermath of the 
Japanese surrender.   
Programs were quickly established to continue to provide advisors to redeploying 
Nationalist Army units, and to help supervise the surrender and movement of Japanese forces 
back to the home islands. A massive effort to transport Nationalist combat formations from the 
interior of China to key coastal ports and the northeast soon began to take shape. In addition, 
significant amounts of military equipment and war materials were provided to support this effort. 
The Unites States now had vast quantities of surplus stocks no longer needed to prosecute the 
war readily available. The efforts to train, equip, and provide advice and assistance to the 
Nationalist forces continued as had previously been agreed to and funded. The immediate post-
war effort in China included the continuation of the small military liaison mission, the "Dixie 
Mission," that began in August of 1944, to the Communist headquarters of Mao Tse-tung (Mao 
Zedong) at Yenan (Yan'an) in northwest China. The United States did not abandon its efforts in 
China, military or diplomatic, with the end of the war with Japan.   
China's long war against Japan had change drastically and fundamentally the strategic 
military situation on the ground between the Communists and the Nationalists. In 1936, the 
Communists had been cornered and were on the verge of military defeat after a long, fighting 
retreat to Yan'an in far northwest China now known as the Long March. However, by 1945 
Mao's Red Army had recovered it strength, occupied key territory and was poised to challenge 
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directly the Nationalists. Mao's forces had conducted guerrilla warfare operations against the 
Japanese, but more importantly, had continued to organize the population in Japanese-held 
territory, in now Soviet-held Manchuria, and in the north and east of China. As Nationalist forces 
moved east from the wartime operating area in central and southwest China their struggle with 
the Communists slowly devolved into open hostilities as both sides vied for military and political 
advantage.  
This emerging situation threatened to derail America's strategic goals in Asia. Major 
General Patrick J. Hurley, who had been sent by President Roosevelt to China in late 1944 to 
assess the situation on the ground, was now serving as the American Ambassador. He began 
negotiations between the two factions and achieved some initial successes including a face-to-
face meeting of Jiang and Mao. However, the talks broke down and Hurley resigned his post 
claiming his efforts were being sabotaged by his subordinates. He alleged that American military 
and State Department Far East experts, or "China Hands," undermined the negotiations with their 
negative reports on Jiang and the Nationalist forces and their pro-Communist leanings. This was 
the beginning of a bitter battle in the American domestic body politic over how the post-war 
situation in China should be handled. The military advisors were not only caught in the middle of 
this political turmoil, but also had to respond with planning and implementing new programs and 
activities under very trying and difficult circumstances. Some of the most difficult and dangerous 
tasks were related to the escalating tensions between the Communists and the Nationalists that 
reemerged in the early 1940s after a four-year attempt at maintaining a united front against 
Japanese aggression. 
When Hurley abruptly resigned in November of 1945, President Truman dispatched a 
man who was America’s foremost soldier-diplomat, General George C. Marshall, to negotiate a 
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ceasefire with the hope of enabling an eventual long term and stable political accommodation. 
The role played by the American military advisors stationed in China was a key supporting effort 
to these negotiations. However, the continued military assistance provided to the Nationalist 
forces during negotiations was also a contributing factor in their eventual collapse. The 
Communists under Mao used this assistance to Jiang's forces in their anti-American propaganda 
effort to gain concessions, play up their anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist credentials, and 
discredit the Nationalists as the legitimate government of China. The failure of the Marshall 
Mission in late 1946 significantly changed the American approach in China and again 
complicated the role of the military advisors who remained with the Nationalist forces. The end 
of the negotiations also ended the liaison mission to Mao's headquarters in Yan'an. 
The United States continued to provide limited military advice and assistance to the 
Nationalists after Marshall was recalled as a full-scale civil war erupted. American ground and 
air forces remaining in China were withdrawn and the reduced number of advisors that stayed 
was directed not to accompany Nationalist forces on combat missions. Even the U.S. military 
effort to assist Nationalist higher-level headquarters in operational planning was very 
circumscribed, and seen as less important and unwanted. While Jiang needed a continuing source 
of military equipment and supplies, he had personally directed the fight against the Communists 
since 1927 while amassing his political power and consolidating his leadership position. Under 
Jiang's leadership, the Nationalists had pushed the Communists to the edge of defeat in the mid-
1930s with a minimum of foreign assistance. The reemerging internal conflict was not on par 
with the war against the Japanese foreign invaders who had fought with modern equipment and 
military concepts successfully adapted from European models.  
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The Communists under Mao showed few trappings of a modern armed force capable of 
large-scale military operations. However, the situation on the ground in China in 1945 was not 
the same as in 1935--militarily, politically, socially, or economically. The emerging regional 
situation was also significantly changed. The ultimate result of the Chinese civil war is well 
known—by 1949 Jiang and the Nationalists were exhausted, demoralized, defeated, and forced 
to retreat to the island of Taiwan. The American strategic effort in China had clearly failed. 
However, this outcome should not be attributed to the American military advisors on the ground 
in China whose efforts are the central focus of this study. A brief review of the regional strategic 
circumstances at the end of the war with Japan that served as a backdrop to the emerging 
Chinese civil war provides additional factors that affected the military advisors left in China. 
The Relevance and Value of the Study 
For more than six decades since the end of the Second World War, scholars, journalists, 
pundits, and political ideologues have questioned, argued, and written volumes about various 
aspects of the “Who Lost China” debate. For most American scholars, the dialogue has primarily 
focused on the administrations of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, their 
political opponents, and the strategic decisions and actions of the senior American political, 
military and Department of State players involved. Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi, the nature of his 
Nationalist regime, the earnestness of his efforts to fight the Japanese, and his desire and 
methods of trying to rid the China of the Communists while building and maintaining a viable 
political and military coalition are often at the center of the controversy. No less of an enigma is 
the ultimate winner, Mao Zedong. The triumphant Red Army, the mystique and appeal of Mao’s 
peasant brand of the Communist ideology (the Yan'an Way), and, his successful implementation 
of guerrilla warfare doctrine or People’s War have received ample attention. Both Jiang and 
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Mao's relationships with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union have also been part of this 
contentious debate. The literature on the key Americans who were senior military or diplomatic 
personnel stationed in China during the period is voluminous, as are their trials and tribulations 
during the McCarthy era. The so-called "China Hands," both civilian and military, were 
repeatedly pilloried as being pro-Communist and anti-American as their actions and advice 
allegedly played a crucial role in the "loss" of China. This study concentrates on the military 
aspects of this era, and specifically, on the advisors who served with and supported the Chinese 
military. 
The official military history narrative of this period is covered in five excellent studies. 
Two historians who served as soldiers in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater wrote the first 
three. They later "formed the CBI Section of the staff engaged in writing the history of the U.S. 
Army in World War II."
6
 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland jointly wrote Stilwell's 
Mission to China (1953)
7
, Stilwell's Command Problems (1956)
8
, and Time Runs Out in CBI 
(1959)
9
. These three volumes of the United States Army, Center of Military History's official 
histories of World War II (Green Books) continue to set the standard for military history written 
about this military theater of war. These studies contain detailed information on the actions and 
activities of the American military advisors. The other two volumes of official history covering 
this period are much less well known and recognized, but are nevertheless excellent scholarly 
studies of military actions and activities during this period. James F. Schnabel's Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947 (1996)
10
 and Kenneth W. Condit's Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
National Policy, 1947-1949 (1996)
11
 provide a broad strategic overview of the situation and the 
military activities pursued to achieve American national policy in China.  
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Much of this debate has been focused on the strategic military and political levels, and 
especially on the key senior leaders directly involved in making policy and decisions, first in the 
war with Japan, and then during the immediate aftermath. However, there are several questions 
related to the military effort in China that are much less asked and the answers less fully covered 
that have the potential to further illuminate this debate. What was the impact of the American 
military advisory effort in China in the decisions made by Jiang and Presidents Roosevelt and 
Truman, both during the course of the war with Japan and the civil war that followed? Bevin 
Alexander begins his book, The Strange Connection: U.S. Intervention in China, 1944-1972, 
with his analysis with President Roosevelt's ultimatum to Generalissimo Jiang to place General 
Stilwell in command of the Chinese armed forces for the upcoming offensive against the 
Japanese. Jiang's slow rolling of the demand to replace Stilwell was not recognized as 
symptomatic of the limits of the future relations between the two powers. Alexander makes the 
case that the United States backed the wrong side, a side that could not be a competent and 
trustworthy ally in the war against Japan, or in the aftermath of the conflicts. Jiang and the 
Nationalists did not have the will or potential to play a key supporting effort to the United States 
in Asia.
12
 
Marc Gallicchio, in a journal article, argues, "it seems clear that Army officers had 
produced an alternative history of the American experience in China that emphasized, indeed 
exaggerated, their successes at the end of the war and minimized the imposing problems that still 
awaited them after Japan's surrender."
13
 He further argues that Army officers influenced the 
domestic political debate by arguing for continued aid to Nationalist China. This study 
reexamines these "exaggerated successes" and the implied critique that these military advisors 
"minimized the imposing problems that still awaited them."
14
 The scope and difficulties of the 
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problems that faced them constitute a core element of this study. It is entirely possible that their 
minimization of the problems after the surrender was a function of the cumulative effect of the 
successes of what they had accomplished during the war with Japan. The relationships and 
shared sacrifices the American had made with the both the Chinese Nationalists and the 
Communists over the course of the three years of war had its effect on what these men believed 
could be accomplished with military assistance to China. Gallicchio's later book The Scramble 
for Asia: U.S. Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific War deals with "how American 
officials sought to translate victory over Japan into a lasting peace in Asia."
15
 His focus is on the 
influence these officials had on domestic political decisions in the American body politic. This 
study focuses more narrowly on the actions taken on the ground between the advisors and their 
Chinese counterparts. 
Ronald H. Spector, in his In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle 
for Postwar Asia, includes China as one of the five Asian nations examined in his study. He 
quickly covers the role of the advisors during the war with Japan and their legacy. His book 
attempts to answer a simple, but important question. "Why did peace in Asia prove so elusive?"
16
 
He outlines the role played by the advisors, and provides insights from several lower level 
Americans that served in China. He also provides a thoroughly researched outline of the role and 
decisions of senior players. However, he concentrates on the post war period and key senior 
American military, diplomatic, and political leaders. Unlike Spector's work, this study argues 
that the post war actions, activities and attitudes of the American advisors and their Chinese 
counterparts at all levels were part of a broader continuum of hard earned successes that began 
much further back in Sino-American military-to-military relations.  
 The crux of this study is an analysis of the role played by the American military advisors, 
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and, by extension, the successes, and failures, of their Chinese counterparts in the fighting 
formations in the field. The focus is on how this effort evolved and was conducted given the 
circumstances: historical, strategic, operational, and cultural. In the decade covered in the study, 
the American advisors served in three very different strategic circumstances. The first three years 
was supporting the Chinese in their war with Japan. Nearly four years of civil war defined the 
second phase of Sino-American relations. This ended with the initial stage of rebuilding a 
defeated force on an island sanctuary of Taiwan, an island seen by the United States as a 
potential strategic asset. This work is an attempt to gain a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of this decade that although it resulted in strategic failure in China, also provides a 
study of how military advisors had a positive effect at the tactical level, and therefore, provided 
senior military, diplomatic, and political leaders with options and alternatives. They provided 
possibilities that might not have been available to decision makers had not they achieved the 
results they did, and persevered in the most trying of circumstances. 
The primary perspective of this work is the actions and activities of the American 
military advisers who were on the ground in China during this crucial period in history. An 
underlying argument in this study is that American military advisors in China, from officers 
serving at the national headquarters to the lowest ranking officers and enlisted men assigned to 
tactical units in the field, were able, over time, to work through and find complementary 
solutions to historical, military, and cultural differences that they confronted. While the solutions 
were not always optimal, they were in the end often practical and effective. The American 
advisors acted like Americans, their Chinese counterparts acted like Chinese, but over time and 
with great effort, significant progress was made in building a competent and able military force 
capable of extended modern combat operations. This neither was a wasted attempt without any 
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hope of success, nor was it a squandered effort where real opportunities and successes were 
callously lost. The military effort was part of a complex mosaic of social, cultural, political, 
economic, diplomatic, and international strategic factors. The outcome of the loss of China 
cannot be separated from the role played by the American military advisors. However, the 
successes and progress the advisors made with their Chinese counterparts should not be ignored 
or slighted. Not all attempts to advise and assist another nation should be summarily dismissed as 
impossible undertakings. 
The potential value of this study is to inform the reader about the significant role played 
by military advisors in China. I know of no published work focusing exclusively on the role of 
the U.S. military advisors to China during this period. The distinguished China historian, 
Jonathan Spence’s impressive survey, To Change China: Western Advisors to China, 1620-1960 
includes two chapters on this period.
17
 His book was published in 1969 as American efforts in 
Southeast Asia were transitioning to include a major effort to provide more advisors to the armed 
forces of South Vietnam. Spence’s study is a warning of the limitations, drawbacks, and pitfalls 
of Western advisors in Asia. However, he goes too far in his unstated assertion that the foreign 
advisory efforts failure is foreordained. The recipient nation’s ability to address, accept, and 
inculcate key and critical changes and the donor nation's ability to assist in bringing about those 
changes in a culturally and politically appropriate manner, must be taken into account. As this 
study is being written, American military advisors are once again playing a key role in this 
nation's national security in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and many other places around the globe. 
This study directly relates to scholarship in four areas. First, it most directly relates to the 
field of military and diplomatic history of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. 
Secondly, this study touches on the field of military history and international relations in the 
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opening days of the Cold War and the competition that developed between the United States, the 
Republic of China on Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China. This period saw America's 
involvement during the Truman administration in the Korean Conflict that continued during the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower presidency. Two major crises in the Taiwan Straits followed this war. 
Thirdly, this historical narrative provides background to America's relations with the two Chinas 
today. Lastly, this historical narrative serves as a case study for ongoing operations and future 
decisions to provide military assistance and advisors to other nations, and the conduct of those 
missions.  
Methodology 
  The methodology used in this study is a chronological narrative. The broad strategic and 
operational context is described, and then the roles, key activities, and where applicable, the 
views and plans of the senior advisors, key subordinate leaders and the trainers and advisors in 
the field are examined. The study outlines the organizational structures, assigned tasks, or 
mandates, and the cross-cultural issues the advisers dealt with for each of the periods covered in 
the following chapters. In terms of factors to assess, Spence's Western Advisers in China offers 
timeless insights of foreign advisors who have served in China since the 17th Century. His long-
term historical perspective also provides specific warnings for those whose national interests 
have brought them to work with the Chinese. The successes and failures of the American 
advisors when assisting other nations will be looked at using enduring principles and activities. 
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the Foreign Affairs journal captures a current view 
of these principles in a recent article. He offers five tenets to enhance America's capacity for 
"building partner capacity." A gist of the five broad strategic principles is outlined below: 
 Agility and flexibility in dealing with unforeseen threats or opportunities; 
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 Effective congressional oversight and partnership with the executive; 
 Assuring partners of reliable long term predictability and planning 
parameters; 
 
 State Department foreign policy prerogatives must be reinforced; and 
 Modesty and realism in the face of different countries and cultures.18 
The last of these principles is probably most appropriate for a study that focuses on the 
Americans working with their Chinese counterparts on the ground in China, Burma, and India. 
 The recent U.S. Army doctrine of Security Force Assistance outlines the enduring 
operational and tactical principles and activities for military advisors. These missions are defined 
as "unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces 
in support of a legitimate authority."
19
 This doctrine asserts that a mindset of working by, with, 
and though the supported forces is a central tenet. Advisors must "overcome the temptation to do 
what they know and do best, whether relevant or not to the situation, advisors must accept that 
they are bound by unique situations."
20
 The guidance then discusses several imperatives, 
foremost among these is to "Understand the Operational Environment."
21
 The tasks that the 
advisors are expected to perform in helping another nation improve the capabilities of its armed 
forces include working with their counterparts in organizing, training, equipping, and building 
the infrastructure as well as combat advising in the field against a common foe.
22
 The situation in 
the host nation dictates the actions of the advisor. He must work within the capabilities and 
limitations of his counterparts. Most importantly, he must understand and adjust to the realities 
of the operational environment. 
 The conclusion of this study uses compliance to these broad principles and tenets to 
evaluate the operational context and actions of the American military leadership and personnel 
during the timeframe under study. When looked at over the ten years of the study, although there 
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were notable exceptions, the American advisors were both reliable and their actions predictable. 
The advisors adapted to complex and dynamic changes in the war with Japan and to the 
challenges of the evolving post war situation. Perhaps most importantly, the American military 
went into the conflict with considerable experience working in China and with the Chinese 
military, and gained more over the decade of this study. Both sides knew what to expect of the 
other. While initial expectations were possibly overly optimistic, ultimately the possibilities, 
given the enormity of the tasks that confronted them as the situation on the ground evolved, were 
well grounded and realistic. 
Study Organization 
 The organization of the case study, with the exception of this introductory first chapter 
and the concluding chapter, uses a generally chronological approach. Chapter 2 provides a brief 
overview of America's diplomatic and military involvement in China prior to the war with Japan. 
The next four chapters each provide a synopsis of the strategic situation, a discussion of the 
organization and tasks of the military headquarters responsible of the advisory effort, followed 
by a discussion of the key components, actions, and activities of the American military advisors 
undertaken during these periods. These chapters also include commentary and notes from the 
senior military leaders, American trainers and advisors, and their Chinese counterparts.  
 Chapter 2 begins with a broad overview of Chinese-American relations that began in the 
late 1700s with commercial trade under the protective umbrella of the more powerful European 
nations, especially Great Britain. The Western missionaries attempt to Christianize China in the 
1800s complemented this predominately-economic activity. The first American military advisor 
in China was a civilian adventurer from Massachusetts named Frederick Townsend Ward who, 
under the pay of local Chinese authorities, formed and commanded the successful Ever-
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Victorious Army in the defense of Shanghai against the Taiping revolutionaries. Apart for port 
calls by the American Asiatic Fleet, until the eight-nation military expedition in 1900 to put 
down the Boxer Rebellion, American military forces did not conduct operations in China. With 
this participation by all three military services, essentially, U.S. forces or advisors remained on 
mainland China for nearly fifty years.  
 In 1800, United States Marine Corps (USMC) detachments guarded the American 
diplomatic mission and legation in Peking (Beijing). Marine Corp battalions and elements 
remained in the Shanghai area until 1941 to provide security for American citizens in the foreign 
concessions. The Army's 9th Infantry Regiment, among others, served in Beijing for a short 
period after the Boxer Rebellion. However, the 15th Infantry Regiment permanently deployed 
into the area around Tianjin in1912 and until 1938 enforced treaty protocols and guarded lines of 
communication from Beijing to the coastal forts. The United States Navy patrolled the China's 
coast, the Yangtze (Yangzi) River, and key estuaries through 1941 to protect shipping and 
American citizens. This long history of military involvement in China provides an important 
backdrop to this study of America advisors in terms of their familiarity with the country and 
understanding the military geography, political situation, culture, and language. 
 This chapter also includes a discussion of the development of China's modern or 
Westernized, military forces. Beginning in the mid 1800s, Great Britain, France, and the United 
States all began to play a role in advisory, training, and arms sales activities that began as part of 
the larger Self-Strengthening Movement. This effort to field military forces with Western 
equipment, organization, and training expanded in the period after the establishment of the 
Republic of China (ROC) and the Warlord era of the early twentieth century. In the years prior to 
the Second World War, first Soviet, and then German, American, and Italian military advisors all 
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played a role and influenced emerging Chinese national unity and relations with the other foreign 
powers. The Chinese Communists also had foreign advisors, Germans and Russians, acting as 
part of the Communist International. Also briefly discussed are the role of the American military 
attachés and the programs to prepare U.S. officers for service in China. These officers were the 
predecessors to the Army's current Foreign Area Officer program of which this author was a 
participant. This chapter also includes an overview of Claire Chennault's effort as a civilian 
contract advisor to the Nationalist air force. This retired American Air Corps officer developed a 
personal relationship to Madame Jiang and the Generalissimo. The chapter concludes with 
observations of how Chinese forces have dealt with foreign advisors prior to the beginning of the 
major American effort that is the focus of this study. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the dispatch of the American Military Mission to China 
(AMMISCA) in October 1941 led by Brigadier General John Magruder. The most important 
function of this chapter is to outline Roosevelt's China policy, and to set the strategic and 
operational context the advisory effort encountered immediately prior to, and in the opening days 
of, America's entrance into the war after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This American mission 
began with a detailed assessment by Magruder and his staff of the requirements of the advisory 
effort and the status of the Chinese Nationalist forces. These U.S. military officers began the 
process of building personal relationships between American advisors and their Chinese 
counterparts, starting at the top with Magruder and Jiang. This chapter also examines relations 
with the British allies, the initial theater command relationships, and the multinational effort to 
defend the key supply line to China through Burma. The Japanese attacks throughout the Asia-
Pacific in December of 1941 immediately threatened America's ability to supply the Nationalist 
Army with vital war materials, and significantly changed the role of the advisors.   
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 Chapter 4 begins with the establishment of the China-Burma-India Theater and the 
assignment of Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr. as Chief of Staff to Jiang and the 
Nationalist Army. Stilwell began his Second World War service in the China-Burma-India 
Theater while the effort to retain Burma by British and Chinese forces was ongoing. His arrival 
in February 1942 came at the beginning of a fighting retreat and attempt to reestablish a secure 
defensive line and land routes to China. This chapter examines, in some detail, the establishment 
of the American training base at Ramgarh, India where the initial efforts to advise and assist 
China ground forces occurred. This chapter also covers the planned training and equipping of the 
additional nearly sixty divisions of both the Y-Force and the X-Force in various locations in 
southeastern China.   
 These forces in concert with the Chinese forces trained in India were key elements for the 
recapture of Burma and the reopening of this vital ground line of communications. The program 
in India was a necessary precursor to the larger effort in China. The American trained divisions 
from Ramgarh were proof that a Chinese army could be organized that could defeat Japanese 
forces in the field, but not without significant assistance in terms of advisors and enabling 
capabilities. The chapter also introduces several of the ancillary or supporting activities that both 
enabled and complicated the American advisory effort in China. These activities included the 
State Department's direct support to the military, the activities of the Office of Strategic Services, 
and the Navy's Sino-American Cooperation Organization. Also briefly examined, is the role of 
the American press in China during this period. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Major 
General Patrick J. Hurley's mission to assess the status of Sino-American cooperation that 
directly led to the relief of "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. 
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 Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of the selection of Albert C. Wedemeyer to replace 
Stilwell and the splitting of the CBI Theater into a Burma-India and a China command. A key 
element of this chapter is a comparison of Stilwell and his successor, Lieutenant General 
Wedemeyer, in terms of their qualifications, leadership styles, experience, and relationship with 
the Chinese leadership. This chapter spans the period from the 1944 Japanese offensive in China 
to the end of the war. Brigadier General Frank Dorn and his program to prepare and employ the 
Y-Forces for the recapture of Burma, and protect the key logistical and training hub at Kunming, 
is an important element of this chapter. The fighting capabilities of Chinese forces properly 
trained, equipped, and led were proven in combat. The chapter also discusses the failed effort to 
protect the American bomber bases in southwestern China. This is the culmination of a strategy 
proposed by Chennault and opposed by Stilwell and others as untenable given the strength and 
disposition of Japanese forces.  
 The zenith of the American advisory efforts was the formation of Alpha force, the nearly 
forty divisions trained and equipped by the United States by mid 1945. By the end of the war, 
this force was prepared to conduct an offensive operation against the Japanese in southeastern 
China. This chapter includes a discussion of the preparations to launch an offensive to drive to 
the China coast and begin the process of Chinese control of its territory. The chapter ends with 
Major General Patrick J. Hurley's efforts to bring the Nationalists and the Communists together, 
the hurried planning to bring American combat forces into China to control key ports, and the 
transporting Jiang's forces with their advisors to key locations in eastern China.  
 Chapter 6 covers the period from the surrender of the Japanese in China in September of 
1945 to the evacuation in January of 1949 of the remaining personnel of the Joint United States 
Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). The abrupt end of the war with Japan created an especially 
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confusing and complex situation in all of Asia, and this was no less true in China. In September 
1945, the American USMC IIIAC quickly deployed as a de facto occupying force. Over the next 
several months, thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops redeployed to the east and northeast to 
supervise the repatriation of millions of Japanese military and civilian personnel. The Nationalist 
signed a pact with the Soviets who continued to occupy Manchuria. Hurley's negotiations with 
the Communists and the Nationalist failed, he resigned, and General George C. Marshall took his 
place in this important endeavor. American military advisory personnel played a central role in 
all these undertakings. Their tasks included the organization and staffing of the Peiping (Beijing) 
Executive Headquarter tasked with monitoring the ceasefires negotiated by Marshall. This 
headquarters also had to be prepared to respond to any support agreements Marshall proposed as 
leverage in the negotiations. Planning a mission to train and equip Communist divisions and 
organize a combined Nationalist-Communist military establishment was also required. Marshall 
was officially recalled in January of 1947; however, planning for continued military assistance to 
the Nationalists became a key part of President Harry S. Truman's diplomatic policy for China. 
The changes brought about by the National Security Act of 1947, caused the 
reorganization of the original service-centric advisory missions that began right after the end of 
the war with Japan. As the Nationalist Army shortcomings on the battlefield became more 
obvious, the Joint Staff in concert with senior advisors in China proposed a new military 
advisory organizational structure. Congress eventually agreed to some of these changes. This 
chapter discusses the key American decisions and actions with a direct influence on the outcome 
of China’s civil war. With the onset of the Cold War and the imminent fall of the Nationalist 
government, planning for what to do next with the advisors in China took on added importance. 
This chapter concludes with Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War.  
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 Chapter 7 and the postscript, the concluding sections, briefly discuss the re-establishment 
of an American Joint Military Assistance and Advisory Group in May of 1951 on the island of 
Taiwan. This recommitment to Jiang and the Nationalists is the culmination of nearly a ten-year 
effort by American military personnel to assist the Chinese armed forces. The key issues of why 
and how the American advise and assist efforts failed to bring about the desired results--a unified 
China, supportive of American interests in the region, moving in the direction of a more 
democratic society is examined from the perspective of the advisors. The strategic failure of this 
endeavor is well documented in the literature. The focus of this study is on what the American 
advisors did accomplish during this difficult and dynamic decade. The positive relationships and 
the many successes in building the Nationalist forces by the American advisors and their Chinese 
counterparts deserves a more nuanced and careful examination. The issues, challenges, and 
complexities highlighted in this study are clear evidence that the past is often prologue.  
 From May of 1951 until the withdrawal of the military mission in January of 1979 with 
the official recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the American military advisors 
and the armed forces of the Republic of China (ROC) worked side-by-side as allies in a troubled 
and turbulent Asia. Even today, Taiwan continues to have a military-to-military relationship with 
the United States military beyond arms sales including continued access to military educational 
opportunities. While only recognized by a few countries as independent and not having a seat in 
the United Nations, the Republic of China is the de facto sovereign over the Taiwan and several 
adjacent island groups. In analyzing the period from 1941 to 1951 in terms of Secretary Gates' 
five principles and current U.S. Army doctrine for working with the forces of an ally, insights to 
ongoing and future military efforts emerge. The receptivity, motivations, and cultural and 
historical differences of a host nation's political and military leadership are critical variables in 
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the success or failure of a military advisory mission conducted by a foreign nation in pursuit of 
its own interests.   
 While China was certainly not America's to lose, that does not necessarily mean that the 
U.S. military's attempts to build a Chinese national armed force capable of securing the country 
internally and protecting it from outside threats could not have had a more positive result. An 
alternate path is not hard to imagine with a different outcome or situation at termination, in both 
the war with Japan and, especially, in the Chinese Civil War. America has certainly paid a 
butcher's bill for the rise of the Cold War in Asia in the aftermath of the Second World War. The 
uneasy accommodation between Mao and Josef Stalin; the three years of war and the decades of 
stalemate on the Korean peninsula; and, the long, divisive effort in Indochina closely followed 
the failure in China. As American forces continue to be asked to perform military advisory 
missions around the globe, we ought not to pass up the opportunity to re-examine how this 
important and extensive advise and assist mission played out in China. This study concludes with 
warnings and observations from this historical experience as the advisors tried to be American, 
but not too American, and as they tried to get their counterparts to be Chinese, but not too 
Chinese.   
 The next chapter begins with a look back at America's historic relationships with China. 
One of the key factors to be considered at the beginning of this study is the long and unique 
American experience in China, by merchants, missionaries, the media, as well as military 
personnel. The American military advisors of 1941-1951 certainly did not enter China without a 
national bias and historic legacies. These were gained over nearly a hundred years of interaction 
not only with the Chinese, but also with Japan and the European powers who maintained 
extensive ties in China and Asia. The American experience itself is set within a larger context of 
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a century of complex Chinese foreign relations and internal turmoil. The next chapter sets the 
stage for this historical study of American military advisors in China.
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CHAPTER 2 
AMERICA'S HISTORIC MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH CHINA, 1840-1940 
Overview 
  The Americans of the late eighteenth century had a very special view of the 
 world, together with a self-image that is hard for us to remember now, even though we 
 have inherited from it certain reflex reactions. The Americans believed that they had a 
 special message for mankind, that they were a new breed of people, new compared with 
 the Europeans. The believed in egalitarian democracy. They believed in small 
 government, government that would help the enterprise of the individual and not hinder 
 him, give him protection when necessary. They believed their free enterprise promised a 
 superior way of life both materially and spiritually, vastly better than the old societies of 
 Europe or the British empire or any empire they might come up against.... 
  First to arrive was the merchant, who tried out what he could do on foreign 
 shores, and then, particularly if the merchant got in trouble, the naval diplomat, a captain 
 or commodore with a warship who provided a little gunboat diplomacy to help out the 
 merchant. The missionary followed along behind, seizing the opportunity to try to 
 improve the local people's spiritual welfare.
1
 
 The above quotation is from a work by the now deceased distinguished professor of 
Asian history at Harvard University, John King Fairbank. He and his wife both worked for the 
United States government in China during the Second World War for the Office of War 
Information (OWI).
2
 In the above quote, he outlined a pattern of activities with a unique set of 
underlying American values and attitudes. The United States imperialist activities followed a 
similar pattern to the British who were America's senior partner in some respects.
3
 From the 
beginning of the 19th Century, Americans conducted economic, military, and diplomatic 
activities in China. From the first official emissary, Caleb Cushing, in the early 1840s to the 
early 1940s when Brigadier General John Magruder was sent to the wartime capital of 
Chungking (Chongqing) by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to oversee the newly established 
lend-lease program, China and the United States maintained an important and unique 
relationship. China had been at war with itself, the major European powers, or Japan in one form 
of conflict or another for most of the nearly one hundred years prior to the start of the Second 
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World War. American troops had not taken a direct role in these conflicts until 1900 and the 
Boxer Rebellion. However, the United States did continuously maintain forces in China 
thereafter. American merchants, missionaries, and military personnel not only had been 
observers of these events, but also were often direct participants during this important period of 
modern Chinese history. When the American military advisors, trainers, administrators, and 
liaison officers arrived in China in the weeks and months before and after the December 1941 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, they were treading on familiar ground.  
 China's humiliating defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) was the opening act 
of over five decades of military, diplomatic, and political conflict leading to the Second World 
War in Asia. In 1900, Japan joined America and the European powers in the eight-nation 
invasion, relief of the foreign legations, and occupation of the capital and surrounding territories 
in what is known in the West as the Boxer Rebellion. Japan's emerging dominant position in the 
region was further enhanced with its defeat of Russia in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War. 
President Theodore Roosevelt brokered the peace treaty ending this conflict, a reflection of 
America's growing interest in the region. Japan officially took control of Korea as its colony in 
1910 and moved inexorably to exert even greater control over northeast Asia. These foreign 
incursions paralleled the intermittent violence, misrule, and chaos of rebellion, banditry, and 
regional warlord governance that characterized daily life in many areas of China. 
 At the end of the First World War, Japan, which had been one of the Allied powers, 
moved quickly to take advantage of the favorable outcome of post war diplomacy and increased 
its territorial mandate in Asia. Enticed by China's governmental and military weakness, Japan 
began a long-term effort to move into and control resource rich Manchuria, and bring China into 
its sphere of influence. With this occupation and the subsequent formation of the puppet state of 
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Manchukuo in northeastern China in the early 1930s, the Chinese people were clearly the 
unwilling victims of the worst of Japanese imperialism and military aggression. This was 
happening while a complex political-military contest for the future of the nation among the 
Nationalists, the Communists, and diverse group of powerful warlords raged across the rest of 
China.   
 During this time, the United States initially looked on from the sidelines, protecting its 
own interests and prerogatives. Eventually the Roosevelt administration conducted largely 
ineffective diplomatic maneuvers until it began to implement piecemeal economic sanctions and 
embargoes in the late 1930's focused on strategic materials critical to the Japanese war effort. For 
Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi and his Nationalist military, the Second World War began on July of 
1937 with an incident near the city of Beijing.
4
 It would be over four years before the United 
States would become directly involved in the war with Japan. The Japanese attack against 
American military bases on U.S. territory in Hawaii finally brought the United States into the 
war. China, a nation of over 400 million people in a land mass nearly the size of the continental 
United States, was to be part of the multinational alliance established to combat Japanese 
aggression in Asia. This developing wartime relationship was the result of America's long 
involvement in China and Asia, including diplomatic and military activities that began nearly a 
century before at a time when both internal and external enemies were threatening China's ruling 
dynasty. 
The Early Years of American Involvement 
 Although the first American ship, Empress of China, had landed at Whampoa (Huangpu) 
near Canton (Guangzhou) in southern China in 1784 to trade ginseng root for tea,
5
 the first 
official diplomatic action between the United States and China was essentially a coercive 
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commercial agreement. The Treaty of Wanghia (Wangxia) was signed in July of 1844, 
approximately two years after the conclusion of the humiliating defeat of Chinese forces in the 
First Opium War (1839-1842) by the British military. One of the few British battlefield defeats 
during this conflict was the result of the actions of a civilian militia band call Sanyuanli, an 
incident specifically mentioned in the history chapter of Mao's 1936 classic On Guerrilla War.
6
 
This violent peasant reaction resulted in calls on the government to fight the foreigners.
7
 The 
resulting 1842 Treaty of Nanking (Nanjing), among other provisions, ceded Hong Kong Island to 
Great Britain and provided for access to five additional ports for international trade.
8
 To ensure 
the United States also benefitted from this greater access to the China trade, Caleb Cushing, the 
nation's first government emissary to China, negotiated a separate treaty. The United States was 
provided "most favored nation" status and parity in matters of import and export duties and 
tariffs with the European powers.
9
 Perhaps more importantly, while not having participated 
militarily, the United States was seen by the xenophobic Chinese government as another one of 
the foreign powers who sought to open up China to trade, commerce, and religious conversion, 
by force if necessary.
10
   
 America's own aggressive military behavior in Asia during this time was focused on the 
closed, insular nation to the east of China. Originally partially opened by the Dutch in the 1600s, 
Japan remained isolated and feudal in its outlook and behavior into the 1850s. Because of its 
prime location astride rich whaling and fishing waters, sooner or later Japan was going to be part 
of the greater European thrust into the Western Pacific. In 1853-1854, the "Black Ships" of 
Commodore Matthew C. Perry's Asiatic Squadron were ordered by President Millard Fillmore to 
open up Japan before either the Russians or the British had seized the opportunity. This 
successful incursion along with the diplomatic actions that followed (the Treaty of Kanagara in 
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March of 1854), was a catalyst to historic political, military, diplomatic and social changes in 
Japan. This change in Japan's status and outlook had significant ramifications for China, the 
United States, and the European powers conducting a broad range of activities in Asia. Japan's 
Meiji Restoration, beginning in 1868, led to unprecedented changes in that nation's military 
capabilities, foreign policy and the regional outlook of this formerly technologically backward, 
isolationist country. With the purchase of Alaska from the Russians in 1867, America's military 
and diplomatic role in Northeast Asia and the North Pacific became more significant, and 
prominent.
11
 This transformation in Japan, a country that would become China's mortal enemy in 
less than thirty years, occurred while both Chinese dynastic and revolutionary leaders looked on, 
seemingly incapable of action. China itself was dealing with both foreign and internal threats and 
pressures for change. 
 The Second Opium War (1856-1860) also known as the Arrow War for the name of the 
ship on which the incident precipitating the conflict took place followed the First Opium War 
(1839-1842) that resulted in a humiliating treaty with the British. Again, the Chinese suffered a 
series of military defeats at the hands of the British, this time joined by France as its ally. After 
several initial military victories and resulting successful diplomatic actions during the first two 
years of the war, the European forces had to recommence military actions after China failed to 
comply with agreements made in 1858. The British and French conducted a major military 
expedition that eventually led to the occupation of the Chinese capital, the destruction the 
Summer Palace northwest of Beijing, and the legalization of the opium trade. Perhaps more 
importantly, additional areas of China were opened to commerce and foreign influence including 
inland ports along the Yangzi River.
12
 The United States, again, was not a military participant in 
this conflict. However, it did benefit from the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin) in June 
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of 1858 with provisions that ensured whatever treaties the Chinese government signed with 
foreign powers that Americans also "shall at once freely inure to the benefit of the United States, 
its public officers, merchants, and citizens."
13
  
 At the same time the Chinese central government in Beijing was dealing with this 
external European aggression, it also had to deal with growing internal threats. The leader of the 
most important revolutionary movement of this period was a purported Christian from the 
southern province of Guangdong. Hong Xiuquan, who would later claim he was Jesus Christ's 
younger brother, began a peasant revolt that would last more than a decade and reportedly cause 
more than 20 million deaths. With a quickly expanding group of followers and religious 
adherents, Hong's rebellion surged out of southern China and eventually grew to threaten the 
very existence of the central government. With its capital established at Nanjing, the new 
Kingdom of Heavenly Peace disrupted trade and commerce, especially along the Yangzi. This 
threat precipitated a reaction by the foreign forces to defend their interests and the concessions 
where they resided down river in Shanghai.
14
   
 The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) established the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace with the 
goal of ruling all of China and imposing a new religious order based on a mix of distorted 
Christianity and a rudimentary form of peasant socialism. The movement's primary political, 
military, and religious leader studied for a short time under the American Baptist missionary I. J. 
Roberts, but soon lost Western religious support as his visions moved further and further from 
orthodox Christian tenets.
15
 This rebellion's ideology, in addition to calling for believing in 
Hong's religious visions demanded sweeping social changes in China. His new regime's goals 
included the end of dynastic rule, a holistic, national military organization encompassing the 
entire society, and, in a major break from Chinese history and culture, greater equality for 
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women and their service in the state bureaucracy and armed forces.
16
 The Taiping army had 
evolved in a way that was quite contrary to traditional Chinese military thought, organization, 
and leadership.  
 The twenty-year history of military failures suffered by the imperial forces of the Ch'ing 
(Qing) central government at the hands of the technologically superior foreign forces does not 
explain the dramatic martial triumphs of these backward rebels led by military amateurs who 
originated from the rural areas of southern China. The beginnings of China's effort to reorganize 
its military and seek Western assistance in its modernization can be traced to the internal and 
external threats of this period in the mid 19th century. Until this time, the central government 
directly controlled the predominant military forces in China. These units were stationed in small 
elements throughout the nation. Their primary mission was to react, first to internal threats, and 
then combined for larger campaigns when external enemies threatened Qing sovereignty or 
prerogatives. These forces were the Manchu Banners and the Army of the Green Standard Army. 
By the mid-1800s, these armies had shown themselves to be less and less capable of dealing 
successfully with the expanding threats to the dynasty.
17
  
 The ruling Qing dynasty itself was a legacy of an external armed force taking power by 
military conquest. In reality the Manchu regime that ultimately defeated the Chinese Han of the 
Ming dynasty in 1644, although it received considerable help from disaffected Han forces, was 
itself an invading foreign power. The conquering Manchus from what is now northeastern China 
or Manchuria established a new dynastic regime. Not unique in China's history, this foreign 
dynasty retained the preponderance of military power under its direct control. However, the 
Manchus generally allowed the Han Chinese bureaucracy to continue to administer the country 
under the time-tested magistrate system albeit under the close direction and supervision of 
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selected Manchu leaders.
18
 The Manchu Banners of the 19th century traced their lineage back to 
the nomadic warrior cultures of the steppes to the north of China. However, once the Manchu 
dynasty was established in Beijing, and sovereignty and influence attained over an area larger 
than China today, this once powerful military ruling elite slowly began to deteriorate for a 
variety of reasons. Issues related to imperial overstretch, political reliability, internecine court 
feuding, and popular Han sentiment against a foreign occupation all played a role. Perhaps most 
telling was the mounting costs of training, equipping and maintaining its far-flung forces to cope 
with near constant regional rebellions and border conflicts across the broad expanse of Chinese 
territory. To deal with these threats, in addition to the Manchu forces, the Army of the Green 
Standard, officered initially from the Banners, was organized as a predominately Han Chinese 
infantry force.
19
   
 These Han Chinese military units also suffered from some of the same weaknesses as the 
Banners. They were also seen as much less politically reliable by the Manchu-led central 
government. By the time of the Opium Wars and Taiping Rebellion, the drain on the national 
treasury had reached a point where the maintenance and improvement of a large standing army 
by the central government was problematic for cultural, ideological, as well as financial reasons. 
Nevertheless, the pressing need for updated methods of recruiting, training, equipping, and 
organizing competent military forces became increasingly obvious to key leaders in the central 
government. This was especially true within the ranks of the Qing regional magistrates and 
provincial governors in eastern coastal China as the threat from the Taiping Army including to 
the capital in Beijing, the resource rich Yangzi River valley, and the port of Shanghai became 
more obvious and dire.
20
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The First American Military Advisors 
 During the Taiping period, foreign military advisors including a small group of 
Americans led by Frederick Townsend Ward began to play a role in China's military 
development.
21
 Ward was a Massachusetts native who started out his life of foreign adventures 
as a merchant seaman. He also claimed to have been a Texas Ranger, fought in Central America 
as a mercenary, and served with the French in the Crimea.
22
 After making his way to China on a 
merchant vessel, he seized the opportunity presented by the Taiping threat to the foreign 
community in Shanghai and began to build a mercenary force for hire. Under contract to a local 
Chinese magistrate, Ward, together with two other Americans, Edward Forester and Henry 
Burgevine, assembled, trained, and commanded in combat a mixed unit of European, Filipino, 
and Chinese forces over the next three years. Although senior American representatives in China 
knew his activities, Ward was not working for the U. S. government when he embarked on his 
short, but glorious career as a mercenary in the service of China. From late 1859 until his death 
from battle wounds in 1862, his force fought in conjunction with European and Qing armies to 
protect Shanghai and reduce the threat from the Taiping attacks and encroachments. At the time 
of his death, he had essentially "gone native." He had renounced his American citizenship, 
married a high Qing official's daughter, sworn allegiance to China, and was promoted to the rank 
of Brigadier General in the Imperial army.
23
      
 Interestingly, he reportedly made similar observations to those General Joseph W. 
Stilwell and other American military advisors would make in the early 1940s about the fighting 
qualities of the average Chinese soldier. "In his escapades he had learned from the Taiping 
themselves that Chinese soldiers, well armed, well trained, and well led made fierce fighters."
24
 
After Ward's death the leadership of this force, later to be known as the Ever-Victorious Army, 
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was passed to a professional British military officer, Captain Charles G. (Chinese) Gordon, who 
was to lose his life later fighting in another of Queen Victoria's colonial conflicts in the Sudan. 
This army was a multinational mixed force of several thousand that included European officers 
and non-commissioned officers. The troops were equipped with modern infantry weapons, 
artillery, and water transport. Fighting alongside locally raised, equipped, and trained provincial 
Chinese armies, this foreign-led army played a key supporting role in the defense of Shanghai 
and in the eventual defeat of the Taiping forces after some early setbacks. This Army not only 
gained the confidence of the European leaders in Shanghai, but also caught the attention of two 
influential Qing officials, Li Hung-chang (Li Hongzhang), the Governor of the province, and 
Tseng Kuo-fan (Zeng Guofan), the commander of the Qing forces in the Nanjing region. These 
two officials would both be key players in future attempts to modernize China's military. 
  Though Ward was only thirty years old when he died, he had managed to forge 
 for himself, in a chaotic time and by whatever methods were at hand, a personal and 
 financial success of imposing stature. He had, as well, managed for the first time to train 
 Chinese troops to fight in the more effective European manner; had provided a model for 
 Li Hung-chang's own Huai army; had impressed Li with the possibility of strengthening 
 herself along Western lines without relying on foreign nations and foreign troops; had 
 help clear a thirty-mile radius around Shanghai of Taiping rebels; and had build up the 
 foundations of a force that was to be more effectively used by his famous successor, 
 Gordon.
25
 
 
 In the aftermath of the Second Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion, the national forces 
of the central government and the old methods of organizing and fighting of the Manchu Banners 
and the Army of the Green Standard had been discredited. However, the fiscal position of the 
central government was in shambles. The ruling dynastic regime was already weak from military 
overextension, problems with domestic taxation, and loss of revenue with the outflow of silver to 
the British precipitated by the opium trade. The eventual successful response to the Taiping 
threat pointed to the need for a very different military system. The central problem was how to 
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pay for it and how to maintain political control while accomplishing this task. This was not and 
would not be a problem that was easily solved in China. The answer, at least in part, was found 
in the programs for building regional militias and beginning to produce modern equipment and 
munitions indigenously. Qing provincial officials began, with little help from the ruling powers 
in Beijing, an effort to organize more powerful regional militias capable of conducting warfare 
with modern weapons and Western-style training and doctrine.   
 The next logical step was to gain greater access to foreign weapons and technology and 
to build a domestic capability to manufacture armaments. Under the aegis of Prince Kung 
(Gong), the dynasty's pseudo-foreign minister, Li Hongchang and other powerful regional 
military and civilian officials slowly began to put together a comprehensive program of reform, 
known as the Self-Strengthening Movement. Despite the obvious need, support from the Qing 
leadership in Beijing was ambiguous and the cost of building such forces ensured this could only 
be done piecemeal and over the long term. There was also the fear of the loss of central political 
power as regional officials and military leaders built competent and capable forces, not 
geographically close to the capital and clearly not controlled or necessarily obedient to the 
direction of the emperor.
26
 
 The Self-Strengthening Movement emerged in the 1860's, a time when the defeat of the 
Taiping Army and successful campaigns against other rebel bands in China highlighted the 
capabilities of the regional militias and the weakness of the central government. This was also a 
period of relative peace with the European powers. The foreigners were now established in 
protected enclaves in many of the port cities of China to facilitate trade and commerce, and 
religious conversions. While extraterritoriality protected the foreigners from prosecution by 
Chinese courts and magistrates, the stationing of small numbers of foreign forces also provided a 
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protective umbrella of available, reliable, and competent military support for the defense of these 
international communities. The Qing dynasty was forced to accept, at least for the time being, the 
humiliation of these foreign territorial and military encroachments and the loss of sovereignty 
that they signified. Conversely, this was also a period of cooperation as foreign military 
specialists and technicians were now training small numbers of Chinese forces in Western 
military methods. In addition, shipyards, factories, and arsenals were established to provide 
indigenously produced modern munitions and equipment. Among these foreign arms 
transactions were deals with the American company, Remington Arms. British, French, and 
German firms also provided the machinery and technical expertise for shipyards and arsenals to 
manufacture small arms and ammunition as well as cannons, and small to medium-armed 
steamships of modern European design.
27
  
 Despite some progress in acquiring modern Western equipment and the technical 
capabilities to incorporate these new tools and methods into the Chinese armed forces, key senior 
officials in Beijing chafed at the idea, and especially opposed changes to the training of young 
Chinese scholars. It was from this group that the officer corps would historically have been 
recruited. The importance to the ruling dynasty of centrally selecting bureaucrats to run the 
government and senior military officers based on a system of examinations that selected the 
administrative elite of China made any change in the educational system very difficult. These 
time-honored written tests, beginning at the local level and continuing through the provincial to 
the national level, required in-depth knowledge of ancient Confucian texts and commentary. The 
idea of China's educational elite having separate examinations for modern Western science and 
technology and attending special academies to learn English and other foreign languages met 
very stiff opposition from the highest level of government. Beijing also did not look favorably on 
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efforts to reduce the size of the Army of the Green Standard to provide more funds for 
modernization.
28
 Political, cultural, and financial factors adversely affected the opportunities for 
the successful systematic improvement of China's armed forces--a pattern that will repeat itself 
during the next seventy years or more. 
 A prime example of the give-and-take of those Chinese leaders who wanted to change the 
system and those who desired to maintain the status quo was the program to send young Chinese 
students overseas to study, especially in the area of science and technology. "Li [Hongzhang] 
was impressed by Japanese efforts to learn Western techniques. He learned that the Tokugawa 
shogunate [Japan] had sent young men of distinguished lineage to Western countries to serve as 
apprentices in the factories and had acquired 'machines that make machines' and installed them at 
home."
29
 A young Chinese scholar Yung Wing, who had studied at Yale University in the United 
States, presented such a plan to the Chinese leadership in 1868. However, it was not until 1872 
that this effort was finally approved. In 1875, the first thirty (out of 120) Chinese students to be 
sent to the United States began their planned fifteen-year program of studies in Hartford, 
Connecticut. The authorities in Beijing promulgated specific regulations to ensure Chinese 
scholars accompanied these students so that they also received traditional instruction as well.   
 This American program was curtailed, and only lasted until 1881, in a dispute over 
whether or not these students could attend the American military academies. Culture, 
nationalism, and racism played a part in decisions made during this dispute. However, promising 
Chinese students continued to be sent to Europe with a greater focus on military related subjects 
as part of a still limited program of study and work in Western technology especially in the areas 
of transportation and industry.
30
 China was not ready politically, educationally, intellectually, or 
militarily to embrace the foreign military technologies and the cultural changes that would be 
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needed to move its armed forces to operate successfully against the European powers. As Denis 
Twitchett argues, "the hold of traditional cultural values was as strong as ever. Such institutions 
as the examination system and the Green Standard army not only were upheld by vast vested 
interests, but gained sanctity because of tradition. Modernization would plainly require the 
breaking of cultural and institution values."
31
 With only half-measures in defense modernization 
at best dictated by the central authorities, China's improvements in its national military 
proceeded in fits and starts, on a small scale, and only regionally. Nevertheless, selected Qing 
military units now armed and prepared with Western equipment and training were successful in 
the 1870s in putting down several internal rebellions. The Qing government, by being able to 
deploy quickly well armed and equipped forces, was also able to resolve a potential military 
conflict with Russia in the west without fighting. This enabled the dynastic regime to maintain 
better control of its vast, remote western territorial borders.
32
  
 However, in 1884-85 a war with France over the colonization of a Chinese tributary state 
in what is now Vietnam again displayed Qing military deficiencies when opposing a competent 
European military force. A major element of Chinese military modernization effort had been the 
building of a Western-style navy. At the time of the Sino-French War, China had built locally or 
purchased about fifty steam-powered warships. Foreign experts were providing training, but the 
program to establish a modern navy was incomplete when the conflict started. By the time, this 
costly war with France ended China had lost nearly one-third of its newly acquired navy, and 
potentially would have lost more if the naval forces stationed in the north Peiyang (Beiyang) had 
joined the fight given the competence of their naval leadership.  
 The weakness of the central government in Beijing allowed some regional authorities to 
maintain a certain level of autonomy. This was to prove very costly. In its battles with the French 
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navy, between ships of nearly equal capabilities, Chinese training deficiencies and the lack of 
unity of command of its national naval forces were disastrous. The deficiencies on land against 
foreign forces could be mitigated to a certain degree by China's ability to mobilize large numbers 
of troops. Operations on land, in terms of battles won and territory taken, showed some 
improvement in Chinese military capability. However, an evaluation of China's victories in terms 
of casualty ratios clearly gave the advantage to the French. The Chinese did achieve a victory in 
the Battle of Bacle in northern Vietnam, but more because of surprise and overwhelming odds 
than military prowess. Their forces did limit the advance of the French assault on the island of 
Taiwan. Significantly, at the Battle of Lang Son in northeast Annam (Vietnam), they were able 
to force the withdrawal of a smaller and poorly deployed French force.  
 The Chinese ground forces were holding key terrain in Annam when the final session of 
peace negotiations began in 1884. However, the naval forces equipped at great cost were in ruins 
and the weaknesses in leadership and organization exposed. Although land operations had shown 
some promise, the overall result of the conflict was another humiliating defeat at the hands of a 
foreign power. This weakness in its military contributed to an additional diplomatic setback in 
Southeast Asia. In addition to its loss of influence in what became French Indochina (Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia), in 1885, the British were ceded control of Burma, another Chinese 
tributary state. 
33
 A little over fifty years later, Burma and the critical lines of communication to 
Jiang's wartime capital in west central China would become the key battle ground for the British, 
Chinese, and American allies and their collective efforts to defeat Japan in the Second World 
War. 
  The Sino-French War of 1884-85 was China's first test of its newly modernized 
 army and navy. During the previous two decades, China's opponents had included 
 political rebels, ethnic separatists, and religious militants, most of whom were less 
 developed technologically than Han infantry and Qing Bannermen. Now for the first 
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 time since the Opium and Arrow Wars, the Chinese faced a modern European army and 
 navy. Clearly, China failed the test.
34
 
 Less than a decade later, China was involved in an even more devastating and 
humiliating foreign conflict. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was the direct outcome of a 
ten-year challenge by Japan to replace China's influence in Korea. The key precipitating cause of 
the outbreak of hostilities was a request from the Korean king for military support to help put 
down a local rebellion. By treaty, both China and Japan were committed to send forces, but 
Japan was in a better position militarily to respond. In late July of 1894, Japan's navy sank a 
Chinese troopship leased from Britain carrying reinforcements to the peninsula. On land 
Japanese ground elements attacked and defeated a Chinese force garrisoned near Seoul. Despite 
attempts by outside powers to bring about a diplomatic solution, war was declared on the 1st of 
August 1894. On both land and sea, over the course of the conflict, the Chinese forces were 
consistently defeated as the war spread to northern Korea, Manchuria, the Shandong peninsula 
southeast of Beijing, and to the island of Taiwan. The treaty ending the war ceded Taiwan to 
Japan and that island would remain under their control for the next fifty years.
35
    
 Bruce Elleman in his Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 quotes Ralph L. Powell on 
why the Chinese military failed so miserably during this conflict. "[These] defeats can be 
explained by the decentralization of command, the lack of specialization, the inadequacy of 
training, and the shortage of modern weapons." Even more important was the corruption that 
extended from top to bottom of not only the military hierarchy, but also the civil bureaucracy. 
Elleman also quotes Allen Fung that the problem was the "quality of the officer corps," and the 
"numerical inferiority of Chinese soldiers with real fighting value."
36
 The result of this military 
defeat by a country with a population one-tenth the size of China's was the humiliating 1895 
Treaty of Shimonseki. China was forced to pay a huge indemnity; recognize Korean 
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independence; cede Taiwan to Japan; open up more ports to trade and commerce; and, before 
being forced to give up its claim by European powers, gave Japan the Liaodong peninsula, a year 
round port with access into the Manchurian interior. The shock of this stunning defeat at the 
hands of the "lowly" Japanese finally seemed to mobilize the ruling dynasty to greater activity to 
improve its military forces. Elleman, quoting works by Allen Fung and George F. Natziger, 
concludes the following about the Chinese military at the turn of the 20th Century:  
   For the first time, not only was Beijing losing control over its tributary states, but 
 over large sections of China's traditional colonial Empire as well. The Sino-Japanese 
 War, therefore, more than any other event, began the process whereby foreign powers 
 "partitioned" China...This resulted in a period of intense military reforms, beginning with 
 the creation of the "Newly Established Army" in 1895. The immediate success of these 
 reforms was revealed in 1900 during the Boxer Uprising, when the Chinese army was 
 quickly able to cause serious problems for even first-rate [Western] armies.
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 At the turn of the twentieth century, the rapid rise, modernization, and aggressiveness of 
Japan as a major military power was of interest, and possibly concern for the other powers in the 
region. However, the weakness of China and expanding foreign encroachments was troubling for 
the United States that sought a sovereign China open to unencumbered foreign trade. In order to 
check the process of the partitioning of China, also characterized as "carving up the melon," in 
1899, the United States Secretary of State John Hay offered the "Open Door" policy.
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 At this 
same time, the United States military was involved in a war with a European power in the 
Caribbean, and more importantly for America's future role in China, in the Pacific. After the 
quick defeat of Spanish military forces on land and sea, American Army and Marine units now 
occupied Cuba and were heavily involved in stabilizing the Philippines as the result of its 
successful 1898-1899 naval and land campaigns. 
 Large numbers of U.S. ground forces deployed to the Philippines to deal with the 
subsequent conventional conflict with the indigenous independence movement led by Emilio 
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Aguinaldo. This campaign later evolved into a long and bitter guerrilla warfare campaign. The 
United States was now a growing power in Asia and had both ground and naval forces 
permanently stationed forward. The U.S. was positioned to begin to play a greater role 
diplomatically and militarily in the region, and especially in China. The quotation below is taken 
from the opening pages of the Department of State's United States Relations With China, With 
Special Reference to the Period, 1944-1949.    
  The anti-foreign disturbances in China in 1900, usually referred to as the Boxer 
 Rebellion, afforded the United States (which had participated with the other Powers in a 
 joint expeditionary sent to rescue the beleaguered legations in Peking) an opportunity to 
 make a statement of policy which went a step beyond the Open Door notes of the 
 preceding year. In a circular note to the participating Powers, dated July 3, 1900, Hay 
 declared that the "policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution" of 
 the difficulties in China which would "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative 
 entity" and "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all 
 parts of the Chinese Empire.
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American Military Forces: On the Ground in China 
 The Boxer Rebellion or Uprising was the result of the interplay of complex domestic and 
international factors.
40
 The Boxers or "Righteous and Harmonious Fists" (Yihe Chuan), began in 
the late 1800s as an anti-foreign, anti-Manchu movement of religious fanatics who believed their 
magical powers could make them impervious to the effect of weapons. The uprising began in the 
1890s with sporadic attacks on Western missionaries and especially their Chinese converts in the 
Shantung (Shandong) region. In early 1900, the Boxers (many of who were unemployed youth as 
a result of floods and the loss of agricultural opportunities in the area south of the capital) moved 
north to Beijing. In June, as Chinese imperial forces looked on, the Boxers began a siege of the 
foreign legation area of the capital. Foreign governments were unable to get the Chinese dynastic 
rulers to act against the Boxers and protect their citizens. In reaction to this inactivity and 
apparent acquiescence by the Chinese government and its forces, from June through August 
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1900, a multinational coalition of foreign militaries mounted a series of military operations. 
Eight nations' military forces were involved in the defense of the foreign legation in Beijing, or 
the foreign concession area of Tianjin, or took part in international expeditionary relief 
operations that began in the coastal area of Taku (Dagu). A force comprised of army, navy and 
marine units from Russia, Japan, France, Italy, Germany, Austro-Hungry, Great Britain, and the 
United States were finally able to break through and rescue the besieged foreign diplomats, 
civilians, troops, and Chinese Christian converts in Beijing.   
 After one failed attempt by a smaller multinational force of several thousand, that 
included U.S. Marines and Sailors, in August a force of about 18,000 was assembled. Their 
mission was to again move on Beijing and rescue the legations. This force included a USMC 
battalion and elements of the U. S. Army's 9th and 14th Infantry Regiments, the 6th Cavalry, and 
accompanying artillery under the command of Major General Adna Chafee. Over the next three 
weeks, this force fought from the Tianjin/Dagu area through to Beijing. The initial success of the 
Boxers in driving out foreign missionaries, besieging the legation, and defeating the first foreign 
rescue mission led the Qing regime of Tz'u-hsi (Cixi), the Empress Dowager, to order the 
Imperial forces to join with the Boxers to oppose the second foreign relief expedition.  
 The successful foreign rescue was accomplished in a series of operations that began by 
seizing the Dagu forts on the coast, moving overland and securing Tianjin, and then driving on to 
Beijing a total distance of almost one hundred miles over mostly flat terrain crisscrossed with 
rivers, streams, and canals. While the exact size of the opposing Chinese forces in not known, it 
is estimated that from 60-90 thousand Imperial troops and over 100 thousand Boxers attempted 
to stop the invading multinational force of less than twenty thousand. This loosely organized 
foreign force whose largest contingents were Japanese and Russian troops inflicted another 
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humiliating and disastrous defeat on the Qing government that was forced to sue for peace and 
once again signed another "unequal" and financially costly treaty.
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 Foreign forces were now again in control of China's capital, the key city of Tianjin, and a 
secure route to the coast. An indigenous rebel movement armed with magic, swords and lances 
had been defeated, and its surviving elements were hunted down and destroyed by the foreign 
forces as they enacted their revenge. The Imperial forces in the Beijing area, some armed with 
modern weapons and equipment, had also been defeated, and although the Qing government 
survived, its ability to rule and control its own territory was now even more in doubt. Elleman 
makes three points in the conclusion to his chapter on the Boxer Rebellion that indicate how 
much this uprising was a turning point in China's history and in its military modernization.  
 First, were the ominous "declarations of neutrality" by key Qing officials in southern 
China who refused to join with the central government to declare war on the foreign powers. 
Second, the military units these officials controlled, among them the Imperial General Yuan 
Shikai who would become the leader of China shortly after the Revolution of 1911 at the 
beginning of what has come to be known as the warlord era, "declined to come to Peking's aid." 
Third,  
   ... The Boxer Uprising was a major psychological watershed in the history of 
 Chinese military development. China's military modernization had begun much earlier, 
 but the appearance of the Boxers represented a temporary retreat from this 
 modernization. In particular, the Boxer's reliance on traditional Chinese martial arts, not 
 to mention their use of swords and lances to oppose modern weapons, failed miserably.... 
 The only road left open to China after the Boxers was to modernize and adopt western 
 methods.
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While the demand to modernize may have been the only road left open, what that modernization 
would look like in terms of organization and especially in terms of professionalism and political 
role was still not clear.  
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 The Boxer Protocols, negotiated for the Qing regime by the now elder public official, Li 
Hongzhang, was signed in September of 1901 officially ending the conflict. In addition to a large 
indemnity, the agreement established a permanent foreign military presence to guard the 
legations and maintain a corridor from the coastal Dagu forts to the capital to protect the foreign 
population in the Beijing-Tianjin area. Of note, the American portion of the indemnity was used 
to bring more Chinese students to the United States.
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 Perhaps more importantly for military 
modernization, foreign weapons purchases were forbidden for two years.
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 This was an 
indication that the Western powers and Japan recognized that Chinese forces, properly led, 
equipped and trained, had the potential to be a formidable and capable foe. Not allowing them to 
buy more foreign weapons was seen as a way to keep China from increasing its military strength 
and opposing future interventions, especially while all the foreign powers maintained significant, 
but not overwhelming numbers of forces in the country. However, while some improvement 
could be seen at the tactical level, the lack of central control, inability to coordinate large 
formations, and the independence and autonomy of regionally controlled militias also reaffirmed 
China's systemic military weakness. Once again, modern weapons, formations, and training 
programs are only part of what make a capable military force. 
  Beginning in 1900, the U.S. would continuously maintain military personnel in China for 
most of the next fifty years. The Marines, and at times U.S. Army forces, guarded the legation in 
Beijing and deployed additional units to China in times of crisis. At various times beginning in 
the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion, the Army's 9th, 14th and 15th Infantry Regiments with 
supporting arms conducted occupation and stabilization duties, predominantly in the area of 
Tianjin. Additional U.S. Army units from the Philippines reinforced and supported the forces in 
place. Concurrently, while the U.S. Navy had operated in and around China since the 1850s, the 
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Asiatic Squadron was expanded to patrol coastal and inland waters in the early 1900s to protect 
American citizens and insure the free flow of commerce.
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 Competition over markets and inland 
transportation lines among the international powers maintaining military forces in China was 
getting more difficult and complicated. China was fast losing control over its own territory and 
governmental prerogatives.  
 In 1904, two of America's Boxer Rebellion allies, Russia and Japan, commenced 
hostilities over control of key territory and lines of communication in Manchuria and northeast 
China. Japan's decisive victory at sea at the Battle of Tsushima Straits, and costly, but successful 
offensive operations on land against Russian forces on Chinese territory on the Liaodong 
Peninsula and in Manchuria, presaged that nation's coming dominance in northeast Asia. Russia 
was militarily defeated by this newly emerging Asian power and was forced to make concessions 
to the Japanese in the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. This diplomatic effort earned President 
Theodore Roosevelt the Nobel Peace Prize. However, this did not cause Russia to retreat from 
Asia, nor abandon its efforts to further its security and economic interests in China. This 
essentially foreign war waged on its territory was further evidence of China's diplomatic and 
military weakness and the collapse of the dynastic form of government was not long in coming.
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After one more centrally directed attempt at "self-strengthening" and Westernization, in 1911, 
Qing dynasty internal family intrigue and regime weakness reached crises proportions. What 
started as a local revolt in Wuhan in central China soon spread across the country.
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 During the period between the Boxer Rebellion and the Revolution of 1911, another 
American soldier of fortune in the mold of Frederick Townsend Ward of the Ever Victorious 
Army played a role in China. Homer Lea entered into a relationship with a group of Chinese 
dissidents led by a former regime senior official, Kang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei), intent on 
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overthrowing the dynastic rule of Empress Dowager Cixi. Lea, a Stanford University student 
with no military background, joined a secret Chinese society in San Francisco and began a 
decade of support to the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan). He traveled 
to China during the Boxer Rebellion where he undertook the task of traveling around the country 
organizing Chinese revolutionary forces. Achieving little success, he returned to California and 
began raising funds for the cause in the United States. He also embarked on an effort to recruit 
and train Chinese youth in America by utilizing military personnel who had served in China. He 
supported Sun's efforts to raise money and garner support when he visited the United States. He 
also accompanied Sun to London and Paris to raise funds and returned to China with him. Lea, 
with promises from Sun of a senior position in the new Chinese military, arrived in China in 
December of 1911 shortly after the revolution. Chinese military leaders who had no need of his 
assistance soon marginalized lea. In 1912, Lea contracted influenza, returned to the United 
States, and failing to recover died later that year.
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 In 1912, after over seventy years of internal turmoil and foreign encroachments, the once 
powerful Qing dynasty finally collapsed and the Republic of China emerged under the temporary 
leadership of Sun Yat-sen, a southern Chinese medical doctor and political activist who had 
attended school in the United States. Turmoil soon followed and Yuan Shikai, a senior military 
officer in the Qing regime, soon replaced Sun as the leader of the Republic of China. In that year, 
the U.S. Fifteenth Infantry was deployed to China and moved into barracks in the area around 
Tianjin. This regiment began a permanent American basing structure that would continue until 
1938 as China struggled internally for unity, stability, and competent governance. While 
sometimes under the direct command of military superiors in Washington or in the Philippines, 
more often than not, the unit's instructions came from the State Department's most senior 
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representative in China. The regiment also operated within an ever-changing coalition of allied 
forces conducting what would now be called a "presence" or multinational peace mission or 
stability operations. 
 The primary mission of this unit was to show the flag and keep the corridor open and safe 
from the embassy compounds in Beijing to the coast. In concert with the other foreign powers 
including Japan and Russia, American forces were also there to protect its citizens residing in 
China, whether embassy official, businessman, or missionary. The 15th Regiment arrived 
immediately after the formation of the Republic of China when the stability of China after 
thousands of years of dynastic rule was very much in doubt. American forces in China were part 
of a Pacific military presence in the Philippines, Hawaii, and at sea emblematic of the United 
States growing power and influence in global affairs. The command and staff alumni of the 15th 
Regiment who would serve in China over the coming decades included some of America's most 
distinguished military officers.
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 First among these was George C. Marshall who played a crucial role in U.S.-China policy 
formation and implementation under two presidential administrations (Roosevelt and Truman). 
The list also includes the two officers, Joseph W. Stilwell and Albert C. Wedemeyer, who later 
represented the United States military in China during the Second World War as commanders of 
the China-Burma-India and then China Theaters, respectively. Both would also serve as Chief of 
Staff to Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi, heading America's military advisory effort. In addition, 
David D. Barrett, who would command the first military observer mission to Mao's Communist 
headquarters at Yan'an, served in the regiment as a company grade officer. Two other 
distinguished military leaders who would later serve in key positions during the Korean War, 
Matthew B. Ridgeway and Walton H. Walker, also spent time in the 15th as young officers.  
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 Living in China and often being forced to interact with military and governmental 
officials from a variety of Chinese factions demanded the officers and men of the regiment 
acquire what is now called "situational awareness" as well as cultural understanding, and at least 
rudimentary language skills. Marshall, who served as the acting commander of the unit at a 
crucial time during the warlord period in the 1920s, instituted programs to improve language and 
cultural knowledge in the regiment. Stilwell, who served under Marshall, "was acknowledged as 
the unofficial 'dean' of the regiment's 'Chinese Language College'.
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 Barrett's dedication to the 
study of language and culture was especially notable. However, the following sentiment also 
highlights the Army's ambivalent attitude toward time away from operational units for in-depth 
language and area studies.   
  The year 1924 found Barrett in Peking, assigned to the American legation as an 
 assistant military attaché for language study. This set him apart from career-minded 
 officers who considered attaché and language study duty as superfluous to true soldierly 
 military experience, though two important exceptions who played a role in Barrett's later 
 career, Marshall and Stilwell, thought otherwise.
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 The experience of the 15th Regiment in China, while contributing to the Army's 
understanding of China, its people and political situation, did not include advising or assisting in 
the building of a modern Chinese military for the emerging republic. In 1915, after the death of 
Yuan Shikai, a general from the Imperial Army who took power from Sun Zhongshan in the 
early days of the republic, China once again erupted into the chaos of regionalism and 
warlordism. There was really no central government to support or national Army to build in the 
early years of the American military deployment. However, by the beginning of the 1920s, Jiang 
emerged as Sun's senior military commander with a power base of operations in southern China. 
Jiang had attended military school in Japan and served for a brief time in a Japanese Imperial 
Army artillery unit. According to Edward L Dreyer, in 1911, while most of Chinese military 
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officers were graduates of provincial military academies, some 800 had studied in Japan. The 
Army that emerged after the 1911 Revolution contained elements of both a nationalist army and 
forces with strong regional roots and leadership.
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 Jiang represented the revolutionary nationalist 
faction of officers trained in the Western tradition. In 1923, Sun sent him to the Soviet Union to 
observe their military system as a potential model for China's future military.
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The Rise of Jiang Jieshi, Huangpu Military Academy, and Foreign Military Advisors 
 In 1924, with Sun's backing, Jiang established Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy 
in the Canton area under the tutelage of Soviet military advisors whose tasks are enumerated 
below: 
  1.  To organize and instruct a National Revolutionary Army in the South of China 
 for national liberation from the yoke of imperialism and for the unification into one 
 independence democratic republic. 
  2.  To give every assistance to the government [at Canton] by working in the army 
 and among the population in order to promote democratic principles. 
  3.  To make popular the doctrine of Communism and Sovietism and to work 
 toward bringing about complete rapprochement and [mutual] support between China and 
 the U.S.S.R. and to create in the Army, in the labor organizations, and in the peasantry 
 the desire for further revolutionary movement .
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 Clearly, these tasks outline the building of a revolutionary army of a political-military 
nature with strong connections to the Communist Soviet Union. Sun's speech at the opening of 
the academy speaks to the need for a strong military capability, as without it "the Chinese 
revolution will be foredoomed from its beginnings."
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 Sun had learned this the hard way in 1912 
as General Yuan Shikai had pushed him aside and taken over the leadership of the new republic. 
However, within a month of the founding of the Huangpu Academy, "Chiang and the Soviet 
advisers differed substantially on important points concerning curriculum and management of 
the academy.
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 Ultimately, the Soviet advisors acceded to some of Jiang's demands, but the 
program of mixing political and military training went forward, but not without modifications 
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specified by Jiang. One of the trump cards the Soviets could play was the offer of military 
equipment, the shipment of which began by the early fall of 1924. Nevertheless, the curbs put on 
the Soviet advisors and modifications of the program at Huangpu demonstrated Jiang's 
independence and willingness to impose his own ideas on a foreign partner when his political 
prerogatives were threatened. 
 Virtually as soon as the initial Huangpu training regiment was equipped, it was put into 
action. These units soon gained a reputation as effective, capable, and disciplined military forces. 
The young officer corps that led these units grew increasingly loyal to Jiang and more than 
willing to do his bidding. This was not yet a national army, but it was a core element of what 
would emerge as first the National Revolutionary Army and, eventually, the Nationalist Army of 
the Republic of China. Despite the obvious success of his new army, Jiang remained 
uncomfortable with some of the more political aspects of the Soviet program. In 1926, he moved 
against the Chinese leftist factions being nurtured by the Soviets and essentially marginalized 
their power and influence by "removing Soviet advisors from administrative and executive 
posts..."
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 Jiang very early on showed willingness to put foreign advisors in their place and 
maintain a leading Chinese position in organizing and training his forces. 
 Jiang emerged as a more powerful political and military leader after the death of Sun in 
1925. From 1924-1926, he not only out-maneuvered the Soviets advisors, but also the Chinese 
left leaning factions and key southern warlords by diplomatic action, battlefield victories, or 
backroom political dealings. In late 1926, he prepared to conduct a major offensive campaign 
[The Northern Expedition] to expand Chinese territory under Nationalist control. He did this 
against the advice of the Soviet advisors.
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 Once again, his independence and sense of 
nationalism and purpose trumped foreign advice. F.F. Liu sums up the situation very succinctly. 
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  .... [The Soviets] gradually came to realize that Chiang and his associates would 
 not be docile puppets. The China-for-the-Chinese and China-for-world-revolution 
 movements clashed head-on. Chiang Kai-shek, M.N. Roy, Joseph Stalin, and Leon 
 Trotsky all had their version of the story, but in the final analysis it came down simply to 
 the basic clash between the Reds, who wanted to enlist the Chinese in revolution and 
 were willing to expend money and men to accomplish this, and Chiang and the 
 Kuomintang, who had different purposes and who were willing to accept all of the 
 assistance but little of the domineering advice the Soviets cares to give.
59
 
Jiang still had to have a supply of military equipment and funding in order to prevail on the 
battlefield and successfully conduct his campaign to move north and unify the country under his 
leadership and direction. Jiang practiced a very careful game to maintain both his leadership 
position and continued foreign support--a practice that would often be repeated in the coming 
decades. 
 Part of the answer to the armament problems were to capture the Chinese arsenals and 
munitions plants as his forces moved into the vital commercial Yangzi river heartland. The 
existence of these facilities in part can be traced back to the efforts of the Self-Strengthening 
Movement of the mid-1800s. Another aspect of Jiang's political and military progress was that 
success breeds success and allies. His Northern Expedition campaign with key supporting 
warlords and the loyal Huangpu faction achieved victory after victory on the battlefield. 
Following on the initial successes of this campaign, by April of 1927, Jiang was able to set up a 
new Nationalist government capital in Nanjing. He then continued to further consolidate power 
and began to interact internationally from a position of greater strength with the foreign powers 
who still maintained influence and extensive commercial interests in China.  
 Having marginalized the Soviet influence in 1926 and gained a measure of strength and 
independence with his military victories, he now moved to reorganize his military using a 
German model and advisors. "When in the spring of 1927, Jiang decided to dispense with his 
Soviet military advisors, it was a former German colonel, Dr. Max Bauer, who he appointed as 
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his military aide."
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 As F.F. Liu outlines in his classic work, A Military History of Modern 
China, 1924-49, while Jiang admired the efficient and professional military system and 
organization of the Germans, China did not yet have a corps of professionally trained and 
educated officers needed to make truly revolutionary changes in organization and training in his 
armed forces.
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 The task of organizing, manning, training, and equipping the armed forces of a nation as 
large as China still emerging from the legacy of thousands of years of dynastic rule, an 
incomplete revolution, and encumbered with a century of foreign interference was daunting. 
Jiang's task was not made any easier with both internal and external military influences including 
at different times advisors from Japan, the Soviet Union and Germany. Perhaps more 
importantly, China had not fully developed a cadre of its own military professionals. "On the 
whole the reorganized military structure in the China of 1928 was cumbersome and unusually 
intricate. Too much complexity can always threaten to plunge the whole organization into 
anarchy especially when there is a shortage of both competent administrators and working 
experience."
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 To maintain the momentum of officer education, the Huangpu Military Academy 
was moved from Canton (Guangzhou) in southern China to Jiang's new capital, Nanjing, in the 
eastern central part of the country. This important school for Jiang's emerging officer corps was 
renamed the Central Military Academy. With expanded capacity and access to greater numbers 
of qualified applicants, the school was charged with the dual task to "prepare junior officers 
adequately versed in political knowledge, "and especially, "to provide advanced and specialized 
training to officers of the senior grades in the armed forces."
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 While Jiang had rejected the 
political-military system of the Soviets, he still recognized the need for political training in the 
building of loyal nationalistic forces. 
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 In the late 1920s, Jiang not only took on the task of building a competent and modern 
military force and organizing a government, he also continued military campaigns to reunite the 
country by bringing under control the various regional armies, especially those of the northern 
warlords. Additionally, Jiang moved to neutralize the power and influence of the left or 
Communist wing of the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (Guomindang), He targeted the 
Communists who had previously worked alongside the Nationalists and supported Sun's efforts 
to build a strong, socialist Republic of China. However, Jiang's dramatic, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, "Shanghai Massacre" in 1927 did not completely eradicate the left wing of the 
Nationalist movement including Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), who had been a labor organizer in 
southern China, and Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai), who had served as his deputy commander at the 
Huangpu Military Academy. The Communist survivors were able to retreat into the hinterland 
and rebuild support and military capabilities. They established remote sanctuaries in eastern and 
central China called Chinese Communist Soviets. This was the beginning of the Communist 
effort to build a guerrilla army. While internal factors dominated Jiang's political-military 
agenda, the Japanese military efforts in the early 1930s to advance their interests in northeastern 
China and Manchuria could not be overlooked.  
 Following the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident in 1931 the Japanese military became more 
aggressive in Manchuria resulting in 1933 with the declaration of the puppet government of 
Manchukuo (Country of the Manchu) headed by the last emperor of China, Puyi. These actions 
served over time as a catalyst to bring the various factions vying for power in China together to 
oppose the growing Japanese threat. The most famous action to bring about this "second united 
front" was the kidnapping of Jiang by the northern warlord Zhang Xueliang and several 
supporting Nationalist generals in the northwestern city of Sian (Xian).
64
 Since the early 1930s, 
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the Nationalist forces had conducted a series of "extermination" campaigns the fifth and last of 
which drove the Communist armies out of southern China on a fighting retreat that is now 
famously known as the Long March. It was during this extended fighting retreat that Mao gained 
the leadership of the Communist movement in China. 
 The Soviets, through the Communist International or COMINTERN, provided military 
advisors to the Chinese Communist movement. Chinese Communists were provided political 
training both in the Soviet Union and in China. However, during the Long March, in a dispute 
over military tactics, Mao took control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Red 
Army.
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 As with Jiang at Huangpu, the Soviet advisors were also marginalized as their military 
advice was seen to have been a key factor in the Communist military defeats that led to the loss 
of their sanctuaries and created the necessity to conduct the Long March. The Kansas City 
journalist, Edgar Snow's book Red Star Over China first published in 1938, chronicles this epic 
retreat to remote northwest China. In 1936, Jiang had traveled to Xian to meet with his military 
leadership to plan for a climatic final assault on the newly established Communist sanctuary in 
northern Shaanxi Province. However, several of his key subordinates had decided to take matters 
into their own hands. 
 The Xian Incident was a conspiracy by key Nationalists and the Communist Zhou Enlai, 
who had been Jiang's deputy commandant at Huangpu Military Academy. The kidnapping of 
Jiang from a mountain resort area outside the city led to lengthy negotiations. Under still 
disputed circumstances, an agreement was finally reached with Jiang to form a "Second United 
Front." This brought together virtually all the Chinese--Nationalist, Communist, and warlord--to 
oppose further Japanese aggression. While the facts of the kidnapping are still argued between 
the Communists and the Nationalists, the effect was to force Jiang stop his offensive campaign 
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against the Communist and to take a stand against Japanese occupation and aggression. All out 
war with Japan was not long in coming. On July 7th, 1937 an incident at the Marco Polo Bridge 
on the western side of Beijing precipitated all out war between China and Japan. However, 
China, Jiang, the Communists, and the still autonomous warlords
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 were ill prepared for the 
coming conflict with the powerful, modern, well-trained, -led and -equipped forces of Japan's 
Kwantung Army. Jiang's forces, especially the German trained and equipped Huang faction 
units, appeared strong in relation to the risk averse, poorly equipped regional warlords, and 
poorly armed guerrilla groups forced to survive in China's hinterland. However, when forced to 
fight the powerful Japanese forces using modern battlefield tactics and equipment, the flaws in 
the Nationalist Army's leadership and preparation were again obvious. The time of the fight was 
not Jiang's choosing. 
 By 1937, the German advisory effort had grown significantly and was helping to build a 
modern, but limited in size and strength Chinese military force. These advisors had worked with 
Jiang and the Nationalist government on issues of building additional industrial infrastructure 
and procuring additional armaments. Twenty divisions had been manned and equipped and a 
plan to increase the total to 60 fully equipped divisions had been promulgated. The Nationalist 
Army had shown impressive growth in capability and much of this was centered on officer 
education and training. F.F. Liu outlines the establishment of service schools including a staff 
college, air and naval academies, infantry, armor, mechanized, cavalry, artillery, air defense, and 
a variety of logistics and specialty institutes, including language schools. These were all 
necessary to build and support modern military structures. In addition, China sent officers for 
advanced military schooling overseas to Europe and the United States. This included cadets at 
West Point and the Virginia Military Institute, and mid-level staff officers at Fort Leavenworth.
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However, a major issue that American advisors would later face emerged. Liu offers the 
following assessment: 
  However, the greatest improvement the general staff school might have made in 
 the army's personnel system it was unable to accomplish. It failed, in the face of deep-
 rooted  Chinese tradition and shortsighted modern generals, to consider, in choosing 
 candidates for positions of responsibility, merit, record, proven ability, and qualities of 
 leadership, instead of patronage.
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 Once again, lack of time, culture and tradition, internal organizational weakness, and an 
aggressive and powerful external threat all conspired to impede China's progress in military 
modernization. That is not to say major improvements had not been made. However, an army, 
good or bad, is judged by how effective it proves to be against its opponents and results on the 
battlefield. The growing alliance between Germany and Japan would also soon mean the end to a 
very effective advisory effort and source of modern military equipment. In the mid-1930s, senior 
American military officers including Stilwell served in Nanjing as military attaches. They had 
watched the German advisory efforts and seen its strengths and weaknesses and how it had been 
received by the Chinese. They also had the opportunity to observe the capabilities of the 
Nationalists in the early battles with the Japanese as they moved south from Beijing, attacked 
Shanghai, and moved up the Yangzi river valley. Japanese not only had superiority in artillery 
and air forces, their leadership was able to out-maneuver the Chinese and take advantage of their 
outmoded tactic of strong point defense which could not withstand the modern firepower 
advantage of the enemy.
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An American Effort Emerges 
 From 1912 until 1937, American forces had been observers, protectors, participants, and 
victims of China's internecine warfare and Japanese aggression that characterized the chaos and 
conflict in China as the warlord era. However, actions in the second half of 1937 would lead first 
to a build-up of forces to protect American and other foreign civilians and financial interests, and 
then to the complete withdrawal of American combat units from China as the "Second Sino-
Japanese War" expanded from northern China to Shanghai and then into central China. On 12 
December 1937, the USS Panay, a Yangzi River patrol craft, was attacked and sunk by Japanese 
aircraft with significant casualties among the crew. While the Japanese later apologized and paid 
reparations, this attack highlighted the confusing situation in China and the deterioration of 
relations between Japan and the United States. The Fifteenth Infantry Regiment was withdrawn 
from China in March of 1938. While isolationist sentiment to avoid war in Europe and Asia was 
strong at home, there was also growing opinion back in the United States to aid China in its war 
against Japan.
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 While the United States military attachés in China watched and reported on the 
evolving conflict, another American military officer began to play an important role in the 
Nationalist armed forces. 
 Claire L. Chennault who retired from the Army Air Corps in the spring of 1937, was 
hired by the Chinese government as a military advisor soon after. According to his own 
memoirs, Way of a Fighter, "Less than four months later I was flying through Japanese flak and 
fighters over Shanghai in the midst of the Sino-Japanese war.
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 Chennault would assist the 
Nationalists in building its air arm and he was the force behind the creation of the American 
Volunteer Group (AVG), the Flying Tigers. Another American serviceman, Evans Carlson, who 
would later gain fame as the leader of the United States Marine Corps, 2nd Raider Battalion in 
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the South Pacific, spent several months in the late 1930s in China attached to the American 
embassy. His mission was to observe the Sino-Japanese conflict and assess the Communist 
forces of the Eighth Route Army in the northwest. This USMC captain would have the 
opportunity to talk to the American president about his findings and remained an unofficial 
advisor to President Roosevelt throughout the war. He left the Marine Corps in order to write a 
book about his experiences traveling with these guerrilla forces fighting the Japanese, Twin Stars 
of China, but rejoined the Marines in 1941 when the United States entered the War.
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 During this period, Joseph W. Stilwell was also again in China where he served as a 
military attaché in the embassy charged with reporting on the performance of the Nationalist 
Army and the conflict. His memoir--The Stilwell Papers--provides significant insights into the 
personal feelings of an American military officer with an in-depth knowledge of the operational 
and tactical situation, the performance of China's armed forces and capabilities and limitations of 
China's key military leaders. Barbara Tuchman's book, Stilwell and the American Experience in 
China, 1911-1945, chronicles his military career and long service in Asia.
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 Stilwell was a 
military attaché on the ground in China from 1935-1939. These and other American military 
personnel, diplomats, businessmen, and missionaries kept up a steady official and unofficial 
correspondence back to Washington on the situation in China. Perhaps the most influential 
Americans in terms of providing information to the public during this period were the journalists 
who were reporting from China. 
 Some very competent and adventurous journalists including Edgar Snow, his wife Helen 
Snow, Theodore White, and Agnes Smedley, to mention some of the most famous, all had spent 
time following the Nationalist political and military situation. In some cases, they spent 
considerable time traveling and living with the Communist forces providing regular reporting, 
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articles and books on their observations. Peter Rand, whose father had been a journalist in China 
in the 1940s, in a book entitled, China Hands, examines: "...American dreamers and misfits who 
went to China to seek escape and adventure during the first half of this century. Some came 
back, others did not, but they  all achieved fame and glory, however fleeting, as "China Hands" 
who wrote about the Chinese people and publicized their struggle."
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 In addition to the reporting by correspondents, the situation in China was being reported 
through military and State Department channels by experienced observers. American 
missionaries also kept up a correspondence through their religious communities back in the 
United States. American businessmen like Herbert Hoover, who with his wife had conducted 
mining surveys in north China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, knew the geography, 
transportation infrastructure, and availability of resources.
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 Other businessmen, like Frank 
Lilley, who worked in the petroleum business, took their family to live in China for a long 
period. One of his sons, later ambassador the China, James Lilley, would serve as a soldier in 
Asia during the war years.
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 Against this backdrop of interested and informed citizens, a long 
tradition of military involvement, and the pressing need for assistance, President Roosevelt and 
his advisors had to make decisions on what to do about the situation China.   
 By 1941, President Roosevelt and his administration had decided to assist China. The 
problem was how to do this without becoming directly involved in a war with Japan. The first 
course of action was to provide financial support and limited military aid. In July of 1937 and 
again in April of 1941, the United States agreed to purchase Chinese currency to help stabilize 
China's economy. Other economic measures were taken before the United States entered the war 
with Japan to assist China economically and financially including loans and credits. In addition 
to lend-lease to provide military equipment, which also began in 1941, the administration wanted 
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to find a way to support Claire Chennault and the Flying Tigers who were officially a part of the 
Nationalist Chinese Air Force (CAF). Chennault had become personally connected to the 
Generalissimo and his wife and was in effect put in charge of training and equipping the Chinese 
air forces.
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 The American involvement with the CAF had actually begun in 1932 when Colonel Jack 
Jouett, with a small group of United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) officers, set up a training 
school in Hangchow (Hangzhou) in eastern China. This effort continued with limited equipping 
support for two years until a disagreement arose over the use of American supplied air assets by 
Jiang and the Nationalist military to attack a rebelling warlord in Fujian province. Jiang reacted 
strongly by replacing the U.S. effort with an Italian training team and aircraft support agreement. 
As he had done earlier when the Soviet advisors had overstepped their bounds, Jiang did not 
hesitate to play one potential foreign suitor off against another. He also showed he would react 
quickly and negatively to any attempt to usurp his leadership prerogatives. This was the 
background and situation in the CAF in 1937 when Chennault arrived in China to attempt to 
prepare Jiang's air force to hold their own against a very well equipped Japanese force with 
excellent pilots. 
 Chennault offered his services in the evolving war with Japan to Jiang after the July 7 
incident. He was hired to train the fighter pilots of the CAF that was equipped with a mix of 
American and Italian aircraft. In a short space of time, he became a personal advisor to the 
Generalissimo with unique access. Perhaps more importantly, he was essentially given a broad 
mandate to direct the operations of China's entire air arm. When the Japanese attacked Shanghai 
in August of 1937, Chennault was in the air over that city observing and directing operations.
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Having proven himself to Jiang and having direct access, he began the process of building a 
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competent force in the midst of war. His access and friendship with the Generalissimo and 
Madame Jiang would also be a source of continuing problems within the American military 
chain of command. His view of how to conduct the war against the Japanese, and how it was to 
be supported, was frequently at odds with his American superiors in China. This problem did not 
go away when he was later promoted to general officer rank and reintegrated back into the Army 
Air Corps. 
 While no official government military assistance had been provided from the United 
States to oppose Japan's aggression in China in 1937, the Soviet Union responded with a limited 
deployment of fighters and bombers with their crews to assist the Chinese in their war with 
Japan.
79
 While the Communist had rejected Soviet support, Josef Stalin maintained a relationship 
with Jiang and the Nationalists. However, neither Chennault nor the Soviets were a match for the 
Japanese air force that showed itself to be capable of gaining and maintaining air superiority over 
China. In 1938, Chennault moved to Kunming in southwestern China to begin the arduous task 
of re-building the air force far away from the action and relatively safe from Japanese air attacks. 
He was selected for this effort by direction of Madame Jiang (Soong Mei-ling),
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 the powerful 
and well-connected wife of the Generalissimo, a woman who spoke perfect English and who had 
graduated from Wellesley College in Massachusetts. Chennault's mandate was to train, man, and 
if possible, equip the Chinese Air Force (CAF) for the long conflict ahead. Chennault offered the 
following about working with the Chinese. While this highlights cultural differences and the 
difficult situation facing foreign advisors and trainers, it also points out that even those showing 
up in a foreign country with virtually no language or cultural skills or training can build effective 
relationships.  
 Teaching is a difficult job at best. With mechanically minded Americans teaching 
 classically educated Chinese to fly, there was ample opportunity for all the clashing 
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 elements of the two conflicting civilizations to rub raw against each other in nerve-
 wracking discord. In later years, many American newcomers to China marveled at my 
 ability to deal smoothly with the Chinese and generally attributed it to some occult touch.  
 The ability was acquired the hard way through years of experience--often bitter, often 
 painful, but always instructive.
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 In addition to the problem of building the human elements of an air force, there was the 
problem of equipping the force with modern aircraft capable of defeating the well equipped and 
early in the war, technically superior and well-manned Japanese air arm. The problem was more 
than just training pilots. A system had to be instituted to obtain the necessary fuel, ammunition, 
and replacement parts and airframes to maintain that capability. In October of 1940, Jiang sent 
Chennault and the senior Chinese general in the CAF to Washington to obtain aircraft and recruit 
American pilots to serve in China. After a year of arduous lobbying and acquisition work, China 
was allowed to buy 100 P-40Bs originally scheduled for Britain that were swapped out for newer 
models. Despite strong opposition from the U.S. military, former service pilots and ground crew 
were hired under contract to the private Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CAMCO) for 
service in China. By July of 1941, men and equipment started to flow out of the United States 
and Chennault was notified of "presidential approval for the second American Volunteer Group 
of bombers with a schedule of one hundred pilots and 181 gunners and radiomen to arrive in 
China by November of 1941 and an equal number to follow in January 1942."
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 U.S. defense assistance to China, unofficial and not fully supported by the military 
services, was ingeniously engineered by an American "contractor" working under the direct 
employ of a foreign government. He doggedly negotiated directly with American military 
equipment manufacturers to procure aircraft for the Nationalists. Given the size of the Chinese 
military and the enormity of the threat, this small, peripheral effort was no model for support 
given the magnitude of the need to prepare China for its war with Japan. President Roosevelt 
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sought alternatives to support America's allies currently at war with Germany and Italy in 
Europe, and Japan in Asia. The answer that emerged was a program called lend-lease. This arms 
sales program approved by Congress in March of 1941, immediately began providing access to 
military equipment and material to the European theater, especially Britain and the Soviet Union, 
but China was also part of this innovative program.   
 In January of 1940, President Roosevelt sent a trusted economic advisor, Lauchlin Currie, 
to China to assess that country's requirements. Over the past two years, four loans totaling over a 
$100 million in economic assistance had been provided, but this was not nearly enough and had 
come with strings attached concerning the purchase of military supplies and equipment in order 
not to antagonize Japan. In May of 1941, the defense of China was "declared vital to the defense 
of the United States."
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 At the same time, Jiang established the China Defense Supply (CDS) 
company under the direction of T.V. Soong (Song Ziwen), the brother of Madame Jiang, a close 
financial advisor to the Generalissimo, and a future Chinese foreign minister. Song was a 
Harvard graduate, very well connected, and informed about the American political process. He 
served as the point man for China's defense purchases for several years. However, with lend 
lease equipment authorized; financing being made available, the problem was getting the 
equipment and war materials to China. Japan controlled most of the ports along the China coast 
as well as those in Indochina. France's surrender to Germany allowed the Japanese to occupy 
Vietnam. Britain had also closed the port of Hong Kong for the transshipment of military aid to 
China in order not to prematurely push Japan into war on British controlled areas of Asia. 
Burma's port of Rangoon and the long and difficult road and rail network that ran north to China 
was China's only viable lifeline.
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 To facilitate lend lease to China, Brigadier General John Magruder, another officer who 
had previously served in China as a military attaché, was sent to Jiang's wartime capital, 
Chungking (Chongqing), as the first director of the American Military Mission to China 
(AMMISCA).
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  In July 1941, the Division of Defense Aid Reports, China Defense Supplies, and 
 the War Department started to canvass the possibilities for equipping and training large 
 numbers of Chinese ground forces. These decisions resulted in a project for completely 
 reequipping 30 Chinese divisions under Lend-Lease by the end of 1942. Artillery, anti-
 aircraft guns, armored vehicles, and tanks were to be sent from the United States. In 
 addition, machinery and supplies for China's arsenals would be sent to help increase her 
 own output of small arms and ammunition. 
  In anticipation of the arrival of these supplies, an American military mission 
 under Brigadier General John Magruder arrived in Chungking in November 1941.The 
 mission supported by Lend-Lease funds was composed of specialists in all the phases of 
 modern warfare. They were to survey China's needs for additional arms and help train 
 the Chinese troops in the use of American equipment.
86
 
 
                                                        
  1John King Fairbank, Chinese-American Interactions: A Historical Summary (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1975), 11-13.   
 
 2John King Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty Year Memoir (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1982). 
Parts Four and Five of this book discuss his time in China in detail. 
 
 3James L. Hevia, English Lessons: the Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press Books, 2003), 4. Hevia calls the Western approach to China beginning in 1839 (The 
Opium War) "Euroamerican imperialism."  
 
 4Mark Peattie, Edward J. Drea, and Hans van de Ven, eds., The Battle for China: Essays on the Military 
History of the Sino-Japanese War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). Peattie in a chapter entitled 
"Dragon's Seed," outlines the march to war from Japan's invasion of Taiwan in 1870 to the clash between Chinese 
and Japanese troops on 7 July 1937. 
 
 5Kemp Tolley, Yangtze River Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 
1971), 2-4.  
 
 6Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrila War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961).   
 
 7Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 2-4. 
 
 
8
John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-
1854 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), 155. This study details the complex relationship China 
establishes with the foreign powers and contains details of treaties and agreements that we made. 
 
 9U.S. Department of State, United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-
1949, Department of State Publication 3573, serial Far East Series 30 (Washington, DC, August 1949). (Hereafter 
68 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
cited as China White Paper). This controversial document was released by the Truman Administration to explain to 
the American public its actions toward China at the end of World War Two and though the Nationalist defeat. The 
documents begin with a brief synopsis of Sino-American relations beginning in the mid Nineteenth Century.  
 
 
10
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1999), 162-63.  
 
 11Arthur P. Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 16.-21; Michael Edwards, The West in Asia, 1850-1914 (New York: Capricorn Books, 
1967), 143-52.  
 
 12Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 45-51. 
 
 13China White Paper, 413. 
 
 
14
Jonathan D. Spence, God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1996). Spence's study of Hong and the Taiping Rebellion discusses the formation of 
this movement and charts the progress of its military campaign. Mao also selects this rebellion for inclusion into his 
history chapter of Mao on Guerrilla War translated by Griffith.   
 
 15Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 37.  
 
 16Spence, God's Chinese Son, 120-121.  
 
 17David Graff and Robin Higham, A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 2002). This overview work provides an overview of the development of Chinese military strategy and forces 
including the period of the Qing Dynasty. The early military conquests and problems in this period are especially 
well covered in China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Eurasia by Peter C. Perdue. 
 
 18Spence, Search for Modern China, 27-48. 
 
 19Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press  
of Harvard University Press, 2005). 
 
 20Graff and Higham, Military History of China, 144. 
 
 21Caleb Carr, The Devil Soldier: the American Soldier of Fortune Who Became God in China (New York: 
Random House, 1992). This biography of Frederick Townsend Ward chronicles his background and the unique role 
he played in China at the time of the Taiping Rebellion. 
 
 22Spence, To Change China, 58 (see chap.1, no. 17). 
 
 23Ibid., 70-73. 
 
 24Ibid., 65. 
 
 25Ibid., 73. 
 
 
26
Stanley Spector, Li HUNG-CHANG and the HUAI ARMY: a Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese 
Regionalism (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Pr, 1964), ix-xi. This biography is of one of the foremost 
reformers in the waning days of the Qing regime. Spector argues Li confront two "profound" conflicts, the problem 
of westernization and the acquisition of military power by regional political figures. Spence, To Change China, 215-
222. 
69 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 27Denis Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Part 1, Late Ching, 1800-1911 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 491-95; Spence, Search for Modern China, 217-219. 
 
 28Ibid., 502-503. 
 
 29Ibid., 498.  
 
 30Ibid., 537-542. Spence, Search for Modern China, 215-220. 
 
 31Ibid., 503-504. 
 
 32Ellemann, Modern Chinese Warfare, 75-76. 
 
 33Ibid., 87-91. 
 
 34Ibid., 92. 
 
 35S.C. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1895-: Perception, Power and Primacy (New York: Cambridge 
Press, 2005). The study of the 1st Sino-Japanese War provides an excellent source of information on this important, 
but little written about conflict. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 95-112. 
 
 36Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 112. 
 
 37Ibid., 114-116. 
 
 38China White Paper, 2-3. 
 
 39Ibid., 2. 
 
 40 Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997). This study of the Boxer Rebellion provides not only an excellent history of the 
key players and events of the conflict, but also the complex social, economic, political and economic issues as well. 
This study also uses Elleman for an evaluation of the military aspects of the rebellion. 
 
 41Elleman, Modern Chinese History, 116-137; Richard O'Connor, The Spirit Soldiers: a Historical 
Narrative of the Boxer Rebellion (New York: Putnam, 1973), 237-61. O'Connor's account describes in detail the 
military aspects of the conflict. 
 
 42Elleman, Modern Chinese History, 137. 
 
 43Dudden, American Pacific, 120. 
 
 44Elleman, Modern Chinese History, 135. 
 
 45Dudden, American Pacific, 121. 
  
 46Ibid., 122-123. 
 
 47Edward A. McCord. The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1993). McCord makes a compelling case for the rise of the political autonomy of 
military commanders at the end of the Qing through the rise of the Republic. A national Army did not rise in China 
as political support for Qing central forces would not allow for the rise of a truly modern Army. That task was left to 
the regions and the warlords, a problem that was not overcome until the establishment of the People's Liberation 
Army in 1949. 
 
70 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 48Lawrence M. Kaplan, Homer Lea: American Soldier of Fortune (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2010), 3-6. 
 
 49Alfred E. Cornebise, The United States 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938 (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland and Company, 2004), 27. This book provides an historical account of this regiment's time in China 
outlining its mission, organization, manning, and the changes in command and control it experienced during its more 
than twenty-five years of duty in and around the Tianjin area.  
 
 50Ibid., 76-95. 
 
 51Ibid., 86. 
 
 52Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949 (New York: Longman Publishing, 1995), 32-34.  
 
 53Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 17-20.  
 
 54F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1956), 6.   
 
 55Ibid., 8. 
 
 56Ibid., 9. 
 
 57Ibid., 24. 
 
 58Ibid.  
 
 59Ibid., 35. 
 
 60Ibid., 61.  
 
 61William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984), 3-
4. This study outlines the decade from 1927 to 1937 were German military advisors exerted a significant influence 
over the modernization of the Chinese Nationalist armed forces. 
 
 62Liu, Military History of Modern China, 70.  
 
 63Ibid., 82. 
 
 64Taylor, Generalissimo, 117-137. This account of the incident provides insights into the divided nature of 
the Nationalist and the delicate nature of the relationship between Jiang and the regional power brokers. 
 
 65The Red Army was formally established in August of 1927 (bayi) and would remain the name of the 
Communist armed forces until liberation and the formation of the People's Republic of China when it would 
renamed the People Liberation Army, the name it goes by today. 
 
 66McCord, The Power of the Gun. This study discusses in detail the evolution of the warlord's period with 
special attention to the period after the 1911 Revolution. McCord sees the development of warlordism as part of the 
political process that emerged with the weakness of the Republic government and part of the process of building a 
new political order. The key is that for Jiang, the warlords were as much political rivals as military counterparts. 
 
 67Liu, Military History of Modern China, 83-88. 
 
 68Ibid., 89. 
71 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 69Hsi-sheng Chʻi, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1982), 82. This study argues the political weaknesses of the Jiang's Nationalist regime 
were a factor of an over reliance on military power and a "peculiar pattern of relationships...that was a mixture of 
distrust, hostility, appeasement, and compromise. Part Three of Peattie, Drea, and van de Ven's The Battle for China 
covers the early Nationalist defense of Shanghai and the Yangzi Valley. 
 
 70Tolley, Yangtze River Patrol, 246-252. 
 
 71Robert B. Hotz, ed., Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1949).   
  
 72Evans F. Carlson, Twin Stars of China: A Behind-The Scenes Story of China's Valiant Struggle For 
Existence by a Marine Who Lived and Moved with the People (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1940). Carlson was 
attached to the American Embassy in Nanjing and had the opportunity to travel to northwest China and link up with 
the Communist forces, travel with them, and observe their operating tactics. He also was an observer of Japanese 
military operations against the Nationalists. He had served as a military assistant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and maintained a correspondence with him. Some of his letters are in the Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde 
Park, New York. 
 
 73Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-1945 (New York: Macmillan 
Company, 1970). 
 
 74Peter Rand, China Hands: The Adventures and Ordeals of the American Journalists Who Joined Forces 
with the Great Chinese Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 15. 
 
 75Hal Wert, "Hoover in China: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage and Diplomacy in Asia," History 
Today 61, no. 9 (2011). 
 
 76James R. Lilley and Jeffrey Lilley, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy 
in Asia (New York: Public Affairs, Perseus Book Group, 2004). Lilley provides a very personal account of growing 
up in China, the son of a businessman and then serving as a junior military officer during World War Two. This lead 
to a life in the service of the United States in intelligence and diplomatic positions, and ultimately to American 
Ambassador to China. 
 
 77China White Paper, 28-33. 
 
 78Hotz, Way of a Fighter, 36-46. 
 
 79Ibid., 61. 
 
 80Ibid., 73. 
 
 81Ibid., 75. 
 
 82Ibid., 104. 
 
 83Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Land-lease: Weapon for Victory (New York: MacMillan, 1944), 109. 
 
 84Ibid., 109-113. 
 
 85Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, 28-29. 
 
 86Stettinius, Weapon for Victory, 115.   
72 
 
 
THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO CHINA 
Advise and Assist  
 
"You have to live it the way they live it." 
Technical Sergeant John "Red" Sweeney, US Army Ramgarh, India
1
 
 
 President Roosevelt approved the Lend-Lease Act in early March of 1941. Two months 
before, as the legislation was being debated in Congress, he asked his administrative assistant, 
Dr. Lauchin Currie, to visit China and make an assessment of their receptivity to American 
military support and their requirements. On 11 March, after six weeks in China, he returned and 
reported the Chinese were preparing to receive American assistance to include technicians and 
advisers.
2
 By the end of the month, the Chinese had made a specific request for additional 
aircraft for the unofficial American Volunteer Group (AVG) program begun by Chennault to 
support operations and training in the China Air Force (CAF). In May of 1941, Brigadier Henry 
B. Clagett was dispatched from the Philippines to conduct of survey of China's air forces. 
Because of the problems of conducting aviation training in China itself, he recommended a 
program be established to train pilots and mechanics in the United States. The first fifty Chinese 
trainees arrived in Arizona in October of 1941 to begin flight instruction. This program 
continued during the war in the United States as well as at schools established in China and 
India.
3
 The early emphasis of assistance to China was in the area of building a competent air arm 
to oppose the significant threat posed by Japan's air forces. 
 In addition to requests for assistance for the air arm, the Chinese representative in 
Washington, Song Ziwen, Jiang's brother-in-law,
4
 also asked for munitions and equipment for up 
to thirty divisions. This request included a support package of equipment and expertise to 
improve and protect the air and landlines of communications through Burma and India to China. 
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Currie reported that the Chinese appeared eager to enlarge their military support relationship 
with the United States and were ready to build up their forces with modern American 
equipment.
5
 According to Riley Sunderland and Charles Romanus, "Soong [Song] believed that 
a revitalized Chinese Army could not only hold key defensive points, thereby forcing Japan to 
keep troops in China, but could ultimately assume the offensive. Song estimated that with 
adequate lend-lease aid these strategic aims might be achieved in two years' time."
6
  China was 
to be a key pillar in an emerging American strategy for the looming conflict in Asia. China had 
the manpower, but lacked the equipment and the technical training to build a competent modern 
military force to oppose the Japanese. The Chinese forces had conducted an extended fighting 
retreat and if properly trained, equipped, and led had significant potential to play a key role in the 
war with Japan. 
 When the lend lease program was established there was no administrative or support 
structure in place to manage the effort to provide America's allies this equipment and technical 
advice in its use. In addition, which countries would have the priority for American equipment 
was also not designated. Given the dire situation in Europe, the first order of business was to get 
equipment, especially ships and patrol craft, to the British. The first two lend-lease directives, 
promulgated in March of 1941 by President Roosevelt, designated the defense of Great Britain 
and Greece as vital to America's security interests.
7
 China had been purchasing American 
equipment since the late 1930s through an Import-Export loan program, but this was more or less 
cash and carry and not a high priority for the American government or the nation's munitions 
industries. In May of 1941, China was added to the list of nations vital to America's defense and 
was now eligible to procure equipment and munitions as part of the new program. Song quickly 
established China Defense Supplies, incorporated as the agency to handle his nation's military 
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procurement from the United States.
8
  However, just as the China program was getting started, 
the situation in Europe changed significantly. In June of 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet 
Union, and became a de facto member of the anti-Axis alliance. While not immediately given 
access to the lend-lease program, military equipment was quickly made available under normal 
purchase agreements. Reacting quickly to this strategic opportunity, by October Roosevelt made 
lend-lease available to the Soviets.
9
  America's Europe first strategy was obvious, but Roosevelt 
had also made a decision to assist China. 
 The American military's official commitment to China in its war with Japan began on the 
3rd of July 1941 with the approval by General George C. Marshall of the establishment of an 
American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA). The organization's mission was clearly and 
succinctly laid out in an August 1941 memorandum from the War Department. 
  (1)  Advise and assist the Chinese Government in all phases of procurement, 
 transport, and maintenance of materials, equipment, and munitions requisite to the 
 prosecution of its military effort. 
  (2) Advise and assist the Chinese Government in the training of Chinese 
 personnel in the use and maintenance of materials, equipment, and munitions supplied as 
 defense aid material by the United States. 
  (3)  When requested assist personnel of other Departments of the [United States] 
 Government in carrying out their respective duties in furtherance of the objectives of the 
 Lend-Lease Act pertaining to China. 
  (4)  Assist the Chinese Government in obtaining prompt and co-ordinated 
 administration action by the United States authorities necessary to insure the orderly flow 
 of materials and munitions from lend-lease agencies to the Chinese military forces. 
  (5)  Explore the vital port, road, and railroad facilities with a view to the 
 establishment and maintenance of adequate lines of communications.
10
 
At this point in time, there was no requirement to provide military advisors or operational 
planners, which would potentially have brought American military personnel into direct combat 
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with Japanese forces. While the United States was committed to improving China's armed forces, 
it was not yet at war with Japan.  
 In order to accomplish the advise and assist mission, especially tasks (3) and (4) above, 
AMMISCA quickly established offices in both Washington, D.C. and China. The lend-lease 
administrators had to be able to work closely with their Chinese counterparts and other American 
governmental agencies in both locations.
11
 These administrative and logistics tasks were 
obviously within the direct purview of the military in that they dealt with war materials and 
technical training. Nevertheless, implicitly there were political and fiscal aspects that would 
require civilian agency, diplomatic, and economic expertise both in Washington and in 
Chongqing to oversee and manage such a large and complex undertaking. The size and scope of 
the program was also beyond the capacity of the military personnel assigned as attachés at the 
American embassy in Chongqing.  
 Discussed later in this study are the State Department personnel and others from 
supporting government agencies who worked alongside the military in China. Although a 
contentious issue between the Departments of State and War, Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss, 
retained overall "coordinating jurisdiction" over the AMMISCA program.
12
 Nevertheless, the 
military personnel in this organization would have to undertake operational missions in both 
China and Burma to accomplish the assigned tasks. While not at war, the American military 
advisory personnel were assisting a military that was at war and were physically present in a war 
zone.  
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The Advisors 
  This is NOT one of those Public Relations scenarios written to glorify some 
 individual person or group of men. It is a simple record of facts, good and bad, miserable 
 in spots, and perhaps humorous in others. It has educational value somewhere between 
 the lines, but real education is hidden and never can be absorbed from numbered 
 paragraphs in field manuals.
13
 
This first group of American military personnel to go to China as part of AMMISCA were 
breaking new ground and learning by doing. While the U.S. military had trained and equipped 
indigenous forces in the Philippines since the early 1900s, the scale and complexity of the 
mission in China was unprecedented.
14
 AMMISCA had to have technical specialists and be able 
to carry out a variety of difficult logistics related tasks. The first major problem was to set up a 
depot to receive supplies and equipment in the port of Rangoon, Burma (Yangon, Myanmar).   
 The best overland routes to deliver supplies to the Nationalist forces would have been 
through Chinese eastern ports, Haiphong-Hanoi in French Indochina, or British controlled Hong 
Kong. By 1940, these routes were either not viable or available.
15
 Therefore, American lend-
lease materials had to go through Rangoon. Once landed and offloaded, in addition to storage 
and preparation for onward movement by river barge, truck, and railway through that country's 
rugged terrain, some of the inbound equipment also had to be assembled. This required the 
acquisition of local labor and facilities. Because a state of war did not yet exist between Japan 
and Great Britain, the bureaucratic peacetime customs and licensing procedures could not be 
expedited, a practice that continued even after the Japanese attack on Burma commenced.
16
    
 This first group of AMMISCA officers included active duty logistics and transportation 
officers, but also called for military reservists with specific technical and training skills. 
However, there was more to this mission than service of supply (SOS) tasks and technical skills. 
The senior officers had direct access to Generalissimo Jiang, his senior officers, and other 
important government officials. Therefore, the head of AMMISCA needed to be someone with 
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knowledge of the country's geography, its military organization, the workings of the American 
embassy, and preferably, a familiarity with the language and culture.
17
 
 On the eve of America's direct involvement in China, the United States Army had 28 
officers who had been in China as language students and were available for duty.
18
 The United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) also had a similar, but smaller, program to station officers in China 
for language training. One of these officers, Major General William Worton, would play a major 
role after the Japanese surrender as part of the III Marine Amphibious Corps deployment to 
China.
19
 For these junior officers, normally in the rank of captain, the program could be as long 
as four years of language study while attached to the American embassy. In addition to the 
language officers, both the Army and the Marine Corps had maintained major combat formations 
from the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 through 1938 and 1941, respectively, to protect American 
property and citizens in China. The military had built a relatively large pool of personnel with 
experience working in China, and with the Chinese, as it embarked on the mission of supporting 
China's military in its ongoing war with Japan.   
 The first officer assigned to China by the United States Army as part of its newly 
established Military Intelligence Division language program was Joseph W. Stilwell. The 
primary purpose was to produce military attachés to serve at the embassy, but also to meet the 
potential needs of an Army coming out of World War I as a major international power with vital 
interests in Asia. The qualifications for selection were a solid file of efficiency reports, some 
aptitude for languages, and to be a volunteer. Stilwell took a year of Chinese language at the 
University of California at Berkeley and then, in 1919, was assigned to Beijing with his family. 
There, he and one other officer attended North China Union Language School; an institution 
originally set up to teach missionaries, but later expanded to educate businessmen and others 
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needing language and cultural skills. The language instruction was intensive with small group 
instruction progressing through the three or four year program teaching the students to be able to 
read Chinese characters and speak the language fluently. In 1923, his program successfully 
completed, the forty-year-old Stilwell, returned to the United States to teach at the Infantry 
school. That assignment was followed by attendance at the Command and General Staff College 
at Fort Leavenworth and selection to return to China as a battalion commander in the 15th 
Infantry Regiment in Tianjin.
20
   
 The program that began in 1919 with Stilwell was ongoing in 1941 when the Army was 
searching for qualified officers to serve in AMMISCA. Five officers, four Army and one Marine, 
were studying language in China as the new lend-lease support program was being established. 
The program had moved out of Nanjing and was reestablished in Chongqing in the late 1930s as 
the result of the displacement of the Chinese capital. These officers relocated to Chengtu 
(Chengdu) from Chongqing for safety reasons due to the Japanese bombing campaign. The 
Japanese air attacks continued through 1941 when the Army leadership finally decided to end the 
program and assigned these officers to various duties in the theater including AMMISCA.
21
 The 
U.S. also maintained a robust embassy and consular network that included a significant number 
of military attachés to report on the evolving war situation and the condition of the Chinese 
military. As covered in the last chapter, an Army regiment (the Fifteenth Infantry), that at times 
had over three thousand personnel of all ranks, had operated in northeast China from 1912-1938. 
While this unit had not provided advisors to Chinese army units, they had lived and operated in 
China.  
 Assignments to the 15th Regiment, the language program, and service at the embassy all 
played a key role in preparing officers to serve in China during the period of this study. Brigadier 
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General William D. Connor, who took command of the regiment in 1922, "endeared himself to 
the Chinese, his diplomatic approach resulting in considerable good will on all sides. He was 
responsible for the introduction of the enforced study of the Chinese language for the personnel 
of the 15th."
22
 In addition, the 15th Regiment's mission was "characterized by constantly 
changing local conditions--political, military and international....the Army's forces in China were 
subordinate, with respect to their mission, to the American minister [ambassador] in Peking 
[Beijing] and his superiors in the State Department in Washington."
23
 The result of the Army's 
effort was an available pool of middle and senior-ranking noncommissioned and field grade 
officers with experience working in China, under an often ambiguous and non-standard chain of 
command, in a time of great internal turmoil, and alongside the forces of allies and the future 
enemy, Japan. Among those with long service in China in 1941 were two officers who had been 
through the army's language program, served as attachés, and had attained the rank of general 
officer--Joseph Stilwell and John Magruder.
24
   
  Brigadier General John Magruder, then serving as the commander of Fort Devens, 
Massachusetts, was selected to go to China as the head of AMMISCA. He immediately moved to 
Washington to study the situation, organize the part of the mission that would remain in 
Washington, and prepare for the move to China. In September of 1941, the first AMMICSA 
personnel began to arrive in China's wartime capital to begin to carry out the assigned mission. 
Magruder deployed to China in October to personally lead the effort to advise and assist Jiang's 
government and the Nationalist military forces, and especially, to facilitate the timely delivery of 
lend-lease equipment. The officers of AMMICSA were assigned to five project areas: 
"communications, aviation, military supply, arsenals, and military training."
25
 The task ahead 
was daunting, as China's forces, both Nationalist and Communist, had suffered a string of costly 
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military defeats over the last more than three years of war with Japan. Although in the fall of 
1941 the battle lines in China were relatively stable, China and its people had paid a terrible price 
in the war with Japan--militarily and economically.   
AMMISCA's Strategic and Operational Environment 
  It is said that China has around 5,000,000 men in her army, is organizing her 
 country industrially and ties up some forty to fifty per cent of the Japanese land forces  
 and probably fifty to seventy percent of the air and some of her navy. China in spite of 
 all obstacles against her does not appear to be getting any weaker...The Chinese despite 
 their losses of territory and heavy casualties, appear willing and able to carry on. The 
 Japanese, unable to impose their will on the enemy may have to be content with trying to 
 protect what they have gained.
26
 
 
The above words are from a March 1941 Far East situation update in Military Review, the 
journal of the United States Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. The 
strategic and operational situation outlined below describes the situation in China prior to the late 
1941 Japanese attack on Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Although the 
situation is tense, and the war in Europe is not going well for the Allies, in early 1941 there was a 
military stasis in China and Asia.   
 The Japanese were now allies of the Germans who appeared to be unstoppable in Europe. 
The Soviets had ceased supplying and providing air support to the Nationalists in their fight 
against the Japanese. From 1937 to 1941, this support had been substantial as a state of war 
existed between Japan and the Soviet Union. The Soviets had supplied the Nationalists with 
hundreds of aircraft, thousands of advisors, and large quantities of ground vehicles and 
munitions. However, in April of 1941, Japan and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression 
pact. This resulted in the reduction and eventual ending of Soviet support to China by 1942.
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The Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941 and the chances of Moscow reneging on 
the non-aggression agreement with Japan and facing the possibility of having to fight a two-front 
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war now seemed remote. Given the Soviets own equipment needs, restarting aid to the 
Nationalist was also not possible. Outside support for Mao and the Communist forces is a highly 
debated subject, but in the late 1930s, the Soviets and Jiang's Nationalists were allies in the fight 
against Japan. However, only the United States had the industrial potential to provide significant 
amounts of supplies and equipment to the allies. Japan's fears of a Soviet attack, similar to what 
had occurred in 1937 and 1938 were much reduced, but the legacy of the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905, and the decades long struggle for access and control of Manchuria was certainly not 
forgotten, nor was Soviet earlier support for the Mao and the Communists through the 
Communist International.  
 In January 1941, in an event that would presage a key element of this decade long 
American advisory effort, Nationalist forces attacked the Communist New Fourth Army killing 
its commander and many of the soldiers.
28
 The Nationalist-Communist cooperative relationship, 
the 2nd United Front, in place since the Xian Incident in 1936 appeared to be unraveling. Jiang 
was now simultaneously fighting two wars. The priority of his effort remains a contentious issue 
and still not been clearly established. Over the long term, the political-military contest between 
the Nationalists and the Communists for control of China that had begun in the 1920s had yet to 
be resolved.
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 Japan's future strategy in northeast Asia was also unclear, but with its forces 
currently available in China and Manchuria, it appeared a dynamic stalemate of sorts was in 
place.
30
 China had been at war for nearly four years and there had been few successes on the 
battlefield against the technically and logistically superior Japanese forces. An appraisal of the 
Chinese military's strengths and weaknesses, their ability to absorb modern American equipment 
and training, and their potential readiness for offensive action was a high priority for 
AMMISCA.
31
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 The Nationalist forces had been significant weakened in 1937-1938 with the loss of some 
of their most well-trained and equipped formations in the unsuccessful defense of Shanghai, 
Nanjing, and economically vital Yangzi valley.
32
 The Nationalist military's defeats were the 
consequences of its deficiencies in airpower and artillery. Questionable tactics in conducting 
strong point defenses of key cities also contributed to the loss of eastern China. However, the 
overall strategy of regrouping forces and establishing a viable defensive posture further inland 
was successful. The Nationalist Army had also suffered significant casualties with tactics aimed 
more at attrition of the Japanese than holding key political and military terrain. This was not an 
Army with a common doctrine, interoperable equipment in terms of munitions and spare parts, or 
a system of command where those leaders closest to the action could and would adapt to the 
dynamic battlefield conditions.  
  As was outlined in Chapter 2, the Nationalist Army had officers who had been educated 
in China, Japan, Europe, and American. The Chinese armed forces had variously received 
training and equipment from the Germans, the Soviets, the Italians, and the Americans. In the 
fall of 1941, Jiang's only hope appeared to be the lend-lease program and the promise of 
American advisors to train and equip China's ground and air forces. Jiang and his leadership had 
gained valuable experience over the last four years of fighting. Both F.F. Liu in A Military 
History of Modern China, 1924-1949 and Hsi-sheng Ch'i in Nationalist China at War: Military 
Defeats and Political Collapse outline the series of reorganizations and especially the influences 
of the German and Soviet staff systems on the Nationalist military. It is also clear that foreign 
command and staff systems were not copied, but rather were adapted by Jiang and the military 
leadership, but this effort was neither systematic, nor fielded throughout the force. Liu argues 
with the conferences in 1938 and 1941 new, smaller formations capable of surviving and not 
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being wiped out in large-scale static defense schemes emerged as the preferred method of 
organization. However, this was a not a force organized for offensive operations or rapid 
movement and maneuver of units to battle positions.
33
 Ch'i stresses that in addition to changes to 
more mobile formations, training and logistics shortfalls were also recognized and efforts to 
make the necessary changes put into place.
34
 Jiang and others in the Nationalist forces 
understood the shortcomings and weaknesses that had spelled defeat in fighting the Japanese. 
The Situation with the Red Army 
 While the focus of AMMISCA was the Nationalist forces, Communist forces were also 
engaged against the Japanese and controlled large areas of China or maintained sanctuaries and 
operational areas in the north and east. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
Communists forces had also been advised by German and Soviet members of the Communist 
International in the 1930s. Mao Zedong had disagreed with the advice he received from his 
foreign advisors on how to fight the Nationalists. During the Long March in 1934-1935, Mao 
gained the leadership of the Red Army and dismissed these advisors. Conventional style large 
unit combat as advocated by the foreign advisors against the stronger and better equipped 
Nationalist forces was not tenable. The Chinese Red Army struggled for a strategy to survive the 
Nationalist extermination campaigns and began to fully develop the doctrine of people's war or 
protracted guerrilla warfare. In the early 1940s, the Red Army also searched for a way to fight 
the Japanese and grow in strength for the inevitable struggle with Jiang.
35
 As will be discussed in 
more detail later, American journalists and military officers had accompanied and studied this 
new emerging method of war. Magruder, as a former attaché, was likely fully aware of the 
Communist situation and the Red Army's operational methods. Mao had also tried a large unit 
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approach to fighting the Japanese that proved very costly, not only on his forces, but also to the 
people that supported them. 
 From August through December of 1940, the Chinese Communists forces suffered 
significant defeats and reduced the size and scope of attacks against the Japanese after their 
unsuccessful Battle of the Hundred Regiments.
36
 Mao's major effort to conduct widespread 
attacks on road and rail networks throughout Japanese controlled territories in northern China 
backfired. The resulting Japanese counterattacks reduced areas under Communist control and 
inflicted significant casualties on Mao's forces. The Japanese reactions forced the Communists to 
curtail operations and conduct more selective guerrilla actions and mobilization activities.  
 More critically for Mao's rural-based effort among China's predominately-agricultural 
society, the Japanese responded with a "kill all, burn all, loot all" campaign designed to reduce 
popular support.
37
 After early 1940, both the Nationalists and the Communists saw survival, 
rather than regaining territory and conducting offensive action again the Japanese, as their 
guiding objective. Brigadier General Samuel Griffith's translation of Mao On Guerilla War 
outlines a doctrine that calls for flexibility when fighting a protracted guerilla war and to fall 
back to an earlier phase if the enemy is too strong is completely acceptable.
38
 Mao practiced 
against the Japanese what the Red Army will again be forced to do in 1946 and early 1947 when 
pressed by Nationalist forces. 
 Weakened by its clashes with the Japanese, the Communists were vulnerable. When 
AMMISCA arrived in China, the relationship between the Nationalist and the Communists was 
complex and ambiguous. Both politically and militarily, their cooperation was tentative at best.
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Despite the breakdown of military cooperation on the ground, a Communist liaison mission to 
the Nationalist government headed by Zhou Enlai continued to operate in Chongqing, Jiang's 
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wartime capital throughout the conflict. In his position as a trusted aide to Mao, Zhou served as 
the key Communist contact for American personnel in Chongqing. He would play a significant 
role in later efforts by the United States after the war with Japan to bring the Communist and 
Nationalist factions to the negotiating table.   
 Despite China's vulnerable position with Japanese forces controlling the eastern third of 
the country, Jiang continued to see Communist efforts in the north and east as his major long-
term threat. In the early 1940s, Jiang initially reduced forces deployed to counteract Communist 
efforts. However, by 1941, despite the dire Japanese threat, Jiang maintained deployments that 
tied down significant numbers of his better-trained and more loyal forces. These troops were 
positioned to contain the Communist recruitment efforts and prevent the movement of Mao's 
forces into areas still under Nationalist influence or control. In reality, Jiang and the Nationalist 
forces were simultaneously fighting two major conflicts, a civil war against the Communists that 
had begun in 1927, and, as member of the Allied Powers, a war against Japan in Asia. The 
United States was committed to backing Jiang and the internationally recognized Chinese 
government he led. However, for the American leadership at the beginning of the Second World 
War, the defeat of the Japanese was the central and most immediate concern. Avoiding becoming 
embroiled in the Chinese politics and internal conflicts was also a very high priority. However, 
from very early in the war, for the Americans, Mao and the Communists were seen as a potential 
asset in the fight against the Japanese.
40
 This was certainly a sentiment not shared by Jiang. 
 Working with Communist allies, the most obvious being the Soviet Union, fighting 
against Germany, and potentially in the future against Japan, was part of the emerging American 
global strategy. American and British military forces were now, or would in the future, ally with 
Communist underground and partisan groups from France to Greece to Yugoslavia to Malaya 
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and the Philippines. The only litmus test of an ally was its desire to fight the Germans and the 
Japanese and their allies. In fact, the idealism and revolutionary nature of Mao and the 
Communists resonated with many Americans that were provided with detailed accounts of this 
movement by several adventurous members of the American press and as has been mentioned 
earlier by author-commando, USMC Colonel Evans Carlson.  
 American journalists had accompanied Mao on the Long March and wrote articles in 
popular papers and journals as well as books supportive of the Communist effort based among 
the suffering peasants of rural China both during the war and in the immediate aftermath. As 
Edgar Snow's work mentioned earlier, Agnes Smedley's The Great Road chronicled the time she 
spent with the Communists in the 1930s and extolled the virtues of Mao, his generals, and the 
young Communists. Two journalists, Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, who spent many 
years reporting from China and who had studied the Communists published the 1946 classic 
book, Thunder Out of China. They argued, "The story of the War in China is the story of the 
tragedy of Chiang Kai-shek, a man who misunderstood the war as badly as the Japanese or the 
Allied technicians of victory. Chiang could not understand the revolution whose creature he was 
except as something fearful and terrible that had to be crushed."
41
 This fundamental lack of a 
shared vision of the Japanese threat, and how to deal with Mao, plagued the American 
relationship with Jiang from the very beginning of the effort. However, one American was firmly 
committed to Jiang and the Nationalist effort. 
The Flying Tigers 
 Claire Chennault worked tirelessly to recruit American pilots and crew and obtain aircraft 
for the Jiang's air force. A competent air arm could not only oppose the Japanese bombing 
campaign against China's cities, but could also support land operations. Lauchlin Currie reported 
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to President Roosevelt in a December 1941 memo that there were "66 P-40's ready for combat, 
about 90 pilots and 180 ground personnel."
42
 In the report, Currie also advised Roosevelt to bring 
this privately contracted air group back into the U.S. military for unity of effort and command 
and control. A second and separate advisory effort had the potential to be dysfunctional in terms 
of an overall strategy and sharing of scarce military resources. The reintegration of the American 
pilots, crewmen, and maintenance personnel and the elevation of Chennault, a retired Army Air 
Corps captain, who was a personal advisor and confidant of senior Nationalist leaders, would 
prove to be problematic. In addition, the coming problems of having to simultaneously rapidly 
expand the United States air forces, support not only Britain, but also the Soviet Union with air 
assets, and assist China would tax America's industrial capacity. 
 Americans serving in the Flying Tigers would later be offered the opportunity to re-join 
the U.S. military (and many would refuse). Chennault accepted the offer, was promoted to 
general officer, and became a subordinate commander, first to Stilwell and later to Wedemeyer. 
However, Chennault's close and enduring relationship with the Generalissimo and Madame Jiang 
built up in the late 1930s became a significant problem not only for American unity of command, 
but perhaps more importantly, in unity of effort in the formulation of a broad multinational 
strategy to fight the war. Despite being a subordinate commander of American forces, he 
continued to offer his own personal views and advice to Jiang, essentially bypassing the 
American chain of command. He proposed a more airpower-centric strategy to hold off and 
eventually defeat the Japanese to a receptive Jiang. This fundamentally undermined the 
American military strategy that called for a ground forces-centric effort to tie down significant 
numbers of Japanese ground forces, supported by air assets. This controversial issue of a unified 
strategy to defeat the Japanese plagued the Allied and American efforts in the years ahead. 
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However, at this point, Magruder was focused on following Washington's stated early war 
strategy to build up the Nationalist Army to conduct offensive ground actions to move against 
and tie down Japanese forces deployed in China at the earliest possible time.    
 There were additional indications of China's underlying divisiveness, military weakness, 
and fundamental differences with the Allies over military strategy for the conduct of war in the 
China Burma India Theater. There was virtually no surviving Chinese navy, and most of the 
remaining vastly out-numbered air forces had to be withdrawn to the southwest to reorganize and 
refit.  
 China's ground forces, despite the earlier defeats, were still very significant in terms of 
absolute numbers. If the problems of training, equipping, reorganizing, and rebuilding the morale 
of this force could be overcome relatively quickly, this large army offered great potential to 
support the planned Allied effort to defeat Japan. The last sentence in the following quote, 
however, is instructive. This was not a unified army, loyal to a politically unified state. 
  China had about 3,819,000 men under arms. Of these 2,919,000 were formed 
 into 246 divisions classed by the Chinese as "front-line" troops plus 44 "brigades" (a term 
 loosely applied to men organized on military lines). In rear areas were another 70 
 divisions plus 3 brigades, or 900,000 more. Except for the Generalissimo's personal 
 troops, estimated at about 30 divisions, the loyalties of China's troops lay with their war 
 area commanders.
43
   
 To focus on improving the capability of the Chinese ground forces, which on paper had 
the equivalent of over 360 division, appeared to be an easy decision to at least tie down Japanese 
forces if not begin offensive actions to regain lost territory.  China's military, not counting the 
Communist guerrilla warfare effort in the north, outnumbered the deployed Japanese combat and 
puppet forces more than ten to one. However, as appropriate to the Sun Tzu admonition, "In war, 
numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power."
44
 The 
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factors that make a modern army strong and capable are a complex mix of the tangible and 
intangible, not the least of which are training, leadership, logistics, and organization.  
 In a 1942 book, China After Five Years of War, published in the United States by the 
Ministry of Information, of the Republic of China, a very optimistic picture of this potential is 
described. 
  War is fought with metal, money, and manpower; not infrequently with man only.  
 Everything being equal a nation's trained manpower constitutes the chief factor in 
 determining the final outcome of the struggle. Given modern armaments and adequate 
 material resources but without men trained to use them with determination a nation's war 
 machine is like a body without a soul. In this regard, China is in an advantageous 
 position. She has a vast supply of manpower. In five years of war her most important 
 weapon has been man and man is still her main asset in her struggle against Japan. 
  The average Chinese is intelligent and follows instructions readily. He is 
 resourceful and commands extraordinary ingenuity. He is traditionally loyal and faithful 
 to the point of death to a leader who treats him with consideration. He is honest and 
 knows no fear. He is inured to privation and physical hardship and meets death with the 
 philosophical calm with which he faces life. He makes an excellent soldier provided he is 
 well trained and led. 
  With a common conviction and determination, millions of Chinese have been  
 put in fighting trim and under the slogan "Training is more important than fighting." In 
 five years of war [July 1937 to June 1942, from p i.) more recruits were drafted and 
 drilled, more officers trained and more units inspected than in pre-war days.
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 The Chinese Nationalist Army organization was outwardly modeled on Western-styled, 
infantry heavy "triangular" formations with three regiments in a division, three divisions in an 
army, three armies in a group army, with up to three group armies assigned to a war area.
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Despite what this modern organizational structure might infer, this was not a centrally directed, 
mobile army capable of massing and sustaining forces to build up combat power to conduct 
aggressive offensive campaigns. This force was of very uneven quality in terms of manning, 
training, and equipment. In terms of operational capability in the early 1940s, especially after the 
early devastating losses in eastern China, the Nationalist Army was organized, equipped, 
deployed, and logistically supported for only relatively independent, limited defensive actions. 
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Nationalist units could really only freely operate in those territories that had not yet been 
occupied or were minimally manned by Japanese forces. The overall capability of the Nationalist 
Army was further limited by the large numbers of forces deployed to prevent the increase of 
Communist controlled areas, and were therefore, not available for operations against the 
Japanese threat.   
 Despite its weaknesses, the Nationalist forces, and their erstwhile Communist allies, 
maintained secure sanctuaries and conducted limited attacks. The Japanese and their puppet 
Chinese allies had insufficient combat power to control anything more than the urban areas, 
major road networks, and railroad lines. Japan's forces were widely dispersed throughout eastern 
China to protect key lines of communication and control the cities, which also limited their 
offensive capabilities. In northern China and Manchuria, Japanese forces were further tied down 
to deter potential Soviet activity and to counteract the widespread Communist guerrilla threat. 
Adding to Japan's potential military vulnerabilities and weaknesses were their Chinese puppet 
forces that were weak, poorly armed, and of dubious political reliability. By late 1941, the 
situation in China could best be described as static with neither side capable of further sustained 
offensive action.  
  China After Five Years of War provides the following about the manpower situation.   
 From a total of less than two hundred comparatively poorly equipped and ill trained 
 divisions the Chinese Army has grown to well over three hundred divisions with 
 5,000,000 men in the field and 15,000,000 men in reserve units or in training camps. 
 Over 800,000 guerrillas are harassing Japanese garrisons and lines of communication 
 while more than 600,000 regulars are operating behind Japanese lines. In addition 
 50,000,000 able-bodied men of military age are available for service.
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On the previous page are listed 12,500,000 men in militia and guerrilla units in "Free China."  
With figures, numbers, and sentiments like these being published in the United States for all to 
read it is not hard to imagine why the lure of training and equipping the Chinese was hard to 
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deny or to counter as a viable strategy. The problem was that there was just enough truth in this 
image to obscure the reality on the ground of how difficult this task would be to accomplish. 
The AMMISCA Appraisal 
 Within weeks of their arrival in China, AMMISCA personnel carried out their own 
assessments of Chinese forces and the situation on the ground in the area to the east of 
Chongqing. An excerpt of a report by two U.S. officers inspecting units in two war areas quoted 
in Stilwell's Mission to China provides highlights of what the American team found.   
  1. The training of the artillery is very poor. A certain amount of technique is 
 taught in the schools regarding indirect fire, but in actual practice the greater use is in 
 direct fire, with axial methods for indirect fire being used where an obstacle provides 
 protection for the guns. 
  2.  The officer personnel in batteries are poor. How poor is difficult to visualize 
 without seeing. In the battery specially selected for our inspection at Laolokow [Laoho
 kou] the battery commander was not of a very high order of intelligence. He was 
 barefooted except for sandals. It would probably be very difficult to teach modern 
 artillery methods to men of this type. 
  3.  The entire military system, being built on personal loyalty, prevents it being 
 possible to train artillery officers and send them to units indiscriminately as we do in the 
 States. 
  4.  There is very little activity along the front. Either side could probably push in 
 a salient at any point they thought it was possible to do so. No contact between Chinese 
 and Japanese troops at the front was observed. 
  5.  The interest of the Chinese toward aggressive action appears to be quite 
 negligible, regardless of their statements that all they need is airplanes, tanks, and 
 artillery to drive the aggressors from their shores. 
  6.  The small amount of artillery available in the past as resulted in artillery not 
 being present in most divisions, but being held centrally under army or higher control. 
  7.  The maintenance of motor transport is very faulty and makes the use of 
 mechanized units a matter of doubtful advisability.
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The conclusions of the report provide insights on the depth of the problems in terms of cultural 
and organizational differences; personnel policies and capabilities; equipping and maintenance 
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issues; and perhaps, most telling, in the philosophy of the conduct of warfare against the 
Japanese.  
  In addition to the issues directly influencing the training and equipping mission obvious 
in several of the above points, the fourth and last bullets are most telling for the overall situation 
on the ground. The situation was static with neither side attempting to take or re-take territory, 
and given the last remark, Chinese forces cannot be readily moved or shifted to gain numerical 
advantage in order to go on the offensive. The task ahead for the American advisors went far 
beyond simply providing technical training for officers and enlisted personnel in the use of 
modern American military hardware and technology. An understandably defensively oriented 
Nationalist operational strategy had emerged after four years of war with Japan. Avoiding major 
combat operations against the Japanese was a key component. Holding the line against 
Communist expansion in the east and south of the Yangzi was also a central tenet. The third 
pillar was to maintain a decentralized organization of smaller elements capable of mobile 
defensive operations. This prevented the loss of large numbers of troops and equipment. The 
Nationalists would only concentrate forces where the Japanese were weak, thinly deployed, and 
not likely to mass to mount significant offensive operations. Finally, the loss of some of the best 
units trained earlier by the Germans now called for rebuilding by husbanding resources and 
focusing on training and equipping.  
 A Sun Tzu quote is appropriate in explaining the fundamental difference between how 
Jiang and his American advisors saw the war. "Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of 
victory in the attack."
49
 The Chinese defensive "yin" evolved over four years of war against a 
technically and tactically superior enemy. The Americans continually expressed their "yang" by 
continually pushing their Chinese counterparts to train, organize, and deploy to conduct 
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offensive operations. This difference lies at the very heart of the conduct of the war against 
Japan. Jiang had settled on a defensive strategy based on his experience in the 1930s. He was 
now cautious about losing his forces by conducting any large-scale offensive operations. There is 
a time and a place for implementing an offensive strategy.   
 In late 1941, the situation on the ground in China was relatively stable. The Japanese 
position in Manchuria, and along the eastern coast, that contained the key industrial and resource 
areas were secure. A major offensive by the Chinese was impossible. In terms of equipment, 
firepower, mobility, and training in modern tactics, the Chinese were no real threat to the 
Japanese even if they could organize and mass for an attack. China's only real strength was 
numbers of potential soldiers they could put in the field and their defensive dispositions far 
inland. At that point in time, Japan decided to widen the war with naval and ground attacks 
against American, British, and Dutch possessions throughout the Pacific and Southeast Asian 
area. To further isolate China, the Japanese moved to close the vital Burma line of 
communication to disrupt the American lend-lease effort. Those American military officers who 
had served as military attachés or were stationed in China in the 1930s fully understood why the 
Chinese had been defeated. There was not only a lack of offensive spirit, but also equipment 
shortages, insufficient numbers of high quality officers at all ranks, virtually no modern 
transportation assets, and maintenance woes were all noted in the above report. AMMISCA 
personnel merely re-verified the observations of Stilwell, Carlson, and other attachés as well as 
members of the American media that had covered Japan's offensive in China. 
 As an old China hand, Magruder undoubtedly understood the following broad, general 
assessment that summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese military. This 
perception, which focuses on the leadership of the Nationalist forces, would plague the American 
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effort unless it could be reversed. "The greatest asset of the Chinese Army was the hardihood and 
valor of the peasant soldier, fighting in defense of the familiar things of his province. Its greatest 
liability was the failure of its war lord commanders to see their soldiers as anything more that 
counters in the unending game of Chinese politics."
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 The key to success for Magruder and the 
American military advisors was likely beyond the obvious problem of inculcating modern 
training methods and refitting and reequipping a beaten and widely scattered military. As the 
American effort began, there appeared to be two-year window to overcome a military leadership 
problem that had been evident from the very beginnings of the Republic of China, and 
exemplified by the overall performance of the Chinese forces against the Japanese. As 
symbolized by Sun Zhongshan's early replacement by General Yuan Shikai, the leader of China 
had to have military as well as political prowess, power, and influence.
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 This would be Jiang's 
major dilemma throughout the decade of this study. He required a more professional and trained 
military leadership to win on the battlefield. He also needed his loyal military subordinates to 
maintain political power and control, whether they were capable military commanders and staff 
officers or not. 
 Another issue for Jiang and the development of a strong Nationalist force was how to 
avoid repeating the failures of past foreign efforts to improve the Chinese military. The record 
since the 1850s was of half measures and lack of long-term commitment to sustain a systematic 
program of change. In 1941 Generalissimo Jiang, despite the military defeats and territorial 
loses, was the acknowledged political and military leader of China. His background as a military 
student in Japan, his service in an Imperial Japanese Army artillery unit, and his travels to 
Europe to observe modern forces all gave him experience in modernizing an army. His actions in 
implementing a proven efficient and effective German model at Huangpu to build a modern 
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Nationalist Army showed him to be an astute observer of military command and staff operations. 
His rejection of the model of communist political overwatch being implemented by his Soviet 
advisors only to later institute a political commissar model in the National armed forces all point 
to his understanding and use of history, experience and precedent in building the military needed 
for the campaigns ahead. "The political and military struggles of the period following the 
northern expedition were for Generalissimo Jiang the ordeals which tested his mettle. He 
emerged from those trying times with a better comprehension of the broad political and 
economic issues and a clearer picture of the opposition which confronted him."
52
   
 The question of having the money to fund and maintain the effort over time was also 
unanswered. China had lost a significant geographical segment of its economic heartland.
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 Jiang 
had lost access to both his German advisors who had served him so well in the 1920s, and the 
Soviets who had dominated support to the Nationalist in the 1930s. He had also lost access to the 
large, modern arms manufacturers. China's intermittent and uneven process of military 
modernization along Western lines, conducted for the most part by the European powers, 
demonstrably had failed. Outnumbering the invading Japanese more than ten to one, China could 
not overcome the reality that its modernization was incomplete and its forces were pushed into 
decisive combat before they were fully equipped and ready. Had these changes run their course 
the results might have been different. As in the past, although the need for change was 
recognized as necessary by many in the Chinese political and military leadership, any effort to 
modernize and Westernize the armed forces was still impeded by cultural, historical, social and, 
especially, political imperatives.   
 Even with the understanding that the Ministry of Information book was propaganda or 
strategic communications for the American public, it is also an indication of Jiang's self -
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delusion. This time, unlike in the past, there appeared to be a greater impetus for major changes. 
China had lost sovereignty of a major portion of its historic heartland. This was not a matter of 
minor treaties and agreements granting small concessions in areas adjacent to commercial ports 
on the periphery to several competing foreign powers who then maintained small protective 
military forces on Chinese soil. With the Japanese occupation, key areas of the country were 
occupied by a single imperialist power bent on dominating and incorporating China into its wider 
imperialist colonial structure. This was far beyond the normal internal-external threat paradigm 
that had plagued China for more than one hundred years. 
A Glimpse of a Strategy and the Problems for the Allied Road Ahead 
 After the initial defeats in 1937 at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, 
China had survived, but its position was precarious, and its very sovereignty as a nation was at 
risk. Jiang successfully used a strategy for national survival of trading space for time, but the 
heartland of China, the Yangzi and Yellow river valleys and the coastal east had been lost. The 
Nationalists undertook a massive program to withdraw the governmental bureaucracy, key 
educational institutions, vital industrial capacity, and substantial military forces far into the 
Chinese interior. Jiang established a new capital at Chongqing, beyond the range of the logistical 
capacity of Japan's ground forces, but unfortunately, still within the range of enemy air forces 
that bombed that city relentlessly, and virtually unopposed.
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 However, the strategy of retreating west did not apply to the majority of Chinese forces. 
In the earlier fighting against the IJA in the eastern part of the country, Nationalist forces 
generally stayed put and fought unsuccessful strong point defenses at great cost in terms of 
personnel and equipment. Those forces that did survive broke up into small units and remained 
in their war areas or adjacent territory by retreating away from the urban centers garrisoned by 
97 
 
the Japanese.
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 The Chinese forces that had withdrawn either were committed, to the defense of 
the Chongqing area or were arrayed to contain the Communists. Less loyal forces under the 
command of regional warlords remained in their home areas beyond the control of the Japanese, 
and to a certain extent, only under the limited control of Jiang in terms of long-term loyalty and 
centralized command. 
 While this strategy provided for regime and national survival, it also severely limited 
Jiang's ability to respond quickly militarily. It was difficult to collect the units in central 
locations to refit and reorganize, and the re-deploy for an attack. A major offensive against the 
Japanese to retake lost territory was virtually impossible as the Nationalist Army formations 
were difficult to mass, had little artillery or even infantry crew-served weapons, had almost no 
transport assets or supply system, and could not be protected given Japan's air superiority. In 
addition, too many of its senior commanders were either militarily incompetent, politically 
untrustworthy, or were incapable of logistically supporting actions by their formations outside of 
their home regions. Another issue was that commanders, in the best tradition of Sun Tzu's period 
of the Warring States, were careful and risk adverse, as any loss of their forces would be a 
reduction in personal political, military, and economic power.
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 Hopes for an early opportunity to turn the situation in China around and build a powerful 
military ally capable of conducting a major offensive against the Japanese were further dispelled 
as the reality of the state of China's military and Jiang's evolving strategy became evident to 
American military leaders and planning staffs  in both in Chongqing and in Washington. A gist 
of several key findings from Magruder's message traffic back to the War Department outlined by 
Romanus and Sunderland highlight their intentions and weaknesses.  
  The Chinese had no intention of taking offensive action, which would inevitable 
 dissipate the economic and political value of their troops. 
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  Dealing with the Chinese was extremely difficult, Magruder went on, because of 
 their utter disregard for logistics.    
  They had no idea of the capabilities of sea and air transport. 
  Their pet strategic cure-all was air power, and they were unmoved by the fact 
 that their transport system would not support a tenth of the aircraft they wanted to have in 
 China. 
  Magruder was convinced that some plain, blunt speaking would be necessary in 
 dealing with the Generalissimo.
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 For civilian and military policy and decision makers in Washington, this final comment 
would be especially prescient. Plain and blunt speaking is an American trait that could not be 
more opposite of Chinese culture and its tradition of "face." Face is often observed no matter 
how difficult the problem being confronted. This cultural trait was especially difficult to work 
around when proposed changes also portend the loss or dilution of political and economic power. 
There could be no greater loss of face for Jiang and the senior Nationalist leadership than to 
admit that Chinese officers, steeped in the 2,500-year-old military traditions of Sun Tzu and 
tested in battle since the 1920s, could not command their own forces in combat, and especially 
against another Asian power. For those Americans who had served in China, who supposedly 
understood that country's history, culture, and society, the situation in China in 1941 appeared 
very grim. This situation was further complicated by the distinct possibility that Jiang and the 
key members of the senior Nationalist military leadership would not readily accept any 
assistance, except for the military equipment and the direct technical training to support it. The 
next eight years of American aid and assistance through the war and civil conflict that followed 
would thoroughly test that assumption and the relationship between the American advisors and 
their Chinese counterparts.   
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 Foundational to reversing the military situation was the necessity to deal with several key 
issues with broad and continuing consequences. Key industrial and population centers were lost 
that had provided access to arsenals and munitions plants. Jiang's Nationalist government also 
lost access to its large tax base among the business communities in the major eastern urban areas: 
especially Beijing-Tianjin; Shanghai; and the Yangzi River cities of Nanjing; and what is now 
Wuhan (Hankou and Wuchang). The majority of China's vast population was also lost to easy 
access for military recruitment. The loss of potential enlisted men needed to fill out the depleted 
infantry formations and the industrial workers capable of working with modern equipment and 
technology severely impacted the National Army. A significant portion of the educated middle 
class necessary to build an officer corps capable of leading a Western-style army equipped with 
more technically advanced systems was not available for service. However, more pressing for 
the AMMISCA mission was Japanese control of the western Pacific and of all the major Chinese 
coastal ports. Japanese control also extended to the ports of French Indochina with its road and 
rail access to Jiang's new capital in western China. As a result, only routes through the British 
controlled Burma and, should that fail, by air from India could resupply of the Nationalist forces. 
The Army Air Corps conduct studies to attempt to find other potential land routes including 
across the Soviet Union. However, in the final analysis, only the Burma route was viable in 
terms of the tonnages required to revitalize the ground forces and build up the fighters, bombers, 
and transports needed for the Nationalist military to go on the offensive against the Japanese 
occupying forces.
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 Given the importance of this route, in late 1941, the AMMISCA staff in China quickly 
established offices in the port and capital city of Rangoon. In addition, mechanisms were put in 
place to speed up the reception and flow of lend-lease materials that were now being shipped 
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from the United States. In December 1941, the Japanese launched an overarching land and 
seaborne offensive on strategic British, Dutch, and American possessions in Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific. According to Adrian St. John, one of AMMISCA's senior officers on the ground in 
Burma, "The bad days of Rangoon started about December 16th with the first severe bombing 
and machine gunning. About 15,000 civilians were killed...From then on there were at least three 
attempted raids every 24 hours."
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 Among the campaign's objectives was the port of Rangoon, 
which if closed, would further isolate China, and stifle America's lend lease effort.  
 In late December 1941, the British lost their crown colony and the key port of Hong 
Kong on the south coast of China. In a very short and devastating attack mounted by Japanese 
forces moving south from Canton (Guangzhou), the Japanese now showed their military prowess 
over European forces and their colonial troops. In less than two months, further to the west, the 
British suffered one of the worst defeats in its military history. With the loss of the garrison in 
Singapore and the forces defending the Malay Peninsula in January and February of 1942, over 
100,000 Allied troops were killed in combat or surrendered. The loss of naval assets, aircraft, 
and critical facilities in the region further complicated the situation. These strategically located 
possessions were now controlled by Japan, and access to and transit through the South China Sea 
and the Strait of Malacca were now threatened. Britain's ability to respond to further Japanese 
offensive actions was dramatically weakened by the loss of these territories, ports and bases, and 
irreplaceable well-trained and equipped forces. Adding to the Allies' woes was the necessity for 
Britain to focus on holding and reversing the situation in Egypt and North Africa the loss of 
which could be catastrophic to the overall Allied effort with the attendant loss of the Suez Canal. 
 On December 7, 1941, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, America was now at 
war in the Pacific. At the same time as the naval air attack on American bases in Hawaii, the 
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Japanese invaded the weakly defended Philippines. Under American control since the Spanish-
American War in 1898, this location had served since the days of the Boxer Rebellion as a 
staging area for American forces to China. In the aftermath of the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor, the U. S. military worried about further Japanese offensive actions in the eastern Pacific 
and possibly even on the American homeland. While trying to recover after the devastating 
attacks of the opening days of the war and defend the American west coast, it was not possible to 
regain sea control to enable the needed reinforcement and resupply of it forces in the Philippines. 
The isolated American garrison with its Philippine allies fought a desperate, but ultimately 
hopeless delaying action through the spring of 1942.   
For the Allies, the long road back to a strategic position where an attack on Japan's home 
islands could begin had to start from bases in New Zealand and Australia far to the south. The 
Japanese were now in control of, or threatened, the sea-lanes of the western and central Pacific 
and the South China Sea. British, Australian, Dutch, New Zealand, and American ground forces 
were on the defensive throughout Asia, having suffered a series of costly and humiliating 
defeats. Building China's military quickly was the last best hope for making the Japanese pay for 
its strategic overreach. Any hope for early attacks on the enemy’s home island rested on a 
rearmed and active China. Unless, the lines of communication across Burma remained open to 
supply China and build up its forces, attacks on Japan, first by air and eventually by land from 
Chinese ports, could not happen. At a minimum, China had to be helped quickly if only to tie 
down significant numbers of Japan's ground forces to prevent their redeployment to other 
operational areas. The key to that effort was a landline of communication to China from Burma. 
 Ominously for the American lend lease and advisory effort in China, the Japanese 
attacked Burma in late January. The unopposed movement of its army units into and across 
102 
 
Thailand from forces originally deployed to Vichy French-controlled Indochina provided the 
Japanese a secure staging area and protected logistical line of communication to the Burmese 
border. In early January, the Japanese launched a two-division assault into Burma with the 
objective of quickly seizing the port of Rangoon, closing off the vital line of communication to 
China, and destroying defending British and allied colonial forces. This successful effort was 
another major embarrassing military defeat for the Allies and threatened the British hold on the 
eastern area of colonial India. The AMMISCA staff remained in Rangoon managing the 
reception and onward movement of China's lend lease supplies through the 22nd of February 
1942 when it displaced to Maymyo and then on to Kunming, China.
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 The Japanese were now in 
a position to build up for an attack north into China. This Japanese attack had the potential to 
threaten the key logistics center of Kunming and potentially further weaken Jiang's control of 
China.  
 The possibility that Jiang would seek an accommodation with Japan was a continuing 
worry. This could have been devastating to the Allied effort.
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 As a young man, Jiang had lived 
in Japan, spoke and wrote the language, attended a military school there, and actually had served 
a tour with the Imperial Japanese Army. Although Jiang's forces had fought hard to maintain 
Chinese sovereignty, and the Chinese people had suffered at the hands of the invaders, in early 
1942, the Japanese military looked invincible.
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 The possibility that Jiang would be forced or 
could choose to negotiate an accommodation plagued America's senior leadership and also 
limited the leverage that could be used to push Jiang to difficult decisions favorable to the overall 
Allied effort. The ability to continue to provide equipment and supplies was critical to keeping 
China in the war. Deliveries of equipment provided what little leverage there was over Jiang and 
the leadership of the Nationalist forces. India and Burma were critical to that effort. 
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  Burma, a colony of Great Britain ceded to it by the Chinese in the 1880s, was part of the 
British Empire and Commonwealth in Asia that stretched from Afghanistan, to Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka) to Australia and New Zealand, and to Hong Kong. The defense of Burma, and by 
extension India, was a matter of national pride and a potential key to Britain's post-war status in 
Asia. China had suffered at the hands of British and French aggression since the Opium and 
Arrow wars of the mid-Nineteenth Century. As a result, there was no great affinity between these 
American allies. In the years ahead, at times the relationship between China and Great Britain 
seemed almost as difficult to deal with as their common enemy, Japan. The Allied effort in India 
and Burma against Japan called for significant British-Chinese cooperation if it was to be 
successful. This effort had not started well. The earlier refusal of the British to allow the use of 
Hong Kong as a transshipment port for military supplies destined for China; and then, Jiang's 
refusal to step up operations in China to tie down Japanese forces deploying from Guangzhou for 
the invasion of Hong Kong had resulted in mutual recriminations.  
 The British commander in Burma, Sir Archibald Wavell, refused on several occasions, 
and with unacceptable caveats, Jiang's offer of Chinese troops to assist in the defense of Burma. 
For its part, Britain was not about to concede or jeopardize post-war control of its key colonies in 
Asia for dubious tactical gains. The use of Chinese forces outside of China to aid and assist 
Britain in its fight against the Japanese was strategically problematic.
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 In addition to problems 
among and between allies, by early 1942, all three nations' militaries had proved incapable of 
defeating invading Japanese forces. There was a reluctance to commit Allied forces to decisive 
offensive action--a position China had arrived at more than two years before. More importantly, 
the United States was neither willing nor able to provide American combat units to this theater. 
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If Burma was to be saved, it would have to be accomplished by Chinese forces and a British 
military that was predominately comprised of Indian and other colonial troops.  
 A  January 20, 1942 War Department Military Intelligence Division Memorandum for 
Mr. Laughlin Currie outlined the political and military situation in Burma. There were 
indications of internal unrest in the native Burmese population and "fifth column, sabotage, and 
large-scale revolt cannot be overlooked." The memo also outlined the security situation: "It is 
estimated that they [the Japanese] can capture Rangoon in not to exceed five weeks thereafter 
unless Burma receives heavy ground and air reinforcements. The report later outlined the 
military forces available. 
  a. British forces. The British have approximately 35,000 troops in Burma. Of 
 these, there are not more than 4,000 British and 7,000 Indians, the remaining forces 
 consisting of Burmese troops with British officers. The Burmese units vary in quality, 
 ranging from excellent troops or slightly inferior to Indian units to irregulars of 
 negligible value... 
  b. Chinese forces. The 5th and 6th Chinese Corps are on the Burma-Chinese 
 border. Their combat value is unknown. 
  c. Japanese forces. The Japanese have an estimated four divisions of infantry and 
 two regiments of tanks in position to attack Burma...These troops probably total 80,000.  
 Japanese forces are believed to have a unit for unit superiority over British troops in 
 Burma. 
  d. Air. The Japanese have the strategic air initiative in this area. The effective 
 air strength in Indo-China, Thailand and Malaya totals approximately 720 operating 
 combat planes. Of these approximately 468 could be used against Burma if desired.  
 Favorable lines of communication afford Japan access to considerable numbers of 
 reserves.
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 Aware of the grave danger to Burma, a continuing series of bilateral and multilateral 
conferences and informal meeting between the Americans, the British, and Chinese (ABC 
Powers) began in December 1941. The lack of initial cooperation highlights the difficult 
relationship between the British and the Chinese at the early stages of the war. The refusal of the 
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British senior commander in theater, Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell, to accept Jiang's offer 
of two Chinese Armies (essentially two corps of three divisions each) to assist in the defense of 
Burma is indicative of the distrust and lack of a realistic common threat assessment. There were 
also misunderstandings, miscommunications, and controversies over Chinese support to British 
forces defending Hong Kong, British assessments of Japan's military capabilities, and the 
perceived fighting ability of Chinese forces. Underlying these differences was Jiang's negative 
view of Britain's long-term colonial posture in Asia, which included the post-war status of the 
Chinese colony and the major port and commercial center of Hong Kong.
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 The problem of Sino-British cooperation came to an early crisis with the British request 
for, and later unapproved seizure of, China-bound lend-lease material in the port of Rangoon. 
These supplies technically belonged to the Chinese as soon as they left the United States. 
Reacting to what became known as the Tulsa Incident, Magruder and AMMISCA personnel in 
Rangoon did the best they could to smooth over these issues and negotiate a mutually acceptable 
solution. A matter of miscommunication and practicality given the exigency of the situation, 
Jiang and the Chinese logistics personnel assigned to facilitate lend-lease through Burma to 
China considered this an affront to their sovereignty and American good faith. The final result 
was that LTC Joseph J. Twitty, the senior AMMISCA in Rangoon, was relieved and replaced by 
LTC Adrian St. John. This issue was elevated all the way back to the Secretary of War in 
Washington.
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 The British and American underestimation of Japanese offensive military capabilities and 
British refusal to seriously considered Jiang's views on the defense of Burma exacerbated the 
situation. In the end, after meeting personally with Magruder, and having received assurances of 
continued American support, Jiang agreed to British requests for the release of Chinese lend 
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lease shipments for immediate use for the fight in Burma. For the Allied defense of Rangoon, the 
release of additional America equipment and supplies was unfortunately too little, too late.
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 The 
failure to protect the Burma line of communication set the stage for continuing Allied 
disagreements over war strategy. Over the following months, problems surfaced on the timing of 
future offensive operations; the multinational command and control arrangements; the priorities 
for the use of scarce air and other critical combat assets; and most importantly, the transport, 
supporting infrastructure, and distribution of supplies and equipment for rebuilding China's 
military forces. This difficult three-way relationship with the Americans having to placate Great 
Britain and China continued throughout the war.
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 The United States, although it had no combat forces in the theater, had to play the role of 
mediator and negotiator between its two allies. A soldier with the rank of brigadier general was 
inappropriate given the primary mandate to get war material through Burma to China's military 
forces. The problem had now grown to the point of establishing a major theater of war and 
sending a more senior American officer to lead the effort. 
  On December 31, President Roosevelt cabled Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
 proposing the organization of the China War Theater and informing the latter that he had 
 already obtained the agreements of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and New 
 Zealand to nominate the Generalissimo as the Supreme Commander of the China 
 Theater. In this position, Chiang had authority to organize the Chief of Staff of the 
 Headquarters Allied Forces for planning and directing the operations of allied forces in 
 China, part of Thailand and Indo-China under his command. After careful consideration, 
 Chiang cabled Roosevelt on January 2, 1942 agreeing to accept, and requesting him to 
 recommend a trusted high-ranking general to serve as Chief of Staff of the China 
 Theater.
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In early January of 1942, the search was on for a senior American Army general to go 
immediately to China to lead this yet-to-be fully defined mission. AMMISCA was about to be 
replaced with an American combat command and a major theater of war headquarters. 
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 Indicative of the importance of China in the Roosevelt administration's early wartime 
strategy, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, "the senior line officer in the Army," was the first 
choice of Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War.
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 However, Drum disagreed with the 
proposed command relationships, the priority of the mission, and the lack of availability of 
American combat formations to help secure the vital Burma line of communication. These 
problems all caused Drum to have little enthusiasm for position. This led General George C. 
Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff and the senior Army advisor to the president to recommend 
that Drum, who had already been approved by President Roosevelt, not be sent to China. Instead, 
Marshall recommended Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, who was being considered for a 
command in the pending Allied effort in North Africa, to head the China mission.  
"Born in March of 1883, Stilwell was no longer young, but he was energetic and 
indefatigable. As military attaché in China, he had studied the mechanism of the Chinese Army 
and meticulously studied every Sino-Japanese battle of the 1937-38 period."
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 Stilwell departed 
for China in February of 1942 and for the next more than two and a half years he represented the 
United States in this theater. His position was the most difficult and complex command and 
advisory effort in the Second World War. While Eisenhower’s work with the British in Europe 
was difficult, at least it was between peoples with a common language and military traditions. 
This job in China included not only advising and assisting a military at war and command of 
forces in combat, but also multinational diplomacy, strategy formulation, operational planning, 
and the conduct of military operations in some of the most difficult terrain in the world. 
 "Marshall knew Stilwell was not a diplomat, but the mission that was about to be offered 
Stilwell called for a great many other qualities."
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 With an "I'll go where I am sent" Stilwell 
accepted Marshall's offer and was approved on 23 January 1942.
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 Two entries from The Stilwell 
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Papers, published after the war from his diaries and notes, provide a glimpse of his premonition 
of the complexity and difficulties, but also of the possibilities, that loomed ahead. These 
comments include more than a subtle hint of Stilwell's underlying personal view of America's 
allies in the theater. 
  January 24 To War Department and War College. 
 The British have one brigade east of Rangoon and one more on the way. That's what 
 they thought sufficient to hold Burma. And the SUPREME COMMANDER, Wavell, 
 refused Chiang K'ai-shek's offer of two corps. [He] didn't want the dirty Chinese in 
 Burma. 
 Well this has been a full day. If the Chinese will just play ball maybe we can strike a 
 blow where it will do the most good.... 
  January 25 It seems the reason Wavell refused Chinese help for Burma was that 
 the British are afraid of the Burmese civil government. The military have to work 
 through them for use of the railroad. The Burmese hate the Chinese and the British: 
 maybe they are pretty right.
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The situation Stilwell inherited when he arrived in China in February of 1942 had evolved 
significantly from the initial deployment of Brigadier General John Magruder in the late fall of 
1941 to lead the American Military Mission in China (AMMISCA).While the war was joined in 
Burma, the task to advise and assist the Chinese military in their effort to prepare for modern war 
against a competent and determined foe remained a key American mission. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS 
 
 
 The role of the American military advisors expanded significantly with the Allied 
designation of China, Burma, and India as a Theater of War. The initial overarching goal to build 
a force of thirty divisions remained the central focus of the army's advisory effort. However, 
keeping the line of communications open through Burma, of necessity, became the critical task 
as American servicemen began to flow into the theater to support President Roosevelt's decision. 
The appointment of a senior American officer to serve in theater signified China's important role 
in defeating Japan in the Allied strategy. The decision not to deploy American ground combat 
forces into the theater for the near future meant the Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA) had to 
assume a major role in the land war in Asia. In order for this to be effective, the American 
advisors and their Chinese counterparts had to develop a partnership. This chapter focuses on the 
building of those land forces, the impediments to that effort, and the role and functions of the 
other American and foreign entities, military and civilian, working with or supporting that effort. 
The scope, complexity, and difficulty of this challenge are truly remarkable, and unprecedented 
in American military history.   
 
A Hell of a Beating
1
 
 
 Fresh from meetings with both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff 
George C. Marshall in Washington, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell arrived in India in 
February 1942 to meet with his British counterparts. He then continued on to China to take up 
his position as Commander, United States Task Force in China and Chief of Staff to 
Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist Army. His most pressing and immediate task was 
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to facilitate Chinese and British cooperation to blunt the Japanese assault on Burma and attempt 
to keep open that vital line of communication. Stilwell not only replaced Magruder and assumed 
the leadership of the mission of the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA); he now 
had the task of reorganizing the entire American effort. He was commanding all American forces 
in the theater.
2
 
Brigadier General John Magruder, in the Headquarters, American Army Forces China, 
Burma, and India Special Orders Number 2 dated March 15, 1942 was the Commanding 
General, Division General Affairs. Stilwell took advantage of the work Magruder had done and 
the contacts he had made with the senior Chinese military leadership. Stilwell took command of 
all AMMISCA personnel who had been in country since the fall of 1941. Some of these officers 
had been working with their Chinese counterparts for over six months and had already developed 
detailed knowledge of the key issues and problems in the Nationalist Army. In addition to 
assessing the state of the Chinese armed forces, their key role had been to facilitate the 
movement of lend lease war materials to China. This mission had been center stage when the 
Japanese attacked to sever the vital supply line. The best alternative route would be across India 
if the Burma line of communication were lost.
3
  
  The role of the Indian government and the bureaucracy that handled ports and 
transportation critical to the Allied effort also loomed large, especially with the Japanese attacks 
in Malaya. The ports, road, and rail routes in India were very important to the overall war effort 
in the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI). This was true even if the Burma logistics line was not 
kept open. Having served in China in the late 1930s as one of the military attachés, Stilwell was 
familiar with the role and function of America's diplomatic corps and the embassy. To support 
Stilwell and the military effort, Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss detailed John Patton Davies as 
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the State Department's Liaison Officer to his staff.
4
 An indication of Davies' importance on the 
staff was that his name was listed as Liaison Officer, State Department, immediately following 
Magruder's, on Special Orders No. 2. Dragon by the Tail, a memoir of his time in China written 
by Davies, is an important chronicle of his work with Stilwell, the development of American 
China policy, and the full range of military and diplomatic activities during this time. Davies and 
three additional State Department personnel played an important role in supporting the military 
effort during Stilwell's tenure and beyond.
5
   
Stilwell immediately took advantage of the experience and expertise of these interagency 
personnel. One of Davies first tasks was to go to India and prepare a report on the political 
situation and anti-British nationalist sentiment for its potential impact on the Allied effort. 
Davies' knowledge of the region, timely and thoughtful inputs, and diplomatic expertise were 
critical as the rapidly expanding American military staff worked with both the British military 
and the India government to establish facilities, obtain basing areas, and secure transportation 
assets to support the lend-lease program to China. Over the next two and one half years, Davies 
would remain Stilwell's senior political and economic advisor. He not only served as a key staff 
member, but also became a close friend and confidant of Stilwell even after the general was 
relieved and left China.   
 Evidence of the trust and confidence in his State Department colleague is Stilwell’s 21 
September 1943 directive. The order officially appointed Davies to oversee and implement two 
key tasks, the both of which had important implications for military operations in the theater: 
  1.  You will be responsible for supervision of psychological warfare conducted by 
 the United State Office of War Information in the China-Burma-India Theater. You will 
 exercise control of the formulation of psychological warfare policy and will be charged 
 with the implementation of this policy.  
  2.  You will be responsible for the supervision of economic intelligence liaison 
 between this and subordinate headquarters and the Office of Economic Warfare.
6
 
116 
 
 
 Throughout the military’s advise and assist mission, lower level State Department 
personnel detached from the embassy in Chongqing, worked closely with their military 
counterparts and assumed major responsibility for key intelligence, psychological, political, and 
economic functions. With their ties to Washington, they also provided military and State 
Department counterparts assessments of the situation on the ground. Davies would later 
accompany Stilwell into Burma on operations. In a famous incident covered in the New York 
Times, Davies along with several other people including journalist Eric Sevareid, had to 
parachute from a military aircraft that was going down over the Burmese jungle. Local natives 
recruited by an American team of the Office of Strategic Services (the precursor organization of 
the Central Intelligence Agency) picked them up and safely evacuated them back to Allied 
territory.
7
 
 In April of 1942, within two months of Stilwell’s arrival, in a personal letter to a State 
Department colleague, Davies provides a view of emerging differences of opinion in the newly 
formed American headquarters. He assessed the Chinese war potential, how the Chinese 
perceived Stilwell, and the relationship among the Allies currently locked in a losing campaign 
to keep Burma. His insights at this very early stage of the Stilwell’s effort in the CBI Theater are 
both prescient and insightful.  
  The Stilwell school of thought seems to be that if the Chinese will really fight, 
 they can assume and maintain the offensive, and that it has yet to be shown that the 
 Chinese will not really fight. The Magruder school of thought on the other hand, appears 
 to hold that nothing positive can be expected from the Chinese, that the whole Asiatic 
 effort had best be written off as a loss, and that we should concentrate our strength on 
 opening a western front in Europe. 
  My impression is that the Chinese at the very top are very favorably impressed by 
 Stilwell. They like his forthrightness, his good soldierly virtues, his honesty and his 
 wholehearted absorption of the job of fighting the Japs. 
  But in the larger picture, as the British and we continue to prove ourselves as 
 ineffectual allies the Chinese attitude toward us seems to grow increasingly critical...I 
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 have the feeling that unless we can through victory or through increasing the flow of 
 supplies to them prove to the Chinese that as an ally we are an asset, they may well seek 
 ways out of their dilemma not at all to our liking.
8
 
  
  The Allied effort in India and Burma against Japan would call for Stilwell, with virtually 
no American forces in the fight and the promise of American equipment fading with the loss of 
Rangoon, to have to act as the critical allied go-between. This would not be an easy task as these 
countries had clashed on-and-off for more than one hundred years, militarily, diplomatically, and 
culturally. The fact that both Britain and France had fought against China several times during 
the past one hundred years and maintained territorial concessions, most favored nation status, 
and extraterritoriality rights by treaties forced on China by military defeats was not lost on Jiang. 
In addition, Britain controlled the key port and colony of Hong Kong until December 1941 when 
the Japanese captured it. Jiang's sense of Chinese history and anti-colonial leanings did not make 
for good allied relations at this time of crisis and did not portend well whatever post war 
accommodations would have to be made among the Allies. For its part, Britain was not about to 
concede or jeopardize post-war control of its key colonies in Asia.   
 When Stilwell arrived in India on 24 February, the Japanese had defeated the defending 
British forces in eastern Burma and were moving on Rangoon, which would fall less than two 
weeks later on 6 March. The situation had clearly changed for the worse and the British now 
asked for additional Chinese ground forces. Jiang agreed to this request and elements of the 5th 
and 6th Chinese Armies began to move into Burma. With six divisions employed as compared to 
only two British divisions, the Chinese would soon have the preponderance of forces fighting in 
Burma and a valid argument for demanding greater command and operational planning 
prerogatives. The Stilwell Papers include the notes of how important Jiang's decision was to 
employ the 5th and 6th Armies, "the cream of [the] Army" under the command of a foreigner in 
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the early days of this new Allied arrangement."
9
 In addition, after much prodding, Jiang agreed 
to the use of Chennault's American Volunteer Group (AVG), the Flying Tigers, in the defense of 
Burma. This Chinese controlled capability was critical in protecting the cities in western China 
against ongoing Japanese air operations. If the Japanese decided to continue their ground 
offensive further into China, the Nationalist forces would need these assets. The promise of more 
American assistance, especially air assets, undoubtedly played a role in Jiang's decisions to come 
to the aid of the British.
10
   
 By early March, Stilwell had gained control of the personnel assigned to AMMISCA. 
The deploying elements of his old U.S. III Corps staff from the Presidio of Monterey, California 
and individual officers who had prepared for the China mission when General Drum was the 
choice to lead the wartime effort formed the new China-Burma-India Theater headquarters. In 
anticipation of the establishment of training bases in China, a handpicked team of military 
trainers were selected and deployed to China--a journey by sea that took more than sixty days.
11
 
Although the CBI Theater was established, command arrangements remained complicated, not 
the least of which was the role of Stilwell in the existing British headquarters and his relationship 
with Jiang and Chinese subordinate commanders.   
  Both as Supreme Commander and as Generalissimo he had to supervise the 
 training, equipping, and supplying of his troops, and the performance of duty of his 
 subordinates. His chiefs of staff were advisors only, not executive officers. 
 Stilwell, as the Generalissimo's chief of joint staff, was placed in a difficult 
 position from the beginning. He was sent to China to aid the Generalissimo in the  
 discharging of his duties of Supreme Commander of an Allied theater. In this role he was 
 assistant to the commander who was a free agent and whose conceptions of Chinese 
 interests did not always agree with those of the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff--a 
 combined American-British headquarters]. However, Stilwell had three other roles. He 
was  commanding general of the American forces in Burma and India as well as in China; 
 he was the military representative of the President of the United States in Chungking;  
 and he was dispenser of lend-lease material for the United States. His roles would  be 
 workable while the Republic of China and the United States agreed. When they disagreed 
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 or when they were seeking an agreement, Stilwell was automatically placed in a 
 dilemma.
12
 
 
 With six Chinese divisions and parts of two army headquarters in Burma working under 
the control of a British commander trying to maintain the vital line of communication, Stilwell 
very quickly "moved to the sound of the guns." He concentrated his initial efforts helping to 
coordinate the Allied defense of Burma. Over the next several months, British and Chinese 
forces would suffer a series of defeats while conducting a defensive effort that became in reality 
a difficult fighting retreat. British General Sir William J. Slim in his classic book on fighting in 
Burma, Defeat Into Victory describes this series of battles in detail.
13
 One of Stilwell's most loyal 
commanders and staff officers, serving at the time as his aide, provides a first person account of 
"Vinegar Joe's" role and actions during this period. Lieutenant Colonel, later Brigadier General, 
Frank Dorn wrote Walkout: With Stilwell in Burma.
14
 Dorn will later play a significant role 
leading the Chinese Training and Combat Command (CT&CC). The "Y-Force" of twenty-five 
divisions of the first thirty Chinese divisions trained, equipped and prepared for offensive action 
in southern China was a key part of Dorn's command. This force, along with the army (corps) 
headquarters and five divisions of "X-Force" trained in or deployed through India, took part in 
the successful 1943-1944 campaign to retake Burma alongside the first major American combat 
ground force deployed to the CBI, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) better known as 
Merrill's Marauders.  
 Taking back Burma, getting the Chinese and the British to commit adequate forces to the 
effort, and sorting out the distribution of military supplies and equipment that made it to China, 
were Stilwell's most salient tasks during his tour of duty in China. Loyal subordinates like 
Colonels Hayden Boatner and Frank Dorn, for a variety of reasons, were responsible for liaison 
with the Chinese military leadership and the actual training and advising effort. "Vinegar Joe" 
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Stilwell's early actions on the Burma battlefront put him in the national spotlight as his actions 
there were well covered in the American press. This included Time and Life magazine journalist 
Jack Belden's "epic story of fortitude and endurance" in the book Retreat With Stilwell that was 
quickly published in 1943.
15
  
  Stilwell's safe arrival on Indian soil 15 May [1942] created a new figure in 
 contemporary  American legend: "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, the "acid-tongued, indomitable, 
 gruff-voiced, kindhearted old soldier who could make his way through any jungle.  
 Stilwell offered no alibis, sketched no soothing picture of a triumphant withdrawal, but 
 flatly stated: "We got a hell of a beating. It was humiliating as hell. We ought to find 
 out why it happened and go back."
16
  
 
 Now "safe" in India and China in defensive positions, the American political and military 
leadership vowed to take back Burma as soon as possible. The retreating British and Chinese 
forces along the Burma-India and China-Burma borders were now arrayed in tenuous, but 
generally secure defensive positions. The Japanese did not have sufficient forces to continue the 
attack and were at the end of their long logistical lines of support through Indochina and 
Thailand. The main task for the Japanese military was to consolidate their control of Burma. This 
geographically large nation of over 15 million people, split between those nationalists who 
welcomed the invaders and those that remained loyal to the British, was critical to Japan's 
strategy to isolate China and to keep pressure on the allied forces in India.  
 The combat situation on the ground developed into a relatively static standoff by the 
summer of 1942. Stilwell returned to China sure in his own mind of why and how Burma had 
been lost. For him, the leadership of the Chinese units was the main factor. According to 
Chennault, Stilwell met with the Generalissimo and requested that the Chinese forces be 
reorganized with "American officers holding all posts of colonel and above."
17
 Jiang rejected this 
idea and "It was the rock on which Stilwell and the Generalissimo had their final split."
18
 
Another rock that split Chennault and Stilwell was soon to follow with the discussion of 
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reintegrating the Flying Tigers back in the U.S. military under Stilwell's command. The seeds of 
dissention between Jiang and the American military leadership and within the U.S. leadership 
were sown in the summer of 1942."
19
 With the loss of Burma, a new situation emerged and the 
goal of equipping thirty divisions in two years and going on the offensive in China had to be 
reevaluated. 
 
In India or Over the Hump 
 Thereafter, all lend-lease materials were transported through Indian ports. The most 
secure was Karachi far to the west in what is now Pakistan. The materials then went overland on 
a poorly maintained and operated rail and road network to eastern India. Once supplies reached 
northeast Indian airbases, they were prioritized and moved forward into China by air. The 
terminus was in the area of the city of Kunming in Yunnan province. As the American now in 
charge of lend-lease, Stilwell was responsible for deciding the content and distribution of the 
supplies flown over the Hump to China. The power gave Stilwell significant leverage over both 
Jiang and Chennault. The priority of supplies to ground or air units was a key determinant of a 
follow-on strategy for the CBI Theater. The map below shows the vast distances and key nodes 
of this makeshift supply route necessitated by the loss of Burma. 
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 In 1942, there were three key reasons why a significant build-up of ground force 
equipment for China was not possible. There was a lack of Allied transport aircraft available, 
especially with the emergency diversion of assets to support the British effort in North Africa. 
The second problem was the inadequacy of airfields and storage facilities in India. Perhaps most 
importantly was the Japanese air threat from bases in Burma and Southeast Asia that forced the 
re-supply effort to shift further west over the more difficult mountainess terrain. This reality 
supported Chennault's argument that the air campaign should have priority of tonnage shipped 
over the Hump. With these additional supplies, he argued the air forces could protect Chongqing, 
attack the Japanese supply line along the Yangzi River valley, and support the training and 
formation of additional air units at key facilities in eastern and southern China.  
 This air-centric effort would also support the construction and improvement of airfields 
and facilities in southeastern China to enable the deployment of a large American bomber force 
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for attacks on the main islands of Japan. For the Allies, China was the only viable area from 
which to conduct air operations against the Japanese homeland early in the war. The planned 
recovery in areas not under Japanese control in eastern China of the aircraft that conducted the 
April 1942 Doolittle Raid on the Tokyo immediately brought this reality to light. The Japanese 
quickly deployed additional forces and reacted very harshly to the populations in those areas of 
China where the American bombers landed or crashed. Jiang was not informed beforehand that 
this raid would take place. Nevertheless, he continued to support Chennault's air strategy against 
Japan. The handling of this operation was an indication of a lack of mutual respect and trust 
between Washington, Stilwell, Chennault, and Jiang.
20
  
 The dilemma for both Jiang and Chennault was the problem identified early on that the 
Japanese were likely to respond with ground attacks against any airfields that supported aircraft 
attacking Japanese facilities in Indochina, eastern China, and especially the home islands. In a 
March 16, 1943 Memorandum to the President, the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. 
Marshall succinctly outlined the problem that had been identified earlier by Stilwell in opposing 
Chennault's plan. "Here is the most serious consideration: as soon as our air effort hurts the Japs, 
they will move against us, not only in the air but also on the ground. The air situation Chennault 
can take care of with his fighters, but the ground effort against our bases must be met with men 
on the ground. Our 'bomb Tokyo bases' in Chekiang (Zhejiang) Province have been destroyed as 
a result of ground action"
21
   
 Both Marshall and Stilwell believed the success of the planned air strategy required well-
trained, equipped, and led ground forces capable of protecting the airfields from a Japanese 
ground offensive. The requirement for the thirty divisions, or more, stood as a key to the air 
strategy. However, the lack of sufficient aircraft and facilities to fly the large quantity of supplies 
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and equipment needed to build up and support the ground forces and Jiang's call for the priority 
of supplies going to Chennault air campaign was a significant problem for Stilwell and his staff. 
The promised American training and equipping mission for Jiang's Nationalist Army of up to 
thirty divisions in China, agreed to by President Roosevelt in November 1941, was not 
logistically supportable, and seemed a remote possibility in the summer of 1942.
22
 However, 
elements of five Nationalist divisions were retreating from operations in Burma into British 
India. This provided an opportunity for American trainers and advisors to refit, train and equip a 
Chinese ground force for future operations.   
 These operations included the near term requirement for the defense of India from further 
Japanese attacks. However, until the British military leadership and the India government 
negotiated logistics and support agreements this effort could not begin. Ongoing changes in the 
British command structure in India and Southeast Asia in response to the recent humiliating 
defeats further complicated this effort. In addition, the increasingly independence-minded Indian 
government and inefficient bureaucracy presented another obstacle to the unhampered use of 
transportation assets to support the lend lease program for China, and to support Allied 
operations in Burma and China. Jiang also had to agree to allow his forces to stay in India, the 
diversion of lend-lease materials to refit both British colonial troops and Chinese forces, and the 
administrative and command relationships. While the details of this effort were being worked 
out, Stilwell quickly moved to press for major changes in the organization and training of the 
Nationalist Army based on AMMISCA assessments and the performance of Chinese units in 
Burma that he had personally observed.  
 An April 1, 1942 message from Stilwell to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff 
General Marshall is indicative of how he saw the performance of the Chinese forces in Burma. 
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  Arrived in Chungking two AM today.  Operations around Toungoo hampered by 
 breakdowns in transports, delays in supply, rotten communications, sabotage by natives, 
 and politics in the Army. These troubles fade into insignificance compared to the 
 incompetence, lethargy, and disregard of orders amounting to disobedience on part of 
 Division and Army Commanders. Unfortunately my powers stop short of shooting. A 
 fine opportunity for a good slap at the Japs has been ruined by craven obstruction of 
 above mentioned commanders...Have come to Chungking to have a show down with 
 High Command. Under existing conditions cannot continue in command of Fifth and 
 Sixth Armies without being a stooge for the Chinese, who can bypass me for anything 
 they want to do and then blame me for the result.  
 
 Later in the message, Stilwell makes  the following statement: 
 
"Retain all my confidence in Chinese soldier who requires only equipment and leadership to be 
 the equal of anyone."
23
 
 
 This basic assessment of the problem and enduring optimism in the potential of the 
individual Chinese soldier served as a primary motivator for Stilwell and his American 
subordinates. The Americans continued to press hard for systemic changes in the organization 
and leadership of the Nationalist Army. On 26 May 1942, Stilwell sent Jiang "Notes for the 
Generalissimo" which outlined a proposal for reforming the Chinese Army. 
  The Chinese Army is weak partly because lack of equipment, but mostly for other 
 reasons. It is too large to equip properly with the material now available, but a reduced 
 number of divisions could be furnished with suitable weapons, including artillery, if a 
 determined effort were made to get it together. A reorganization should be commenced 
 at once with this end in view. A few dependable, well-equipped, well-supported 
 divisions would be worth far more than double the number of the present average. The 
 lack of artillery, A.A. guns, tanks, and planes has been evident for a long time. There is 
 no use in continuing this complaint. The question is what can be done with what we 
 have. 
  (1) I recommend the merging of divisions to bring all units up to strength, and the 
 assignment of all available weapons to these divisions as far as they will go. Our 
 available strike force will then be concentrated, and usable, as it is not now.
24
   
 
The memo goes on to assess the soldiers and junior officers as sound, calls for selecting middle 
ranking officers who have shown competence for advancement, and for conducting a significant 
culling of the general officer corps.   
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  (2) I recommend a rigid purge of inefficient high commanders. This could be 
 accomplished partly by the training section, which could require field tests, and partly on 
 recommendations from officers in who the Generalissimo has the highest confidence.  
 Without a clearing out of the inefficient, the Army will continue to go downhill, no 
 matter how much material is supplied for it.
25
  
 
 Stilwell then recommended a focus on unity of command and attempted to reduce the 
often-conflicting interference of higher headquarters in tactical operations of fielded forces. He 
argued that unit commanders must have the mandate to direct their assigned forces in the field, 
including the supporting arms and logistic elements, to be able to react to enemy actions on the 
battlefield in a timely manner. This memo specifically mentioned the need to stop the "advice" 
going directly to field commanders personally from the Generalissimo. His officers considered 
these messages to be "orders" that must be followed whatever the actual situation in the field at 
the time.  
  (3) I recommend that in future operations one man be chosen with complete 
 authority to direct the action with complete control over the services, with no staff other 
 than his own present. Liaison officers at the War Ministry can check his orders, as well 
 as his reports, but his absolute control of the troops must not be infringed upon.
26
 
 
 While this recommendation may accord with Sun Tzu's dictum that “He whose generals 
are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious,"
27
 it was not something the 
Generalissimo would easily agree to do, and especially when offered by a foreign officer. 
Stilwell’s memo finishes with comments on awards and punishments, improvement in logistics 
and services, and ends with an optimistic assessment of what such reorganization could 
accomplish. According to Madame Jiang this assessment was similar to what the German 
advisors had told the Generalissimo, but such drastic actions could not be taken as they were "not 
realistic" as "heads could not be lopped off otherwise nothing would be left."
28
  
Madame Jiang was very influential in the China-American relationship. She reportedly 
spoke excellent English and, on several occasions, she represented her husband in Washington at 
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conferences. She attended Wellesley College in Massachusetts, was a Christian, and was 
instrumental in the Generalissimo's religious conversion. In addition, she was the brother of T.V. 
Song who served as China's economic and arms sales representative in the United States in the 
earlier days of the war. She had personally hired Chennault to reform the Nationalist air arm, and 
cultivated the relationship between him and the Generalissimo. She often accompanied her 
husband to key meetings and served as his interpreter. What she said could not to be dismissed 
lightly. A 2009 biography by Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and 
the Birth of Modern China outlines her powerful and influential role during this critical period in 
Chinese history. 
 For Jiang, his relationship with his senior generals was critical for political stability in the 
country. His top priority was to maintain his coalition of regional leaders and warlords and those 
generals in the Nationalist Army who were personally loyal to the Generalissimo. His political 
allies in uniform were "heads" that could not be touched much less "lopped off." Political 
sensibilities took precedent over military necessities, especially in actions far from the seat of 
power where his control was more tenuous. Stilwell pressed unsuccessfully for reforms in 
numerous conferences and meetings with Jiang over the next several months.
29
 In June of 1942, 
a chance for a compromise emerged.  
 Jiang finally agreed to allow the 38th Division commanded by Sun Liren (Sun Li-jen), a 
graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, and the 22nd Division commanded by Liao Yao-shing 
(Liao Yaoxing) to be trained by the Americans in India. In addition, smaller elements of three 
additional divisions (28th, 96th, and 200th) and the 5th Army (Corps) that had retreated to India 
from the fighting in Burma were also directed to stay. These elements were to reorganize, refit, 
and train at a former British prisoner of war camp facility in Ramgarh, India. This remit was later 
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expanded to build, with additional personnel flown back over the Hump, the Chinese Army in 
India (CAI), which would eventually include five divisions and supporting arms for the Allied 
offensive to retake Burma. 
 
 
                http://cbi-theater-5.home.comcast.net/~cbi-theater-5/ramgarh/ramgarh.html  
Ramgarh: Now It Can Be Told 
 This heading is the title of "A pictorial story of the Chinese American Training Center in 
India where the soldiers of two great nations have combined their efforts to mould the means of 
defeating the common enemy."
30
 The following sections of this chapter describe the training and 
equipping of a Chinese army from the perspective of both the Americans who conducted the 
effort, and some of the Chinese trained there. As the dedication in this book states, "the creation 
of a modern fighting force which could stand toe-to-toe with the Japs and slug it out to victory" 
took place at Ramgarh. There would not only be victories in 1944 in the campaign to retake 
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Burma, but in producing the fighting core of the Nationalist Army that would continuing fighting 
until the final days of the Chinese Civil War.
31
 
 In General Order Number 1 dated August 26, 1942, the Ramgarh Training Center (RTC) 
was official designated and organized as Chinese Training and Combat Command (CT&CC) 
under the command of Colonel Frederick McCabe who had been the Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Operations (G-3) in Stilwell's headquarters. Later that fall, Brigadier General Haydon L. 
Boatner, an assistant on the logistics (G-4) staff of the CBI headquarters, was appointed to serve 
as the Chief of Staff to a forward Chinese headquarters element called the Chih Hui Pu (Zhi Hui 
Bu). Under the direct command of the Chinese military, that organization was responsible for the 
"administration, discipline, supply, and sanitation" of the Chinese troops assigned to Ramgarh 
for training. In the beginning, the camp served to rehabilitate and provide medical treatment for 
the retreating Chinese who had suffered significantly from the effects of prolonged combat 
service and disease without adequate rest, logistics, and medical support.
32
  
  The first Chinese troops to arrive at Ramgarh were badly decimated and were 
 suffering from disease, malnutrition, lack of clothing and general war torn condition 
 resulting from their long and trying march through the tropical jungles of Burma and 
 Assam...For the Chinese soldiers, Ramgarh was a wonderland. They were fed for the 
 first time as much food and meat as they could stuff into their hungry bodies. They 
 gained  an average of twenty pounds. They practiced on ranges with live shells and real 
 bullets. Hospitals doctored them for everything from malaria to foot ulcers. And most 
 important of all--they were paid.
33
  
 
This characterization of the arriving Chinese forces from the pages of the unit history, Ramgarh: 
Now It Can Be Told, produced at the end of the war by American servicemen who served there, 
is not subtle about their perceptions of the way Chinese officers cared for their own soldiers. The 
senior American leadership at Ramgarh often had extensive experience working in China. 
However, the newly arriving officers and soldiers were not as well prepared in terms of language 
and culture. They had received a solid curriculum in their technical areas before leaving the 
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United States. The yearbook provides the names and ranks of the personnel serving on the 
various teaching faculties. The faculty of the various technical teaching departments was rank 
heavy with senior enlisted and mid-rank officers.     
 In June and July of 1942, the Americans to run the camp, organize the training effort, and 
provide the oversight for the British and lend-lease funded equipment and supplies began to 
arrive. Procedures where command prerogatives remained with Chinese officers, but Americans 
served as the primary instructors and trainers, supported by "hundreds of Chinese student 
interpreters" were quickly established. Almost immediately, issues related to reorganization and 
Chinese officer conduct emerged that highlights the unique nature of advisory activity. Boatner's 
post-war "Notes on Ramgarh" written after he had left China in 1946-47, detail some of these 
issues and is excerpted below.  
  The first plan for the utilization of those Chinese troops that were evacuated to 
 Ramgarh was to organize them into ten battalions, seven artillery battalions and three 
 battalions of heavy weapons specialists. The artillery battalions following their training 
 would be moved back to China.... 
  The heavy weapons specialists would be used as instructors for units in China.... 
  The fallacy of the plan was that the division commanders had no intention of 
 breaking up their divisions and giving their men to any other commanders; in other 
 words,  they were completely selfish, as in the case with almost all Chinese officers, and 
 wanted to keep their divisions together because of personal gain.... 
  Furthermore, no matter how good these battalions were they would not be 
 absorbed in larger Chinese units without many changes in senior officer personnel 
 because the Chinese officer always has his personal favorites and old time followers that, 
 irrespective of ability, must be taken care of.
34
  
 
As might be expected, the America reorganization proposal at the tactical level, as with 
Stilwell’s efforts, to reform higher-level headquarters with Jiang was not accepted. In the early 
days of the Ramgarh effort and at the national level in Chongqing, valuable lessons on the 
parameters of what was possible in terms of reorganizing the Nationalist Army were learned. 
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Tactical and technical changes and accommodations possible at the lower levels were much 
more difficult to replicate at the large unit and national levels.   
 The American system of building interchangeable units and specialists used by most, if 
not all, modern armies for the replacement of battle casualties and losses was not possible, at 
least at this stage of the effort in reorganizing the two divisions that arrived in Ramgarh more or 
less complete and with their leadership intact. Even with a division commander who had gone to 
a military college in the United States, the Chinese army's organizational cultural norms were not 
compatible with the changes initially proposed by the Americans. Stilwell's efforts in Chongqing 
with Jiang and his staff encountered similar problems as the political nature of the regime and its 
senior military leadership continually trumped changes necessary to build a modern, effective 
military force using a Western model. Personnel selections, organization changes, and specialist 
training programs had to happen within units and within the prerogatives of the senior unit 
commanders at division level and above. Chinese “ownership” of newly established units was 
also imperative. Nevertheless, from the American perspective, addressing the systemic problems 
that reduced the effectiveness of Chinese forces was critical if there was to be any hope of ever 
defeating the Japanese. The key was getting some senior level buy-in, building relationships at 
the levels where the changes had to be implemented, and carefully choosing what programs to 
push, and when. 
 The issues of reorganization and building counterpart relationships were not only 
apparent to American military personnel. John P. Davies, Stilwell's liaison, in a 4 November 
1942 letter to several State Department colleagues, provides comments on the competencies of 
the Americans and some insights into the evolving relationships being built at Ramgarh.   
  The Chinese divisional commanders seem to feel reassured that their divisions are 
 not going to be broken up and harmony seemed to reign....I still think Boatner is the only 
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 first-class high ranking officer there....The junior American officers have risen in my 
 estimation. In contrast to those in China, they get along well with the Chinese they work 
 with. The Sunday I was there they threw a barbecue picnic for several hundred Chinese 
 officers. And the Chinese seemed to enjoy it enormously....
35
  
 
Davies specifically mentioned how well the American junior officers, those with little or no 
experience working with the Chinese, got along with their counterparts. There is also a reference 
to an American style picnic. While cultural knowledge is important, relationships and how one 
treats counterparts and trainees also matters. There are several stories of Chinese officers 
participating in and enjoying American cultural activities conducted at Ramgarh. Davies also 
mentions a difference "in contrast to those in China." After the establishment of Ramgarh, 
training bases were also established in various locations in southern China. Colonel W. J. 
Peterkin, who served as a trainer at the 3515th Infantry Training Center at Kweilin (Guilin) 
published a memoir titled Inside China: 1943-1945 An Eyewitness Account of America's Mission 
in Yenan. He is much more negative about his experience in terms of the American-Chinese 
relationship and the effectiveness of the training in his account of working with the Nationalists. 
 In a 2005, a collection of short accounts of over fifty Chinese soldiers who were trained 
at Ramgarh or who fought beside Americans in Burma and China was published. Under the 
Same Army Flag: Recollections of the Veterans of World War II outlines how the training was 
conducted and, especially, how relationships were formed. The following quote is indicative of 
the types of activities and actions that were shared across the two cultures, how this built 
camaraderie, and provides an impression of how counterparts were viewed. “Due to the language 
barrier and the garrison location, I only knew a few Americans, but they left me very deep 
impressions. Those Americans who watched movies with us always left the best seats to us. We 
were always disciplined, while they were more casual.”
36
 A Chinese officer who was assigned to 
Stilwell headquarters told a story of a disagreement between the two division commanders and 
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the American trainers about extra training being added to the daily schedule. Stilwell listened to 
both of the commanders and the trainers, and after due consideration, decided in favor of the 
Chinese leadership. The young officer wrote the following, which was translated in the book in 
broken but understandable English: 
  Since then, the training of Chinese army in India has surged new tides. Leaders 
 of all different levels could execute their own authority and seldom be interfered by 
 American liaison officers. Though still running between Chongqing and New Delhi [the 
 location of the British Headquarters] frequently, Stilwell always spared some time to stay 
 in Ramgarh for a couple of days to live with the Chinese officers and soldiers, check the 
 training, review the army and watch different contests and combat exercises of the New 
 1st Army Corps and special type army in person. 
  I was very touched when I saw his busy and active figure, because I felt that he 
 was our Chinese true friend!
37
 
 
  Boatner, assigned early on to serve at Ramgarh, does indicate an area where the 
Americans stood their ground and made progress despite the disapproval of the Chinese senior 
officers. The problem of the disbursement of pay and allowances, which the Chinese wanted to 
handle entirely on their own in the traditional way, was easily exploited and invited corruption. 
The Chinese commander drew the pay for all of his unit's personnel and there were no records 
kept of how it was further dispersed. This was an area where the American officers could 
influence the procedures and monitor the situation. The leverage was that the money for pay was 
not coming from the Chinese government. He notes: "Money was at the root of most of the 
dissatisfaction of the Chinese in Ramgarh. Having much more money, better food, and better 
equipment and clothing than any other Chinese unit had ever had in the history of China; they 
were continually after more and continually failed to appreciate why I as an American was 
unwilling to go with them on all sorts of false claims."
38
   
 The organizational and administrative climate that developed at Ramgarh over time away 
from the stresses and strains of combat provides insights into what was possible in making 
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changes in the leadership, training, and equipping of the Nationalist Army, while at the same 
time being sensitive to cultural difference, but dealing with corruption and improper treatment of 
soldiers. The Ramgarh Training Center (RTC) was a laboratory and training ground not only for 
the Chinese assigned there, but also for the American trainers and administrators. Obviously, in 
such an environment, focusing on building up the tactical and technical proficiency of 
predominately the enlisted and junior officer personnel was possible with minimal input from 
senior Chinese commanders once they had agreed to turn their soldiers over to the Americans. 
The new military equipment, logistics support, technical expertise, and pay all provided leverage 
for a broad program to not only improve the combat performance of China's army, but also to 
provide a model for a more effective and efficient modern combat force. 
 The CT&CC at Ramgarh conducted both individual military skills and unit training 
programs. Initially, there were only the infantry and artillery schools. Although the need for tank 
units in the jungles of north and central Burma was minimal, an armor school was later 
established. There was a valid requirement for armored units in parts of Burma and eventually in 
China. For the longer term, the building of technical and mechanical skills, and for providing a 
capability that mirrored the Japanese, had logic of its own. By late 1942, the RTC established 
schools to train military specialties including "Motor Transport, Engineer, Signal, Ordnance, 
Medical, Veterinary, and Chemical Warfare." Another Chinese soldier assigned to the 5th 
Company of the 2nd Battalion of the Technology Training Regiment remembering his training 
recounted the following: 
  I had forgotten which session I was in, but I still clearly remember the serial 
 number: MTR 2504, worn on my chest. Each company had one American lieutenant-
 commander coach officer, on Chinese lieutenant-commander interpreter and four 
 American sergeants. In each car, there were four students and one assistant coach officer 
 (posts held by Chinese monitors in the driving school). We learned to drive in turns and 
 the sergeants were in charge of instructing on the spot.... 
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  Unlike Chinese coach officers, the Americans wouldn't punish you physically 
 because of your unsatisfactory performance. They were very friendly and easy-going.
39
  
  
 In addition to technical courses and programs of instruction focused on battalion and 
below level combat skills, small-unit tactics, and operations, Ramgarh also provided a short 
jungle warfare course and training programs for the use and care of pack animals. Importantly, 
for addressing issues related to making changes in the command climate and dealing with senior 
leader deficiencies in units, courses, and instructions to Chinese officers including generals was 
also provided. This was an attempt to build relationships and to try to overcome the lack of 
formal military training in the upper ranks of the Nationalist Army. In the Ramgarh pictorial, 
there is a picture of an American enlisted soldier with this caption: "Sgt Sweeney is typical of the 
assistant instructors at Ramgarh, and it is not unusual that his pupils are two Chinese generals."
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The officer-enlisted relationship, corruption, corporal punishment, and taking care of troops all 
were dealt with accounting for the extant cultural differences and impediments. 
 The senior American leadership strongly believed that basic to this entire effort was for 
the trainers to gain a better understanding of Chinese culture and the acquisition of at least some 
rudimentary language capability. According to Boatner, one of the Stilwell's first orders to him at 
Ramgarh was to arrange for language training for all American personnel. This was initiated by 
"using the young Chinese interpreters as instructors. Most of them had learned their English at 
missionary schools in China. They loved the prestige of being instructors. Most quickly became 
very friendly with Americans. Boatner mentioned that the course followed closely that I had 
been subjected to in Tientsin (1928-30) and Peking (1930-34)."
41
 The interpreters who had 
worked around foreigners before were cultural go-betweens and advisors, as well as language 
instructors. Some educated Chinese who did not speak English were also sent to language classes 
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if their assignment called for working closely with Americans.
42
  Language was the key to 
developing relationships and understanding. A Chinese sergeant had the following to say: 
  I really like Americans. They were open, unsophisticated, and friendly, whether 
 being a teacher in class, military police (MP), or rank-and-file... I did not like the British 
 soldiers.... 
  Americans seemed less complicated. They love life...There were quite a few  
 female American soldiers in a Battalion barrack, and they looked beautiful and relaxed.   
 Whenever we saw them, we would act like those Americans to give a thumbs-up and say 
 loudly to them "Beautiful." They would turn their heads and smiled broadly at us, and  
 reply in their cute Chinese phrase "Ni Hao, Da Jia Hao (Hello Everyone)." The language 
 barrier never stopped us to show friendliness in various ways when we ran into American 
 soldiers...For over a year when we were in Ramgarh, we had been speaking in a strange 
 language mixed with half Chinese, half English, during our encounter with American 
 soldiers. Our grammar was incorrect, but with the help of hand gestures, we still 
 managed to carry on lengthy and engaging conversations with each other.
43
  
 
  Boatner also discusses the language and cultural handbook that Stilwell had published in 
Calcutta in 1942 to facilitate the education of all arriving American personnel. This pamphlet 
was composed of two sections. Part 1 was a ten-lesson course in Chinese language over half of 
which was focused on military terminology. Part 2 was five lessons including Chinese 
geography, military rank insignia, organization of government and agencies, and ended with 
miscellaneous cultural information.
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 At the very beginning of the American effort to train 
Chinese troops and units, language, culture, and knowledge critical to personnel policies, 
administration, and operational employment of combined Chinese and American elements were 
incorporated. This effort was based on what appeared to be working on the ground and the 
legacy of the past experiences of military officers of working in China. The results of the 
Ramgarh effort was very impressive as the mission to train the additional Chinese divisions in 
southern China was about to begin and the campaign to reestablish a landline of communication 
to China and to retake Burma was imminent. 
  As of December 1943, the Ramgarh Training Center had trained 5,368 officers 
 and 48,124 enlisted men of the Chinese Army in India. During 1944 many contingents 
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 of Americans were processed through the RTC including men of the Z-force [the second 
 group of 30 divisions to be equipped and trained by the United States), Field 
 Replacement Depot and replacements for the 5307th Composite Regiment (Provisional) 
 destined to become part of the Mars Task Force.
45
  
 
 According to Boatner, in April of 1943, in addition to the training programs for the 
Chinese and newly arriving American units, a concurrent program began at the RTC to organize 
and train American personnel for the liaison system of combat advisors. As the time approached, 
where the Chinese units trained at Ramgarh were to be sent back into combat in eastern India 
and Burma, the Americans to accompany them had to be selected and prepared for this mission. 
This effort to build and protect a land link from India to Kunming in southwest China was 
dependent on a successful offensive to take back northern Burma and to build a road and 
petroleum pipeline. Some of the Chinese units would work alongside American engineer and 
Services of Supply (SOS) logistics units in the project that eventually was called the Stilwell 
Road. For American advisors, the need to communicate both within the Chinese units to which 
they were assigned and with both Allied and Chinese controlling headquarters was critical.   
 The American advisors had to be able monitor and overseer unit movements and combat 
maneuvers, but the ability to communicate clearly and accurately was also necessary for 
providing medical evacuation, artillery and air support, in addition to day-to-day status reporting. 
That meant having a large number of Americans who were not only knowledgeable of the 
conduct of combat operations, but who could also had enough cultural knowledge and language 
skills to ensure the interpreters used the right military terminology and understood the nuances of 
working daily in combat conditions with Chinese counterparts. This included having American 
and Chinese operators with the technical skills to use the newly acquired equipment and maintain 
communications.  
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 Boatner indicated that the Americans had learned from their mistakes in dealing with the 
Chinese at the training base. This resulted in the simple guiding philosophy quoted with 
comments at the beginning of this study to direct the actions of the liaison officers. He offered 
the following guidance, which he acknowledged as being "clichés," for Americans that were 
assigned with Chinese units. 
 (1) Tell the Chinese the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 
 (2) Be American but not too American, let the Chinese be Chinese but never too Chinese. 
 (3) Never get mad at a Chinese officer in the presence of others.
46
   
This simple guidance attempts to "operationalize" cultural knowledge. It takes into account both 
American and Chinese traits, but recommended a middle path--compromise and workarounds. 
Telling the whole truth will invariably violate the tenet of "face." However, for Americans there 
can be no progress without a clear recognition of what is not working and why. The second tenet 
pushes both compromise and the necessity of both sides to find alternatives that work. There is 
clearly a recognition that the Chinese cannot transform into a modern, effective military without 
violating some of their "traditions" and methods of operating. However, the Americans also must 
understand and adapt approaches to find ways to make that change occur within acceptable 
cultural parameters. The last point is an example of how to manage "face" in an acceptable 
manner. In that this is also a tenet of proper action in American military culture, it reinforces the 
observation that there are elements of both cultures that are shared.  
 Boatner also discussed a program used for improving the quality and effectiveness of 
advisors and overcoming a very prevalent Chinese bias. Where new American equipment and 
technical training was seen to be necessary, America advice on combat tactics was initially 
discounted by Chinese counterparts. The Nationalist Army had been fighting the Japanese or the 
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Communists for decades; however, there was very little combat experience among their 
American counterparts. This lack of battlefield experience was a very significant issue for all the 
American trainers and liaison personnel assigned to the CBI early in the war.    
  In this field, naturally, there was great mental resistance in the Chinese to be 
 overcome. China has been at war seven years. Many Chinese felt that their battle 
 experience was better than United States theory and were not interested in this phase of 
 instruction. However, after seeing the Chinese in battle, all American observers agreed 
 their minor tactics are extremely faulty. There is no question the Chinese need all the 
 instruction, which was originally planned in minor tactics.
47
   
  
 Boatner discussed one of the ways this issue was dealt with as Ramgarh prepared to push 
American liaison teams to Chinese units that were being moved forward for the upcoming 
campaign to retake Burma. Boatner's papers at the Military History Institute in Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania contain an undated copy of instructions for liaison officers. The following are some 
key excerpts. 
  1.  Introduction: 
  a. As an officer of the Army of the United States you are now representing your 
 Government in an Allied effort. Up until now, all of your service has been training but 
 the job you will do here as a member of the Combat Forces of this sector is one of 
 operations. You and all of us here are playing for "keeps." 
  b. ...You are taking up a very, very difficult assignment for which you have 
 heretofore received no specific instruction. It will tax your initiative, ingenuity, tact, 
 spirit of cooperation to the utmost. Behind every sentence that follows is a background 
 of experience accumulated by officers who for many months have worked and lived with 
 the Chinese Army. These things were learned through mistakes which were not always 
 pleasant. With the instructions below as a guide and with tact and common sense, you 
 can and must carry out the policies of our Theater Commander, General Stilwell. 
  2.  Duties:  
  a. Your duty is to make the organization to which you are assigned the most 
 effective battle unit possible.... 
  3.  Methods of Accomplishment. 
  a. Normally, you will live with, and in the area of the unit to which you are 
 assigned. You must at all times conduct yourself and maintain the personal appearance 
 creditable to an officer of the United States Army. The influence you are able to exert 
 will depend largely on the amount of confidence the Chinese have in you, both from a 
 personal standpoint, and from your professional knowledge. You must particularly gain 
 and maintain the confidence of the Commanding Officer of the unit to which you are 
 assigned. Do all you can through him, always building up his prestige with his unit. 
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 Maintain your own prestige and dignity as an American officer. Your relationship should 
 be that of two members of the same team. Learn to like him and make him your friend. 
 Do not make any promises, personal, social, or military unless you are positive you can 
 make good. If you are not positive always, leave yourself an opening. Always bear in 
 mind that you are dealing with officers and men whose customs are different from those 
 you are used to and you must respect them and be sympathetic to them.... 
    d. ...Make every effort to improve your own grasp of the Chinese language. The 
 Chinese appreciate our trying to learn their language. 
  4.  Conclusion: 
  a. Remember your duty is Liaison - not Command.... 
  b.  ....Those are all the instructions we can give you to enable you to carry out 
 your mission of making more effective our team work with the Chinese, and making the 
 Chinese Army in India the force that will drive the Japs from Northern Burma.   
 
 Boatner wrote a personal note in his own hand on this copy of the instruction that is, 
itself, a testament to the liaison system implemented at Ramgarh. "Although the senior liaison 
officers had the authority to adjust personality clashes between the U.S. and Chinese in units - 
and undoubted did so - I was never called upon to discipline any U.S. officer for misconduct or 
clashes with the Chinese"
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 These instructions were part of a very deliberate effort on the part of 
the senior American military leadership to prepare its officers for this important duty and quickly 
pass along the lessons that had been learned working with Chinese counterparts at Ramgarh.   
"Ultimately, we codified our instructions to U.S. liaison officers...All U.S. liaison officers 
initially served an institutional (instructional) phase with one of our experienced officers before 
taking up their permanent assignment."
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 Successful combat advising demanded demonstrated 
competence, credibility, and the ability to nurture personal relationships.  
 In April 1943, the Chinese 38th Division moved forward followed by the 22nd Division 
in September with additional Chinese units including the 30th Division following as the 
campaign to reestablish the landline of communication from India to China and to retake Burma 
began. Boatner and the American liaison teams moved forward with these units. He served as the 
command's senior advisor. Brigadier General William E. Bergin replaced him at Ramgarh and 
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continued the mission to providing the liaison with the Chinese military leadership for 
administration as the school. Ramgarh continued to provide specialist training for Chinese 
soldiers and the reception and familiarization for arriving U.S. units. This included the mission 
of providing in-theater training for selected newly arriving American forces.
50
        
 Complementing and building on the Ramgarh effort to refit and prepare the first three 
Chinese divisions in India was the equipping and training of Y-Force, also called the Yoke-Force 
in China. This was the training program for twenty-seven additional divisions established at 
Kunming in Yunnan Province by April of 1943. According to an official history of CBI prepared 
as Stilwell was leaving the CBI: 
  "Y" Force's mission for the Americans was three-fold from a training viewpoint.    
 They were to: 
 (1) Train and organize the "Y" Forces; consisting of 27 Chinese Divisions and associated 
 army troops, 
 (2) Coordinate the eastward Hump movement of "Y" Force equipment from India, 
 (3) Assist the Chinese staff in formulating plans for the operations [originally the attack 
 into northern Burma].
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 Preparing these additional Chinese units in Kunming immediately encountered a series of 
different challenges for the American trainers. Foremost among these was that many of these 
units or their leadership elements could not easily be redeployed from their home locations to 
Kunming for training. This meant mobile American teams deployed to various locations 
throughout southern China to provide the training. The formation of traveling instructional teams 
was the solution to this problem. Other problems that were "ironed out little by little," included 
"shortages of students and Chinese assistant instructors, lack of experienced interpreters, and 
shortages of equipment."
52
 The Y-Force experience of training and refitting a deployed army at 
war was to become the norm for American army personnel assigned to this mission for the rest 
of the war.   
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 Davies, in commenting on the Ramgarh and Y-Force effort, mentions another American 
program that was ongoing in China and technically under the purview of Stilwell in his role as 
the senior American military officer in China. These additional responsibilities were indicative 
of the complicated nature of command, control, cooperation, and collaboration with intelligence 
organizations and covert programs. Davies, the State Department representative, was worried 
about the ultimate use of the forces trained by Americans. In addition to line units, individual 
Chinese from internally focused intelligence organizations also received training from 
Americans. 
  This Ramgarh program, the 30-division program and the cooperation with and 
 strengthening of Tai Li's organization by another agency pose an interesting question of 
 policy. How far are we going with all of this? Insofar as these activities contribute to  
 beating the Jap, they are excellent. But are we so sure that the by-products and the 
 ultimate end-product are what we want?
53
  
 
 Tai Li (Dai Li) was Nationalist China's director for internal security. He ran an 
organization called euphemistically the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. He had a 
reputation for absolute devotion to Jiang whom he had served under at the Huangpu Military 
Academy in the 1920s. He was reported to be an assassin who ruthlessly sought out Jiang's 
political enemies, not only Communists, but also those Chinese liberals who called for the end to 
the Generalissimo's military dictatorship and for greater democracy. His organization eliminated 
many of these "traitors," through violence action or long-term imprisonment.
54
 Davies's 
comments in the above paragraph expresses concern for U.S. forces or elements becoming 
involved, directly or indirectly, in potentially embarrassing and illegal domestic activities 
reportedly carried out by Dai Li. This was especially relevant in programs seen as directly 
impacting the internal political situation in China and impeding the need for greater unity among 
the Chinese factions in their anti-Japanese efforts. In 1942, two interlocking American operations 
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were working with and supporting Dai Li that had the potential to influence the Stilwell-Jiang 
relationship and the military advisory mission in the CBI.   
 One of these programs was a U.S. Navy effort called the Sino-American Cooperation 
Organization (SACO) set up ostensibly to gather weather data in China. In reality, SACO was 
designed to advise and assist in the organizing, training and support of Nationalist guerrilla units 
working in Japanese held areas of eastern China. The second organization at work in China was 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. This 
activity included an overt organization made up of China scholars and specialists who made 
assessments using what would today be call "open-source intelligence" collection and reporting. 
They also worked as part of the psychological warfare effort in the Office of War Information 
(OWI). There was also a covert effort in China and Southeast Asia that included special 
operations teams in Burma working with friendly native minority groups to collect intelligence 
on the Japanese and conduct operations in support of Allied forces. As American trained 
conventional units moved into Burma, they would work with native guerrilla groups supported 
and trained by American military personnel. When operations against the Japanese began in 
China itself, conventional forces coordination with SACO and other OSS elements was a 
complicating factor in Allied command and control. 
 The direction of these American organizations, how much information and intelligence 
was shared with Chinese and British allies, the mechanisms for coordination and liaison, and 
issue of logistics priorities and support were never satisfactorily settled. Because of the covert 
nature of many of the operations, especially those in China, and any operations involving Dai Li, 
Jiang demanded be under his purview. Having Americans, conducting military operations in 
China not under the command of the senior advisor to Jiang further complicated the lives of 
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Stilwell, his staff and his military successors. A detailed and very well documented account of 
these organizations, their missions, and what they were able to accomplish is contained in The 
OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War by Maochun Yu
55
 and his follow-on book, The Dragon's 
War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937-1947.
56
   
 Stilwell's primary contact, although different workarounds were tried, for both the OSS 
and the Navy operations on the ground in China, was the head of SACO, Captain Milton E. 
(Mary) Miles, who deployed to China in April of 1942. Having worked in the office responsible 
for the acquisition of naval equipment and ships for China as a staff officer in Washington, he 
had the background to work in the theater. His book published in 1967, A Different Kind of War: 
The little known story of the combined guerrilla  forces created in China by the U.S. Navy and 
the Chinese in World War II, provides a detailed account of the activities of this organization. 
According to Miles, his secret orders were to "find out what is going on there...and set up some 
bases as soon as you can. The main idea was to prepare the China coast in any way you can for 
U.S. Navy landings in three or four years. In the meantime, do whatever you can to help the 
Navy and heckle the Japanese."
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 Because Miles officially worked for the Navy Department and 
by special agreement with the Office of Strategic Services, his relationship to Stilwell and the 
Army headquarters was often difficult and complex. In addition, since SACO was so intertwined 
with Dai Li and his secret organization designed to keep Jiang in power, this organization 
essentially worked for two countries and three masters--often with divergent views, mandates, 
and goals. 
 The fact that the head of the OSS, William J. Donovan, a New York lawyer and Medal of 
Honor recipient from the First World War, was a personal friend and confidant of President 
Roosevelt further complicated Stilwell's relationship with Jiang and his chief of internal security. 
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Control of the OSS in China and the rest of Asia was a very controversial issue. Because SACO 
worked closely with and was supported by Dai Li, the Chinese wanted OSS activities controlled 
by Miles. Stilwell wanted full control of all American military personnel and intelligence related 
activities in the theater, a position supported by Marshall back in Washington. However, this was 
opposed by the Navy that wanted to provide the primary direction to Miles and to ensure his 
organization stayed focused on operations important to the Navy. Efforts to clarify the 
leadership, roles, and missions of OSS and SACO were brought to a head in late 1943 with 
Donovan's personal intervention with a trip to China to meet with all the key leaders. His direct 
involvement did not result in any major changes; in fact, his visit only made matters worse.
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 Further complicating the American intelligence picture in China was an organization that 
was originally designed within the War Department and its Military Intelligence Division (G-2) 
to be a competitor to the OSS. The leadership of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Collection 
Agency (JICA) was opposed to the OSS serving as the single American foreign intelligence 
agency conducting operations worldwide. Army intelligence officers subordinate to Marshall 
argued that JICA should be the primary agency in China to support Stilwell and the American 
effort to collect intelligence and perform clandestine operations. While JICA was organized, 
deployed personnel and conducted intelligence analysis in China, the OSS emerged from the 
bureaucratic infighting as the predominate intelligence organization in China. However, as with 
OSS and the Navy's SACO, the organization and conduct of intelligence activities in China never 
achieved unity of command. Part of this problem was the fact that the various organizations had 
different intelligence requirements and missions.
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 American officers also worked closely with 
Chinese counterparts in these organizations in the most sensitive of missions, sharing 
intelligence between and among allies.     
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 Further complicating the collection of intelligence and related operations in China was 
now Army Air Corps Major General Claire Chennault. He was officially subordinate to Stilwell; 
however, he was running an independent air operations focused intelligence organization to 
assist in collecting unique data for targeting the Japanese in eastern China. This part of China 
was also the main operational area of SACO. An air intelligence organization called the Air and 
Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (AGFRTS) under the control of 14th Air Force 
was formed. This organization also developed connections with OSS and operated in southern 
China, an area controlled by a Chinese warlord not completely trusted by Jiang. Complicating 
this arrangement was the effort by the British in Burma to control American led OSS teams 
working there in support of Major General Orde C. Wingate's long-range patrol missions and the 
upcoming offensive by their 14th Army. There were also disagreements over the control and 
support for covert Free French operations in Indo-China. Efforts by Stilwell and his staff to work 
directly with Mao and the Communists proposed by State Department personnel early on was 
picked up as a potential OSS mission that included training and logistical support further 
complicated the intelligence picture. Although Jiang finally agreed to the dispatch of an Observer 
Group, the Dixie Mission, to the Communists at Yenan in mid 1944, the OSS plan to support and 
supply Communist guerrillas was not approved. That mission was under the direct supervision of 
Stilwell.
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 Jiang had both overt and covert efforts ongoing to eliminate Communist organizers and 
contain expansion into Nationalist controlled territories. He did not want any foreign intelligence 
collection operations by his allies in China not under his control. At the same time, he 
understood the need to collect intelligence against the Japanese for situational awareness, 
targeting, and force protection, and therefore had to compromise on some of these issues. Jiang's 
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internal security chief, Dai Li, was the critical go-between with the American intelligence 
organizations. He was involved in virtually all Allied intelligence operations on Chinese soil. 
The infighting and lack of unity of command among the OSS, the Navy, the Army and its air 
arm, and the Allies further limited the leverage Stilwell had with the Generalissimo as his chief 
of staff and senior American military officer in China. This split among the Americans provided 
Jiang with opportunities to push his political agenda and oppose or slow roll Allied strategic 
plans that were not to his liking. One of the outcomes of this issue was to further strain the 
relations between Stilwell and Jiang at a time when the opportunity to equip and train Chinese 
forces was about to increase significantly. The Allies were also moving back into Burma and 
preparing to defend Chongqing from a predicted Japanese offensive. The requirement for greater 
trust and unity of command in the Allied effort had more storms to weather. 
 
Far Beyond Ramgarh 
 
 In November of 1943, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
met with Jiang, accompanied by his wife and Stilwell, in Cairo, Egypt to discuss future military 
operations in the CBI Theater. At the Sextant Conference, President Roosevelt promised Jiang an 
additional thirty divisions bringing the total number to be trained and equipped to eventually 
total ninety. This was the high point in the planning for American support for training, equipping 
and providing advisors to Jiang and the Nationalist Army.
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 In late 1943, the first thirty divisions 
(Y-Force) were still being trained and equipped. The implementation of a program for the second 
increment of thirty divisions called "Z-Force" was in the initial stages. Since the China-based Y-
Force program was not yet completed because of the lack of a ground line of communication, 
only three equipment sets were promised for use in training the Z-Force. Additional equipment 
could only be made available once the Burma route was reopened.   
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 The American trainers for the Z-Force group prepared at Ramgarh and moved forward to 
Kweilin (Guilin) in south China to set up a new training base and school. As with Y-Force, the 
relocation of these additional Chinese units to a central location for training was not often 
possible. Again, mobile training teams had to be formed and sent to the units significantly 
slowing the training process. In addition to the equipping and decentralization of training issues, 
just as the American trainers and advisors began their efforts, the Japanese commenced a major 
campaign in the spring of 1944 (Operation ICHIGO) designed to capture airfields in southern 
China and threaten both Kunming and Jiang's wartime capital at Chongqing.
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 While the Allies 
had mapped out the future progress of the advisory effort, war is a dynamic undertaking and the 
enemy has the opportunity to respond. The numbers of Americans now in the CBI Theater and 
the numbers of Chinese units trained and equipped was a growing threat to Japan in both Burma 
and China. 
 In terms of numbers of American advisory personnel assigned to this mission and 
training accomplished by early 1944, an extract of the G-3 report from Stilwell's draft CBI 
history provides the following statistics. 
  6.  SUMMARY 
  a. In effect a small number of American personnel under the inspiring leadership 
 of General Stilwell have surmounted many obstacles, tangible and intangible. They 
 inculcated, in those ground and air units of the Chinese Armies with which they have 
 been in contact, a good technical knowledge, and a concept of proper tactical 
 employment of American weapons. 
   
  b. General statistics are as follows: 
 Summand of training accomplishments: 
 "Y" Force. 
  American personnel:  Officers 859 EM 3148 Aggr 4007 
  United influenced (by cadre training or traveling instructional teams) 24   
  Divisions 
 "Z" Force. 
  American personnel:  Officers 268 EM 358 Aggr 626 
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  Chinese personnel:  Indefinite due to disruption of training by enemy advance in  
  Southern China. 
 Ramgarh Training Center. 
  American personnel:  Officers 190 EM 490 Aggr 680 
  Units trained: (entire units) 
  3 Divisions (each including 3 Infantry regiments, 2 75mm Pack Howitzer 
 battalions, and division troops) 
 
In addition, also trained and equipped at Ramgarh were 2 Regiments and 1 Bn of 105mm 
Howitzers, 1 Regiment of 155mm Howitzers, 1 4.2 Mortar Regiment, 1 Motor Regiment, 1 
Engineer Regiment, 1 Animal Transport Regiment, 7 Tank Battalions, and Army and 
Headquarters troops including Military Police, Anti-Aircraft Artillery, and Medical units. To put 
this in context in terms of the number of U.S. personnel involved in CBI this report also provides 
troop strength numbers. On 31 Dec 1943 (Using the format of the report):
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 Type of Troops   In China In India-Burma Total      
  
 Air Force       4520         28313  32833 
 Services of Supply   1104         38384  39448 
 Ground Force    2000           7970    9970  
 Air Transport Command    550         10104  10654 
 Miscellaneous                                        1349    1349  
      _______     ________  _______ 
       8174         86120              94294  
 
 In early 1944, there were three major factors influencing the American effort in China. 
The first was the inability to fly sufficient equipment and supplies over the Hump to both 
continue Chennault's air campaign and equip the ground forces as promised. The second was 
Japan's decision to mass its forces from northern and central China to conduct a major ground 
offensive to connect northern and southern China with their forces in Vietnam. The goal of 
Japan's campaign was to: (1) prevent the use of airfields by American bombers against Japanese 
forces and logistic facilities; (2) secure a land line of communication to Southeast Asia, now that 
the Allies had significantly reduced Japan's ability to protect its vital sea lanes; and, (3) to control 
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key areas of southern China and threaten the Chinese war time capital at Chongqing and the 
logistic hub at Kunming. The third major factor was the increasingly strained relationship 
between Jiang and Stilwell over what the American Chief of Staff saw primarily as the 
unwillingness to effectively deal with the corruption and military incompetence of the senior 
leadership of the Nationalist Army. Perhaps more importantly, Stilwell chafed at the 
Generalissimo's failure to commit to providing the necessary Chinese forces to retake Burma and 
reestablish the vital landline of communication. 
 In 1944, the American military advisory effort was further complicated by emerging 
changes in the Allied global war strategy, partly because of the lack of progress in the CBI 
Theater in terms of early ground operations against the Japanese. For the Allies, after a 
successful campaign in North Africa and a difficult offensive through Italy, the focus was now 
on the upcoming campaigns to return to France and the defeat the German military. In addition, 
progress by American forces in the war against Japan, both on land and sea across the central and 
south Pacific, promised to bring the war directly to the Japanese home islands by 1945 from 
islands in the Pacific and the Philippines. This greatly reduced the value of the China in the 
wider Allied effort. In the opening days of the war, China had been seen as a potential staging 
area for an attack on Japan, or a least for airbases within range of American long-range bombers. 
However, without an offensive to clear the Japanese from central and eastern China and control 
key seaports and sufficient trained and equipped forces in southern China to protect the airbases, 
this would not be possible.   
 A 26 January 1944 report from 14th Air Force to the Commanding General, U.S. Army 
Air Forces in Washington (H. H. "Hap" Arnold) discussed the status of the Matterhorn Project to 
build long-range bomber bases in China.   
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  Thousands of workers are now engaged in building the required bases for the 
 operation of the transports and the B-29 bombardment aircraft in the selected China Base 
 area near Chengtu [Chengdu], China....It is a suitable area for operations against targets 
 in Manchuria or Korea or as a base for maintenance and supply operations against Japan 
 proper, but operations from this area against targets in Japan without the use of staging 
 fields is fraught with many grave tactical problems.
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Chennault then listed five of these "grave tactical problems." At the time, Chennault did not 
control the bombers of the XX (Twentieth) Air Force staging out of India. This message says 
these problems can be overcome, but he argued for complete control of all air force assets in 
China. He stated, "The Commander of Air Forces in China must be given complete command 
and control of all such Air Forces and supporting services as are based in or operating from 
China." This effort was fast becoming too little, too late in terms over the overall strategy to 
defeat Japan.
65
  
 Continued successes by American forces in the central Pacific diminished the need for 
that capability from China. Islands close enough to Japan to be within range of U.S. bombers 
were now being reached by advancing Navy and Marine forces. Unless Burma could be taken 
quickly and a line of communication secured, China's importance in the overall campaign would 
be significantly reduced. While still important in tying down significant numbers of Japanese 
forces in China, Manchuria, Korea, and Southeast Asia and for helping to secure Asia in the 
aftermath of the war, China was no longer necessary for a direct attack on Japan. Over the 
intervening two years since the American advisors had arrived in China, the CBI Theater had 
slowly become a strategic backwater in the Pacific war. 
  The details of this long and often acrimonious strategic dispute among Jiang, the British 
military leadership of Southeast Asia Command led by Field Marshall Lord Louis Mountbatten, 
and Stilwell on the timing and forces to be made available for a comprehensive campaign to 
recapture Burma from India and China are well covered in the second volume of the Army's 
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official history of the CBI, Stilwell's Command Problem. Stilwell's continued focus on initiating 
a major campaign in Burma despite British and Chinese doubts and intransigence, and the fact 
that there were virtually no American ground forces available for this operation, pushed the 
Jiang-Stilwell relationship nearly to the breaking point. This was exacerbated by the inability to 
significantly increase the tonnage of supplies reaching China to both maintain Chennault's air 
effort and to build the nearly 60 divisions of Y-Force, and now Z-Force.  
 Another area of contention between China and the U.S. was support for the Communist 
Red Army's anti-Japanese activities in the northern and eastern areas of the country. The dispatch 
of the liaison element to Mao's headquarters was a precursor to the post war American efforts to 
bring the Communists and Nationalist together.
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 Stilwell's insistence on sending an American 
liaison element to Mao's headquarters in Yan'an was eventually supported by President 
Roosevelt as necessary to the overall effort against Japan. Jiang and the Nationalists were 
essentially at war with the Communists and had deployed significant numbers of forces to 
contain them. Jiang was opposed to this effort, but finally buckled to American pressure although 
with several important constraints.
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 In June of 1944, Jiang finally agreed to the formation and 
dispatch of the Military Observer Group to Yenan, unofficially known as the "Dixie Mission." 
This effort was led by another old Army "China Hand" and veteran of the 15th Infantry 
Regiment, Colonel David C. Barrett, accompanied by two State Department advisors to Stilwell's 
headquarters and small group of military communications and intelligence personnel. The 
official mission of this group was to assist the recovery of down American pilots and collect 
intelligence on the situation in those parts of China controlled by or accessible to Communist 
forces.
68
 An effort to train and equip these guerrilla units to make them more effective in fighting 
the Japanese was not initially allowed. 
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 In July of 1944, President Roosevelt dispatched Major General Patrick J. Hurley, a 
National Guard officer from Oklahoma, successful lawyer, businessman, and politician with no 
experience in Asia to assess the situation and serve as his personal representative to China.
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One of his key tasks was to attempt to smooth out the Jiang-Stilwell relationship. Initially, 
Hurley was directed to persuade Jiang to place Stilwell in direct command of all Chinese forces 
in Burma and China. Jiang, after initially agreeing to this new command arrangement to which 
he had no intention of allowing to happen, changed his mind and once again called for Stilwell's 
relief. Hurley reported this impasse to President Roosevelt and recommended the Stilwell be 
replaced. With the reluctant agreement of Marshall, the President made the decision to replace 
Stilwell. Roosevelt was compelled to choose to support the sovereign leader of an allied nation 
he still saw as critical to the continuing war effort, and especially, to the post war Asian strategic 
situation over Stilwell. An October 31, 1944 White House Memorandum offers the following 
reasoning for acquiescing to Jiang's request: 
 (a)  The Generalissimo is the head of the Chinese Republic. 
 (b)  That the Generalissimo is the head of the Chinese Government. 
 (b) The Generalissimo is the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army. 
The memo ends with the following statement:  "General Stilwell will return to take a very 
important job fully commensurate with his rank."
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 Roosevelt felt it was necessary to relieve Stilwell given the turbulent history of the 
relationship and that a China card might still have to be played at some point in the future. This 
was despite the fact that he had slowly come to agree with Stilwell's assessment of Jiang's lack of 
full commitment to fight the Japanese and deal decisively with the glaring problems with the 
Nationalist Army. He also was well aware that China's role in the overall Allied effort against 
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Japan was diminishing. Jiang's military leadership problems within his own forces, support for a 
flawed air centric strategy at odds with American war goals, the use of his forces against his 
Communist countrymen, and a reluctance to make the extensive changes in the Nationalist Army 
organization were all issues. However, for Roosevelt, keeping China in the war took precedence. 
Within a short period, Hurley was appointed as the American Ambassador to China and took up 
the task of bringing the Communists and Nationalists together. It was hoped that with Stilwell no 
longer an issue, Hurley and the newly selected senior American Army officer in China could 
restart the relationship.
71
 
  In October 1944, Stilwell was replaced with another American Army officer who had 
served in China with the 15th Infantry Regiment. He was currently a senior staff officer in 
Montbatten's Southeast Asia Command and familiar with the situation in the CBI Theater. 
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had shown the ability to get along with the 
British allies, was a very different kind of Army officer than Stilwell in terms of command and 
assignment experience, personality, and temperament. He was a very accomplished strategist, 
had spent significant time on the Army staff in Washington as a senior planner, and more 
importantly, was fully aware of the political nuances and strategic implications of his new 
mission in China. The operational situation Wedemeyer inherited is outlined in Stilwell's 1944 
CBI history and is extracted below. 
  Japanese forces in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, and China, including 
 Manchuria, consists of approximately: 
   38 Divisions 
   13 Independent Brigades 
   12 Independent Mixed Brigades 
   Numerous Puppet Troops 
  These Japanese forces are organized into balanced modern armies with cavalry, 
 army artillery, air, and armored forces. 
  Opposing these forces are approximately 117 Chinese Armies, generally weak 
 in combat efficiency. 
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  General Combat Efficiency of Chinese Armies (less those of CAI [X-Force] and 
 CEF [Y-Force], American trained units): 
 Strength: 
  Table of organization of the Chinese Army is over forty thousand. Actually, the 
 strength is about twenty thousand, of which a very high percentage is composed of 
 coolies and service troops. 
 Training: 
  There is very little training in the Chinese Army that even approaches U.S. 
 standards. The greater bulk of the officers are not professionally qualified to give proper 
 training. 
 Morale: 
  Morale is low, because the men are not properly cared for. They are poorly fed, 
 and poorly clothed, and receive very little medical care. 
 Leadership: 
  A very large percentage of the officers are politically appointed. Some of the 
 Chinese leaders are very good, but the great majority would be rated "unsatisfactory" by 
 our standards. 
 Equipment:   
  The average Chinese Army has fewer than 10,000 rifles, a very large percentage 
 of which are unserviceable. They leave [have] very few of the heavier weapons, which 
 are obsolete or obsolescent. 
 Combat Efficiency: 
  From the above, the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army as a whole is rated as 
 poor. In comparing Chinese and Japanese armies, the Chinese Army is equal to about 
 one-half the Japanese division in combat efficiency, or roughly, six Chinese divisions are 
 equal in combat efficiency to one Japanese division.   
 
 This assessment ends with comments on the Chinese Army in India (CAI) or X-Force 
which is rated as "good," and the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) or Y-Force, that is 
determined to be "low because of depleted strength due to lack of replacements." After more 
than two years of American assistance, the assessment of Jiang's Nationalist Army and the 
situation in China was bleak, both in terms of U.S. equipment supplied under lend-lease, and in 
reorganization and preparation of the Chinese armed forces. There was much work left to do for 
Wedemeyer and the American trainers and advisors to meet the key challenges of continuing the 
campaign to secure the Burma line of communication, building an army capable of defending the 
Chinese territory, key bases and airfields, and assisting in the planning and preparation for a 
future offensive action against Japanese forces occupying most of eastern China.
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  In a 24 October 1944 directive that will not change until the end of the war, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the following guidance to Wedemeyer as he begins his work in 
China. 
  a. Your primary mission with respect to Chinese forces is to advise and assist the 
 Generalissimo in the conduct of military operations against the Japanese. 
  b. Your primary mission as to U.S. Combat Forces under your command is to 
 carry out air operations from China. In addition, you will continue to assist the Chinese 
 air and ground forces in operations, 
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CHAPTER 5   
 
THE EVOLVING CHINA THEATER  
 
   
 This chapter begins with the Allied offensive to retake Burma. Chinese units trained, 
equipped, and accompanied into combat by teams of American advisors and supporting units 
played a major role in reopening this key line of communication. This chapter examines the 
American change of command and senior advisors, the formation of a China theater, and the 
establishment of the Alpha Force. During this period the forces trained, equipped, and advised by 
the Americans not only participated in the recapture of Burma, but also deployed for the defense 
of southwest China. In addition, these forces prepared for a major offensive against the Japanese 
in China. The chapter concludes in September 1945 with the Japanese surrender and as 
negotiations between the Communists and the Nationalists are ongoing mediated by Ambassador 
Hurley. The evolving strategic environment and the regional military situation provide the 
context for the advisory effort during this key period. This chapter is broken into three main parts 
as outlined below.   
 Part one discusses the Allied attack into Burma in early 1944 and highlights the 
participation of significantly improved Chinese forces supported by their American combat 
advisors. This section includes a brief examination of the role played by Merrill's Marauders, the 
first U.S. ground combat formation that fought in CBI Theater alongside their Chinese and 
British counterparts. Part two concentrates on the differences in the leadership of the advisory 
mission when General Stilwell was replaced by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to 
highlight the change in the command climate under which the advisors conducted their complex 
and difficult mission. The third section examines the establishment of a separate China theater of 
operations, the end of the fight in Burma, and the defense of central China in the face of a 
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renewed Japanese offensive. This part ends with an evaluation of the Nationalist forces and their 
American advisors as they are finally poised to go on the offensive in China and provides an 
overview of the status of the forces the United States had trained and equipped at the time of the 
Japanese surrender.  
The Evolving Strategic Situation 
From October of 1944 through September of 1945, the rapidly changing strategic 
situation in the other theaters of war and the successes of the American drive across the Pacific 
directed to the invasion of the Japanese home islands directly influenced the America's advisory 
activities in China. By October 1944, with the successful Allied landings in France in June 1944, 
the breakout from the Normandy beaches in August, and the eastward advancement of Soviet 
forces, the end of the war in Europe appeared to be in sight. While the Ardennes winter offensive 
slowed the timetable, Germany was defeated and surrendered in May of 1945 with the fall of 
Berlin. This event freed up Allied forces, and perhaps more importantly for China, large amounts 
of equipment and war materials for the conflict in the Pacific.  
Significantly, the Soviets prepared to follow through on the promise to join the war 
against the Japanese. Stalin had confirmed this at the Tehran conference immediately following 
Roosevelt's November 1943 meeting with Jiang and Churchill at Cairo, Egypt. Between May and 
August 1945 more than one and a half million Soviet military personnel massed and successfully 
attacked Japanese and Chinese puppet forces in Manchuria.
1
  Successful American operations at 
sea and in the island hopping campaigns across the central and southwest Pacific created the 
opportunity of long-range bomber attacks against the Japanese home islands from these newly 
won territories.   
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The strategic military value of China's ground forces, airfields, and potential eastern 
coastal bases of operations to the overall Allied effort was significantly eroded with these 
successes in the other theaters of war. Although a coordinated multinational campaign to retake 
Burma was finally showing success in the Fall of 1944, the much needed land line of 
communication to supplement the increasingly capable air transportation route to China was still 
months away. In a chapter in a recently published study of the air resupply effort in the CBI 
called "The Hump Becomes an Airline: October 1944 to August 1945," John D. Plating 
discusses the evolving supply operations to China at this critical time. He says, "Ironically, the 
diminution of China's strategic value did not correspond to a reduction in Hump tonnage 
requests, rather, ICD [India-China Division] deliveries soared to unbelievable proportions, with 
75 percent of the Hump's wartime total of over three-quarters of a million tons being delivered in 
the war's final year."
2
  
The availability of sufficient equipment, supporting personnel, and facilities finally 
allowed large-scale air operations by B-29 heavy bombers directly against the Japanese home 
islands from China now began to look more viable. However, the concurrent effort necessary to 
build Chinese land force capable of protecting these airfields, the seat of the Nationalist 
government in Chongqing, and the key training and logistics hub at Kunming was still behind 
schedule. In early 1945, the supplies and equipment to mount an offensive campaign against 
Japanese forces and to secure staging areas in the coastal areas of eastern and southern China 
was still many months away. In October 1944, the key to success in China was still contingent 
on Allied victories in Burma and the opening of a landline of communications.    
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         Burma is Critical to the Chinese Effort 
Combat operations in Burma were under the direct command of the British General Sir 
William Slim.
3
 His British 14th Army and the Chinese Army in India (CAI), the X-Force trained 
and organized in Ramgarh, were initially deployed to open a northern route from India across 
Burma to establish both a landline of communications, but also to allow a safer air route over 
less forbidding mountains peaks. The larger offensive to retake all of Burma required the 
divisions of the Chinese Expeditionary Army (CEA) or Y-Force, being trained, and equipped in 
the Kunming area, to attack from southern China to complement the offensive from eastern 
India. The military and political leadership of the United States and England continued 
negotiations with Jiang to fulfill his promise to Roosevelt and the Allies to release these forces 
for the offensive in Burma. However, Jiang saw these forces as necessary for the defense of 
Chongqing and Kunming, key areas increasingly threatened by the success of a Japanese 
offensive. The Chinese forces, deployed at various locations throughout southwestern China, 
were advised by Americans under the command of Brigadier General Frank Dorn. He was 
another experienced China hand, had served in Nanjing as a military attaché in the 1930s, and 
had been with Stilwell as his aide and deputy since December of 1941, including on his retreat 
from Burma.
4
 The CEA consisted of elements of the thirty divisions of the Y-Force arrayed in 
Yunnan and Guangxi provinces. Dorn, as had Stilwell, fully supported deploying these units into 
Burma in support of the larger effort. 
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 As the controversy over the timing and composition of the attacking forces continued, the 
divisions of the CAI moved forward from Ramgarh and began the offensive. Boatner's American 
advisory teams and supporting American logistics and medical elements were integrated into the 
Chinese formations to secure the road to Ledo and prepare for the attack into Burma. From the 
earliest days of his deployment to the theater, Stilwell had repeatedly requested U.S. ground 
combat forces for the CBI.
5
 In 1942, this was a virtual impossibility given the time lag in 
mobilizing and training U.S. infantry divisions, the announced "Europe First" strategy, and the 
focus on the early Allied campaign to stop the Japanese advance in the South Pacific north of 
Australia. The initial Japanese naval superiority in the Central Pacific was a major factor limiting 
early American offensive action and support to China. The decision not to send U.S. ground 
combat forces to the CBI was essentially precluded by the Army's decision to commence a 
ground campaign in the Southwest Pacific. This offensive action was to take place at the earliest 
possible time in the alongside the Navy's effort in the Solomon Islands.
6
 Given Britain's earlier 
losses in Asia and the ongoing campaign in North Africa, training and equipping the Chinese 
was the only viable option for large numbers of ground forces to oppose the Japanese in the CBI.    
 In terms of an early campaign to retake Burma, these Alliance strategic realities 
weakened Stilwell's position with the Jiang and the British. You could not train and equip 
Chinese ground forces if you did not have a landline of communication across Burma. However, 
he had a problem convincing the British military leadership and the Generalissimo to retake 
Burma at the earliest opportunity. Without U.S. ground combat units in theater to share the 
burden he had little leverage to obtain the commitment for British and Chinese forces for a 1943 
campaign. The British appeared satisfied with defending India and did not see the recapture of 
Burma as an immediate strategic necessity. Jiang did not want to commit his forces before they 
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were ready and take the chance of suffering another humiliating setback.
7
 This became even 
more problematic with the needs of the British to defend Egypt and the planned Allied effort in 
North Africa (Operation Torch). Although there were almost one hundred thousand American 
military personnel in the CBI Theater by early 1944, the majority of them were part of the 
logistical tail of the Service of Supply (SOS) charged with supporting all of the Allied forces in 
the theater or was part of the American air transport or strategic bombing effort. Additionally, 
there were engineer, medical, and tactical Army Air Corps units conducting independent 
operations or supporting the British or Chinese forces in Burma, India, and China.  
 The fact that there were no American ground combat forces in the CBI Theater was a 
continuing signal to Jiang of the theater's lower priority in the overall Allied strategy. This lack 
of commitment also highlighted the Allied expectation that China could provide the needed 
manpower and ground combat units. These forces only needed the training and equipment to 
build an adequate force with the capability to play a major role in the effort against the Japanese. 
In terms of strategic ends, ways, and means, the allies only agreed on the ends, the defeat of 
Japan's military. Who would supply the manpower, key supporting capabilities, and equipment, 
and when and how it would be done, was constantly being postponed and revised, and was never 
satisfactorily resolved. The introduction of U.S. ground combat forces in 1944 was a powerful 
symbol of America's commitment to this theater and China's role in the overall Allied strategy.
8
  
 An American ground combat brigade finally made it into theater more than two years 
after the deployment of AMMISCA. In February 1944, the unit that became known as Merrill's 
Marauders arrived in India to prepare for offensive action in Burma. The American 5307th 
Brigade (Provisional), a light infantry unit, was configured to operate as a long-range penetration 
element and was similar to the "Chindits," a British force organized by Brigadier Orde C. 
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Wingate. These units were to operate independently in the Japanese rear area to attack lines of 
communication and harass weakly defended depots and facilities. The idea was to force the 
Japanese to expend scarce men and resources responding to attacks by a strong, capable force 
supported by air resupply and medical evacuation assets. The majority of this air support was 
provided by the U.S. First Air Commando Squadron commanded by Colonel Philip G. Cochran, 
assisted by both conventional British and American air transport units. Cochran was later made 
famous by the comic strip "Terry and the Pirates."
9
  
These operations by British units, and later Merrill's Marauders, were launched with high 
expectations.
10
  While successful, these deployments behind Japanese lines were conducted at 
great human cost to the soldiers involved in terms of battle casualties, physical exhaustion, and 
the effects of the debilitating illnesses endemic to the environment in Burma. Their overarching 
purpose was to help forestall a Japanese offensive into India, weaken the enemy's defensive 
posture and logistics capabilities, and support the upcoming large-scale Allied attacks to defeat 
the Japanese in Burma. Shelford Bidwell's book, The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the 
Campaign in Burma: 1944 provides an excellent account of these operations, as does Charles J. 
Rolo's contemporary work published in 1944, Wingate’s Raiders: An Account of the Fabulous 
Adventure That Raised the Curtain on the Battle for Burma.  
In military terms, these units and their unique operations are best characterized as an 
economy-of-force effort. While bold, innovative, and carried out with courage and 
determination, the effect of these operations on the overall Japanese military capabilities was 
limited. Large combat formations, corps and divisions, operating with secure logistics networks, 
were necessary to drive the Japanese out of Burma. Nevertheless, once these units were 
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committed, their operations provided an impetus for further Allied action to reopen this vital line 
of communication. 
 Stilwell was eager to quickly commit the first American ground combat unit assigned to 
the CBI Theater to combined operations with the Chinese divisions trained at Ramgarh and in 
southern China against the Japanese. The Marauders were put under the command of one of 
Stilwell's most trusted subordinates, Colonel Frank D. Merrill, who had also served with him 
from the earliest days of the war. Merrill displaced Colonel Charles N. Hunter, who had 
originally formed the brigade and continued to serve as its deputy commander. One of the tasks 
of this unit, in addition to playing a key role in the offensive in northern Burma, was to serve as a 
role model of American force's combat competency and offensive spirit for their Chinese and 
British counterparts.
11
 The intended presence of an American ground maneuver unit was an 
indication of the Roosevelt administration's continuing commitment to China and to successful 
combined Allied operations in the CBI Theater. Nevertheless, this was only one ground combat 
brigade, not the corps and subordinate elements that Stilwell had asked for previously. Great 
Britain and China would have to provide the upper level headquarters and subordinate divisions. 
The United States would provide limited air support and American equipment and advisors to 
China. 
 In late 1943, the three divisions of the original X-Force (22nd, 30th and 38th) and the 
supporting elements of the New First Army forces of the Chinese Army in India (CAI), also 
trained and equipped at Ramgarh, began to reposition forward to prepare for the long awaited 
northern Burma offensive. By early 1944, elements of the Chinese 38th and 22nd successfully 
engaged the Japanese and were moving to open a landline of communication from India through 
northern Burma to China in concert with Merrill's Marauders. In May of 1944, eleven divisions 
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of the CEA from Yunnan Province in China supported by American advisors under the direction 
of Brigadier General Frank Dorn, were finally released by Jiang for employment, and moved into 
northern and eastern Burma.
12
 The composition, employment parameters, and command 
arrangements of this force had finally been settled. Roosevelt who had been convinced by 
Stilwell and Marshall that his direct involvement with Jiang was necessary to force his approval 
on this key issue finally broke this stalemate.
13
 However, in the end, this intervention by Stilwell 
into the Chinese leader's command prerogatives, his confrontational approach, and his 
condescending attitude toward Jiang and several of his key military leaders resulted in a virtual 
ultimatum to President Roosevelt by the Generalissimo for his recall.
14
 
 The Generalissimo had used the deployment of his forces into Burma as leverage to 
increase his involvement in Allied strategy and decision-making. He also wanted greater control 
of the content and distribution of American logistics support over the Hump. The introduction of 
these forces also allowed him to prod the British to increase the number of their forces 
committed to the offensive in Burma. This directly influenced the timing of the campaign and the 
strength of the forces the Japanese could deploy against the Chinese. This issue clearly 
established his position as commander of all Chinese forces and by extension his importance to 
the overall Allied effort against the Japanese in Asia. Now that the offensive was ongoing in 
Burma, the priority of Hump tonnage had to go to the committed CEF units engaged in combat 
operations in northern Burma. While the focus for the advisors was on operations in Burma and 
the CAI and CEF, the reorganization and training of the second group of thirty Chinese divisions 
of the Z-Force by American advisors continued albeit as a bare bones effort. Nevertheless, the 
American advise and assist effort was finally starting to move in the right direction. 
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 The Allied effort in Burma was evidence of what could be accomplished with unified 
action. By July of 1944, after blunting a flawed and poorly planned Japanese offensive into India 
from central Burma, General William J. Slim directed a multi-division counterattack from 
Imphal. This attack put the Japanese forces in the north opposing the Chinese at risk of being cut 
off from their base of supply. The British also provided its 36th Division to reinforce the Chinese 
and American forces conducting the offensive in northern Burma.
15
 After more than two years, 
the Allies were finally on the road to defeating the Japanese in the Burma. 
  For a long time we could not be sure how much we were accomplishing, because 
 time alone could give the battle-tested answer. The answer was given in the spring and 
 summer of 1944 when General Joseph W. Stilwell led his expertly trained Chinese forces 
 into combat against the Japanese in North Burma. In the hard-fought Hukawng and 
 Mogaung valley campaigns, later the surprise attack in Myitkyina, Ramgarh-trained 
 Chinese divisions formed the bulk of the forces that blasted the enemy out of his jungle 
 positions....
16
 
   
 In August of 1944, Merrill's Marauders, in a combined effort with the Chinese New First 
Army, the three divisions of CAI, and two additional divisions staged through Ramgarh 
supported by their American advisors, finally took the key rail and road junction and airfield at 
Myitkyina. Exhausted and depleted after more than six months of near continuous combat, the 
American 5307th Infantry Brigade (Provisional) was withdrawn to India and disbanded.
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Fighting alongside the American and British units, the Chinese forces had proven their worth and 
gained valuable combat experience. Although it would still be months before supply convoys 
would roll into Kunming, the fate of the Japanese in northern Burma was sealed. More 
importantly for the American advisors, this campaign validated their efforts at Ramgarh and in 
the training of the Y-Force at facilities in southern China. The Chinese-American team had 
shown the viability of its cooperative effort.  
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 The clash of personalities, cultures, and strategies at the senior command level definitely 
had its effects in terms of unity of command and the timing and composition of forces in the 
campaign. Nevertheless, despite the problem areas, a combat capable Chinese force had taken to 
the field and defeated the Japanese. The solid performance of these units can be attributed to the 
tireless efforts of Stilwell. However, his enduring faith in the potential of the Chinese soldier if 
they could only be well led also presaged his being replaced. He had fought for the American 
advisors and supporting personnel sent to the CBI Theater, demanded a major share of China's 
lend-lease needed to build the ground forces, and pushed for the earliest return to combat in 
Burma. The performance of the Sino-American team in the field and the recapture of Burma 
was, ironically, a pyrrhic victory for its senior leader. Stilwell's bitter in-fighting with Jiang and 
the senior Chinese military leadership over who was in charge of China's military forces, how 
they should be deployed and fought, and how their modernization would take place culminated 
in the Fall of 1944. He was relieved just as the forces trained and equipped by his advisors, 
supplied over his road, had proven their worth in combat, and were about to open up the vital 
supply line critical to follow-on operations in China.
18
 
 
Change of Command 
 As in January 1942, so again in October 1944, the United States of American 
 ordered one of its general officers to act as a chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
 shek, the Supreme Commander of the China Theater in the war between the United 
 Nations and Germany, Italy, and Japan. On both occasions, Japanese successes in the 
 field alarmed the U.S. Government and preceded the step. But events had not been static 
 during the intervening thirty-four months, and so the two officers concerned Lt. Gen.
 Joseph W. Stilwell in 1942-1944, and Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer in 1944-1946, faced 
 situations whose differences are as enlightening as their similarities.
19
  
 
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, not unlike Stillwell more than two and a half 
years before, took up his new position as the Generalissimo's senior American advisor in the 
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midst of a crisis situation. While the Allies were being successful in Burma and in the air over 
China, a Japanese offensive was now threatening Chongqing, Kunming, and airfields in central 
China. The position of senior American advisor in China continued to demand diplomatic skills, 
expertise in military planning and logistics, and a cultural and situational understanding of the 
political-military environment in China and the region. However, for this very different emerging 
strategic situation in October of 1944, a different type of American officer was selected for the 
role of Chief of Staff to Jiang and senior advisor to the Nationalist forces. This officer also 
served as commander of all American forces in China including a growing cadre of military 
trainers and advisors.  
A classic military novel by Anton Myrer provides insights into how the American 
military looks at different leadership styles. Once an Eagle, first published in 1968, was 
reprinted in 1997 with a new foreword by retired Army Vice Chief of Staff and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, John W. Vessey, who received a battlefield commission during the Second 
World War. He states Myrer's fictional description of the military careers of two very distinct 
military officer types, "is both a perceptive study of the profession of arms and a chilling 
overview of armed conflict."
20
 The comparisons evident in this book to Stilwell and Wedemeyer 
are both striking and instructive.  
The hero, Sam Damon (Stilwell), is a field soldier who comes up through the ranks 
during the First World War and becomes an exemplar of the type of officer that "will be required 
if this nation is to remain free and at peace."
21
 His opposite number is Courtney Massengale 
(Wedemeyer), a figure depicted as a self-serving staff officer who shuns command of troops in 
the field and continually seeks positions on higher-level staffs to better display his considerable 
talents and lobby for promotion. Receiving a battlefield commission, Damon's career focuses on 
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combat leadership and the training of soldiers. He purposely avoids assignments on the Army 
staff or positions of influence at the national level in Washington. His father-in-law, a former 
battlefield commander and mentor, Colonel Caldwell, is noted as having served "at Tientsin with 
the elite 15th Regiment."
22
 Massengale, born into the military officer caste, is brilliant and 
competent, but is ill at ease in the field on combat maneuvers. He is a very political officer more 
capable working on higher level staffs and comfortable hobnobbing in the officer's club. He 
avoided troop duty and tactical level commands to the greatest extent possible, but rose quickly 
through the ranks with competent staff work, personal connections, self-promotion, and his 
service under influential senior officers in high profile staff positions.  
 Certain analogies to Stilwell and Wedemeyer are easily inferred from the coincidences in 
Myrer's work. For example, Damon commanded at Fort Ord, California, located near Stilwell's 
home in Carmel and the Presidio of Monterey where he commanded the U.S. Army's Third 
Corps at the outbreak of the Second World War. The book also concentrates on Damon's long 
service in the Philippines and Asia, including his initial assignment of World War Two fighting 
in the jungles of the South Pacific analogous to Stilwell's jungle fight in Burma. In contrast, 
Massengale was serving on a high-level staff in Washington at the beginning of the Second 
World War, which is where Wedemeyer began the conflict. He was then sent to North Africa, 
which was to be Stilwell's duty station if he had not been selected by Marshall to go to China. 
The most telling coincidence and a useful reference for this study is in Chapter 8 of the book  
describing Damon being sent to China in the 1930s from his duty station in the Philippines to 
observe the Communist guerrilla forces fighting the Japanese.   
 Stilwell had served as a military attaché in China in the late 1930s, studying both the war 
with Japan and the internal political-military situation between the Nationalists and the 
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Communists. Later, in his role as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, he pressed Jiang with the 
agreement of Roosevelt and State Department personnel, to be allowed to send an American 
military observer group to Mao's headquarters at Yan'an. The description of Damon's mission to 
observe the Chinese Communists appears to be based on the real life experiences of USMC 
Captain Evans Carlson, whose time with Mao's Eighteenth Route Army in 1937 is described in 
his book Two Stars Over China. Captain Carlson, who eventually retired as a general officer, had 
worked with Colonel Stilwell at the embassy in Nanjing and several of the journalists who 
covered the Communist movement in China in the 1930s. Captain Carlson, later resigned from 
the Marine Corps to write his book, but rejoined when the war began. He commanded the 
famous, but controversial, Carlson's Raiders in the fighting in the South Pacific early in the war. 
Captain Carlson, when assigned as a military aide, became a personal family friend and 
unofficial advisor to President Roosevelt on China and especially on the Chinese Communist 
leadership.
23
   
 In a very insightful passage in Once an Eagle, Damon muses about his time as an 
observer with a Chinese Communist guerrilla unit:  
  It was like being lifted off the ground, floating and kicking, unable to use your 
 feet--or as though you'd been dropped naked into a huge garden of strangers; very polite, 
 very gracious and well-mannered strangers; it was true, but who were nonetheless quite 
 conscious of your astounding nudity. Now on the verge of observing his first action 
 against the Japanese he felt ill at ease, extraneous, without sustaining force of purpose, 
 the fierce absorption of duties and responsibilities. He wasn't cut out for this type of 
 work. Massengale could do it, he'd be superb at it,--this was just his meat, sitting by and 
 watching events unfold, crisis and countermove, making trenchant observations and witty 
 analogies...Only Massengale wouldn't have taken the detail in the first place.
24
  
 
 First published in the middle of the Vietnam War where a significant advisory effort to 
the Army of South Vietnam was ongoing, the book provides this description of an American 
officer assigned to observe a Chinese unit in combat. This passage provides insights into the 
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personal feelings of lower level military observers, and by extension advisors, to another nation's 
army. As an advisor or liaison officer, you are not in charge, and the soldiers you are observing 
are not under your command, nor are they your fellow countrymen. It is military professionalism 
and a sense of adventure, not patriotism, or nationalism that provides the primary motivation to 
serve in this capacity. As an outsider, to step in and take responsibility in the middle of an action 
either violates the purpose of the assigned task to observe, or if an advisor, to admit that your 
charges are either not capable or not ready to operate on their own.   
 The implication for American military observers, liaison officers, and advisors is that 
different leadership traits are needed to succeed in this type of military mission. This was a role 
Damon, and by analogy Stilwell, was ill prepared to assume despite his knowledge of China's 
culture and language, personal bravery and dogged determination to accomplish the mission at 
any cost. At one point in the chapter, Damon steps in and takes charge, an action for which he 
later apologizes to a knowing and patient Chinese Communist commander. The intended lesson 
is only too obvious. The host nation forces must be allowed to succeed or fail on their own and 
learn from their experiences. The advisor can best influence events advising after the action is 
completed and by practicing the technique of "leading from the rear." The range of actions that 
can be taken by the observer or advisor even in combat is by definition circumscribed, despite 
the position's potential for personal risk and mortal danger.   
 The last line quoted above pertains to how this type of duty of advisor or observer with 
foreign forces is valued in terms of the professional advancement in the American military. 
Although more difficult and often as dangerous as service with one's own forces, advisor duty is 
not often perceived as career enhancing and not to be taken: if it can be avoided. Advisor duty is 
also often seen to be of lesser importance than leading American troops in combat for future 
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command selection and promotion. In Stilwell's time as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, one 
of the key recurring areas of disagreements with Jiang was the issue of Americans being given 
direct, unencumbered command of deployed Chinese forces. These included the permission to 
fire incompetent officers and promote those who proved their worth on the battlefield. This 
problem first surfaced for Stilwell in the spring of 1942 in the initial defense of Burma. This 
same situation would also emerge in Wedemeyer's term as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, 
but his relationship and mode of dealing with Jiang was much different. Although not a China 
hand, he was in some ways more successful than Stilwell was in that he was more able to take 
into account Jiang's position as a national political and military leader. This is an additional irony 
in that Stilwell was the long serving cultural expert and Wedemeyer had refused the chance to be 
a language student in China when offered. 
 Differences over command prerogatives, a personal sense of "face" or prestige, and 
knowing one's position in the hierarchy were the critical issues in Stilwell's eventual relief. 
Despite his long service and knowledge of China, Stilwell's attempts to reorganize the forces, 
change how command and control was executed in the Nationalist Army, and to decentralize 
battlefield decision-making was not successful. He either chose to ignore, or did not properly 
account for, the political-military circumstances of the Nationalist regime. His mental and 
geographic focus on Burma and the tactical level of the conflict, as indicated by his time at the 
front, potentially came at the cost of influence at Chongqing.  
 Jiang and other senior Chinese generals continued to directly communicate and influence 
the actions of subordinate military leaders from positions far from the battlefield. One reason for 
this was related to the domestic political realities. Jiang was less the leader of a national army 
than an alliance of forces held together by an evolving and immature political and military 
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system influenced by traditional cultural values and regional prerogatives. A sense of Chinese 
nationalism had not yet replaced regionalism and overcome warlordism. The building of a 
national army had been an ongoing task for Jiang since he established the military academy at 
Huangpu. Even after nearly two decades of war and conflict, the Chinese military was still very 
much a work in progress. The American model was the latest one available to Jiang in the 
Nationalists' post 1911 revolution history.   
 The intra-regime military leadership dynamics and what the Chinese call "guanxi" or 
relationships made the selection of military leaders more political and personal than military and 
professional. This situation was as true in 1944 with the CAI and CEA conducting operations in 
northern Burma as it had been in April of 1942 with the humiliating retreat of the Chinese 5th 
and 6th Armies during Allied operations to try to hold on to that vital line of communications. 
This problem was exacerbated in 1944 by Jiang's initial rejection of Stilwell's request to employ, 
under U.S. command; the American trained, supported, and advised Y-Force units of the CEA in 
the offensive in Burma in operations critical to re-opening a land route to China. In October of 
1944, when Wedemeyer arrived to replace Stilwell, he was aware of the key issues involved in 
the controversial relationship between Jiang and Stilwell. He had been serving as Chief of Staff 
to the British Commander of Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), Lord Louis Mountbatten, 
officially one of Stilwell's superiors.
25
 
 Stilwell, the tactical commander, and Wedemeyer, the strategic staff officer, were 
certainly very different kinds of leaders with very different pre-war experiences and career paths. 
Stilwell had opted to study the language and served repetitively in China. He also sought service 
with troops in command and training assignments whenever possible. In contrast, Wedemeyer 
had refused the opportunity to stay in China and study the language. He gravitated to higher-
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level staff work including service as a plans officer in the War Department in Washington. The 
two officers were both highly regarded and had previously served with Marshall, and in China in 
the 15th Infantry Regiment. Wedemeyer started the war as a staff officer in Washington. He was 
serving far from the fight in Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) headquarters in Ceylon when 
selected for the position in China. Stilwell began the war as a Corps commander and was then 
selected to serve as the Chief of Staff to Jiang. An argument can certainly be made that Stilwell 
should have concentrated on the political-military problems and built relationships at the higher 
levels of command in Chongqing. Instead, he elected to spend the majority of his time planning 
lower level operations, observing and directing the training effort in India, and eventually 
commanding forces far forward on the battlefields in northern Burma. It is certainly evident that 
knowledge of culture and language while possibly necessary is certainly not sufficient. It is also 
clear that different skills, attributes, personalities, and leadership traits are needed at different 
levels of war, and as a military advisor and trainer. 
 In the real life drama and complexity of wartime China, the evaluation of the strengths 
and weaknesses, and the successes and failures, of Generals Stilwell and Wedemeyer is much 
less black and white and much more nuanced than type-cast and purposely contrived fictional 
depictions, no matter how well written. The task of general officers whose primary role is 
representing their country as a senior military advisor is a very different task from commanding 
one's own national forces. A major effort to reorganize, train, equip, advise, and assist another 
country’s armed forces in the middle of a war against a capable and determined enemy has to be 
one of the most complex tasks any group of military personnel can undertake. This task is even 
more difficult when working in a country with an entirely different history, war experience, and 
military culture.  
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 The anthropologist, Ruth Benedict, prepared a famous study on Japanese culture for the 
Office of War Information (OWI) early in the war. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword begins 
with the thought "The Japanese were the most alien enemy the United States had every fought in 
an all-out struggle." In China, for the advisors at all levels, the Chinese may have been the most 
alien ally the United States had ever assisted in an all out struggle-- first in war with Japan and 
later in its internal civil war.
26
 Nevertheless, by late 1944, the Japanese were being defeated in 
Burma by Chinese forces trained, equipped, and advised by American military personnel. These 
advisors with notable exceptions, for the most part, had no experience working in this part of the 
world, were novices at war, at teaching about war and its accoutrements, and certainly at 
working with their Chinese counterparts.  
 Stilwell had arguable set the conditions for Allied tactical success on the ground in 
Burma with his personal involvement, courage, and determination, traits that General Marshall 
knew he possessed when he recommended him for the job to President Roosevelt. The forces 
trained at Ramgarh and in southern China by American advisors, directed by men Stilwell 
personally knew and selected, had succeeded in the classroom, in the training areas, and on the 
battlefield. For the British military leadership who doubted China's war fighting capabilit ies, this 
was an object lesson on what Chinese soldiers could accomplish when well trained and 
equipped. The British view was likely biased not only by the earlier battles in Burma in 1942, 
but also by the previous hundred years of Sino-British conflict from the days of the Opium Wars. 
The Ramgarh system of training and equipping Chinese forces was also a lesson for the 
Generalissimo and his senior military leadership. Chinese forces properly cared for, led, trained, 
equipped, supplied, supported and advised could defeat Japanese forces and perform as 
competent allies in difficult combined operations. The question was not the American's ability to 
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continue this effort, but the Chinese requirements for, and self-imposed limitations on, this 
support. 
 Despite the emerging successes in India and Burma, in the larger picture, after more than 
two and half years of American effort, less than forty Chinese divisions out of more than three 
hundred had been trained and equipped. In reality, only those trained at Ramgarh were close to 
American standards, and virtually no reorganization or culling of incompetent senior Chinese 
officers had taken place. In remarks in an early 1945 assessment, Congressman Mike Mansfield 
wrote that corruption in the Nationalist Army was still rampant and, for the average soldier, 
"being conscripted into the Chinese army is like receiving a death sentence because the soldier 
receives no training, no food, and little equipment."
27
 This assessment, like Stilwell's criticisms, 
where undoubtedly correct, but for Jiang the cure was seen as possibly worse than the disease. 
There was only so far that the advisory effort would be allowed to go in modernizing the 
Nationalist forces. Jiang's removal of the Soviet advisors, constraints on the Germans at 
Huangpu, and abrupt ending of the American airplane sales and training effort to China in the 
early 1930s were precursors of his sensitivity to the parameters of any foreign advisory effort. 
 In the final analysis, Stilwell had, through his own force or flaw of personality and 
judgment, created a situation where the head of the allied sovereign nation he was sent to assist 
had demanded his relief. The emerging paradox was that only a U.S. trained, led, or advised 
Chinese force could consistently win on the battlefield against the Japanese. However, if Jiang 
allowed Americans to usurp command of his forces, and therefore his political position, the very 
stability and viability of Nationalist China could be at risk. This was further complicated by the 
fact that surrender or accommodation with the Japanese, by Jiang or his replacement, was always 
a possibility the Allies had to keep in mind. The choice for Jiang was only too obvious; he 
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demanded a different American senior advisor and a new approach to this strategic partnership. 
This created an embarrassing situation for Stilwell and by extension Marshall his friend and 
sponsor. The legacy of the successes and failures of the Sino-American partnership since the 
establishment of AMMISCA in 1941 was a challenge for Wedemeyer and the leadership in 
Washington in the fall of 1944, and in the years ahead.   
 The leadership of the United States (Roosevelt) and the American Army (Marshall) was 
forced to acquiesce to this foreign leader's demand. Stilwell had to be relieved and someone 
better suited to the difficult role of Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo found to replace him. The 
selection of a capable follow-on leader to undo the damage done and move ahead to the next 
stage of the advisory effort was important. However, in hindsight this was also a pyrrhic victory 
for Jiang and the Nationalists. Within six months, Roosevelt would be dead and Harry S. Truman 
would be the President of the United States. Marshall would serve Truman, not only as leader of 
the American Army at war, but later in China as first the President's personal representative and 
then as ambassador, and after that as his Secretary of State. The legacy of this acrimony and 
mutual loss of face had significant strategic consequences. Marshall had seen the intransigence 
of Jiang in terms of slow rolling Allied offensive action and the improvement to his own forces 
in the face of a common foe. In addition, Marshall had been forced to cashier his loyal and 
trusted subordinate. Marshall would be the new president’s senior diplomat and, as will be 
discussed later, his most influential advisor for China policy through the end of the war and 
through Jiang's lost campaign to defeat the Communists and control China.   
 
A China Theater is Established 
 If the situation in China was to be turned around, it seemed a senior officer with a 
different leadership style, temperament, interpersonal relationship skills, and personality was 
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needed. In late 1944, it was now Wedemeyer's turn to try to move this problematic wartime ally 
and its military forces forward to a greater effort against the Japanese to support the overall war 
effort in Asia. In addition to Wedemeyer's personal papers there are two books that outline his 
role in China that are used as references in this study. In Wedemeyer Reports! An objective, 
dispassionate examination of World War II, post-war policies, and Grand Strategy published in 
1958, Wedemeyer tells this story in his own words.
28
 A second book, Wedemeyer on War and 
Peace, edited by Keith Eiler also covers his contributions to the military and the nation during 
this critical period. This reference includes commentary and analysis of this senior military 
leader's actions and copies of key documents from the period. , Wedemeyer's most difficult 
challenge as a military leader, strategist, and planner was his time in China in the last year of the 
war and during the immediate post-war period.   
 In October 1944, China was still on the defensive, uncertain that the Allies could stop 
further Japanese offensive actions, and still unevenly prepared for Japan's ongoing offensive in 
China. The campaign in Burma was going well, but the Japanese were not defeated and hard 
fighting remained. Despite herculean efforts to build a road and pipeline through some very 
difficult terrain, the ground supply line so necessary for a more rapid buildup of the Nationalist 
Army were still not fully operational. From the earliest days of the war, Roosevelt had argued 
with the other Allies that China had to be supported and had great potential to play a key role in 
the post-war environment in Asia. None of this would be possible without an increased ability to 
train, equip, and supply the Chinese armed forces, and that could only proceed if Burma was 
completely in Allied hands and China's capital and key logistics center in the west were 
protected and secure from Japanese attack. Progress had been made training and equipping the 
first thirty divisions, but that was less than ten per cent of the Nationalist Army. The Japanese, 
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while retreating across the Pacific after a series of defeats on land and sea, still maintained a 
large and powerful military presence in China. While slowly being pushed out of Burma, they 
were still capable of sustained offensive action against the Nationalist forces in China. 
 The Japanese reacted to the reverses in Burma, the building Allied air threat from 
Chinese bases, and their increasingly precarious sea lines of communications from the home 
islands and eastern Chinese ports to Southeast Asia with the ICHIGO offensive. In late spring 
1944, Japan had consolidated its position in Manchuria and eastern China and massed forces to 
attack south and west. By November, the Japanese had taken Kweilin (Guilin) and Liuchow 
(Liuzhou), captured or isolated key forward airfields, and disrupted the American training and 
advisory efforts to the second thirty divisions of Z-Force. The success of the offensive put the 
Japanese in a position to either continue south and link up with their forces in Indochina, or to 
turn to the west and northwest toward Kweiyang (Guiyang) and Chongqing or southwest to 
Kunming, the vital training center and re-supply hub.  
 The potential emerging threat to Jiang's wartime capital was especially troubling. The 
loss of either Chongqing or Kunming could be catastrophic for America's effort to equip, 
logistically support, and maintain the fighting spirit of the Nationalist Army.
29
 Faced with this 
critical situation, a major change to the current Allied command arrangement was logical and 
timely. With the selection of Wedemeyer to replace Stilwell, a decision was also made by the 
senior Allied leadership to change areas of responsibility in the China-Burma-India Theater. The 
threat inside China due to the Japanese ICHIGO offensive demanded a greater American focus 
and effort.  
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The map below outlines the scope of the Japanese offensive.
 
                                 
Mark D. Sherry, China Defense. http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/ 
                                   72-38/map3.JPG (3 October 2003). 
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 The October 28, 1944 White House press release that was prepared to announce Stilwell's 
relief also outlined the new command arrangements. 
  The former China-Burma-India Theater will be divided into two theaters under 
 separate commanders. The U.S. Forces in the China Theater will be commanded by 
 Major General A. C. Wedemeyer who has been appointed concurrently by the 
 Generalissimo, Chief of Staff of the China Theater. General Wedemeyer is now Deputy 
 Chief of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten. The United States Forces in the India-Burma 
 Theater will be commanded by Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, now Deputy 
 Commander of the China-Burma-India Theater.
30
  
 
President Roosevelt and General Marshall had not only selected a different type of commander 
to lead the effort in China, they also  sent a signal to Jiang by having a senior American officer 
whose sole focus would now be operations in China.  
 The Generalissimo's role in Burma had also been reduced while, at the same time, the 
importance of dealing with problems of preparing the Chinese armed forces was now being 
emphasized. India and Burma remained absolutely critical to increasing the delivery of supplies 
and equipment to China, and its forces were still engaged in combat in support of the British and 
American forces. However, the emerging threat in China now demanded more detailed planning 
and activities in Burma were now less of an issue for Jiang's direct involvement. Whether 
Stilwell's fault or Jiang's fault, or both, in the two and a half years of effort only a small portion 
of the Nationalist ground forces had been fighting the Japanese. The situation on the ground in 
China relative to the invaders and occupiers had not improved; in fact, with ICHIGO the position 
had become more precarious. China's continued military weakness had also allowed Japan to 
position itself operationally to successful mount an offensive that brought significant forces to 
within striking distance of the wartime capital. The situation on the ground is portrayed on this 
map from the Center for Military History's China Offensive. 
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Mark D. Sherry, China Defense. http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/chinoff/p05 (map).jpg 
(3 October 2003) 
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 With this dangerous Japanese offensive ongoing in China and the successful Allied 
offensive operations in Burma, command and control and theater geometry [areas of command 
authority and responsibility] became an issue. Most of the American trained and equipped 
Chinese forces were now committed, British forces were fully engaged, and American ground 
and air elements were now playing a significant role. The principle of war, unity of command, 
and the changing situation demanded changes in the Allied headquarters structure. The timing of 
the selection of Wedemeyer to replace Stilwell provided an opportunity to make these changes to 
the command arrangements. Stilwell's deputy, Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, was selected to 
command U. S. forces in Burma and India. Unlike Stilwell, who had commanded all U.S. forces 
in the CBI Theater and was Chief of Staff to Jiang, this change would allow Wedemeyer to 
concentrate on efforts in China. , his two key tasks were to reestablish a cooperative and 
supporting relationship with Jiang and help reorganize and reposition the Chinese divisions in 
southwest China to oppose the ongoing Japanese offensive.  
 As Wedemeyer deployed to Chongqing in late 1944, the situation continued to evolve on 
the ground as Chinese units of the CAI and CEA with their American advisors and supporting 
U.S. medical, engineer, and logistics units continued to be successful in northern Burma. 
However, for Wedemeyer, there was very little time to build working relationships, reorganize 
his staff, and put his trusted personnel into key positions. The American effort in China was now 
threatened by the success of the Japanese ICHIGO offensive. Enemy forces were moving to 
close key airfields in southern China and displace the American Z-Force training center at 
Guilin. Chinese forces designated for training by American advisors were required immediately 
for combat operations before they were properly prepared. In addition to working with Jiang to 
prepare and deploy Chinese units to defend key areas of southwestern China, Wedemeyer had 
188 
 
also inherited command over several important ancillary American military and paramilitary 
efforts in China. The advisory mission was a part of, and influenced by, a significant number of 
supporting American activities in China. 
 The scope of responsibility inherited by Wedemeyer is outlined in a section of Stilwell's 
classified history of CBI under the heading "AMERICAN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN 
CHINA OVER WHICH THE THEATRE COMMAND HAS PARTIAL CONTROL OR WITH 
WHOM LIAISON AND COORDINATION IS MAINTAINED,"
31
 he lists the following ten 
organizations that were within his purview:  
 1.  American Embassy including Military and Naval Attachés. 
 2.  Naval Observer Group (Commodore Miles). 
 3.  XX [U.S Twentieth] Bomber Command. 
 4.  Office of Strategic Services. 
 5. Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency. 
 6.  Foreign Economic Administration. 
 7.  Office of War Information. 
 8.  American Publications Service.   
 9.  Lend Lease 
 10. American Red Cross 
 Despite the breadth of responsibility across these American organizations with missions 
in China, Wedemeyer's first problem was dealing with the Nationalist Army weakness and the 
ongoing Japanese offensive. Wedemeyer's initial assessment called for revising plans, 
reorganizing staffs and putting new and capable people in place. The situation also required a 
period to build personal relationship at the highest levels of the Chinese military. By the fall of 
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1944, there were over two hundred thousand American troops on the ground in China, Burma, 
and India, with more on the way. Given the changes in the command arrangements in the CBI 
Theater that were announced concurrently with Stilwell's relief, Wedemeyer immediately sought 
guidance from Washington on his responsibilities and command prerogatives. This was 
especially true for the various American intelligence organizations and missions in China. 
Wedemeyer had inherited a complicated and complex patchwork of Allied, American, and 
Chinese military and civilian programs to command, administer, monitor, or provide liaison 
elements to that had evolved over the first two and one-half years of the war. Wedemeyer and 
Stilwell were very different officers in terms of knowledge of China, personality and 
temperament, and military experience, the result of which would be very different approaches to 
dealing not only with Jiang, but also with the other American and Allies activities in the theater. 
 Wedemeyer immediately began the process of putting into place commanders and staff 
officers he had confidence in and whom he thought could work together to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. effort. "In planning to create his own team in China, 
Wedemeyer asked that Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Hearn, who had been Stilwell's Chief of Staff, and 
Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Ferris, who had been Deputy Chief of Staff, be replaced by Maj. Gen 
Robert B. McClure and Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, respectively."
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 Those officers that 
had been very close to Stilwell, whose relationship and view of Wedemeyer was neither close, 
nor in all cases favorable, were immediately suspect as the type of staff officers and commanders 
that Wedemeyer wanted working for him as he reorganized the effort and rebuilt frayed 
relationships with the Chinese. His relationship with now Brigadier General Frank Dorn, who 
had been an especially trusted commander and staff officer for Stilwell, became particularly 
strained over the next several months. 
190 
 
 Dorn was responsible for training and providing the American liaison teams to Y-Force 
that had a significant number of forces fighting in northern Burma when the reorganization of the 
CBI started. 
  Member of the Y-Force Operations Staff and Z-Force, American military 
 missions to China, recently redesignated as the Chinese Training and Combat Command, 
 aided the Chinese in two major military operations in the closing months of 1944. They 
 saw the successful culmination of the Salween [Burma] Campaign to make possible the 
 reopening of the Burma Road and they helped establish the Eastern Front in China to 
 protect Kweiyang [Guiyang], strategically located city on the Kunming-Chungking 
 [Chongqing] road, from Jap attack. 
  Establishment of the China Theater of Operations on 25 Oct 1944 by War Dept. 
 Order (1), was followed on 17 Nov 1944 by the disbanding of the U.S. Army Y-Forces 
 and Z-Forces in China and the re-designation as the Chinese Training and Combat 
 Command of these forces functioning within the geographical limits of the China 
 Theater. Brigadier General Frank Dorn was announced as Commanding General of 
 Chinese Training and Combat Command.
33
  
  
 Between December of 1944 and January 1945, in a series of letters, reports, and 
memorandum, Dorn indirectly called for Wedemeyer to step up the pressure on Jiang to relieve 
senior Chinese commanders and give more authority to American advisors by providing more 
leverage over supplies and equipment being provided. Wedemeyer disagreed with Dorn and 
wanted to separate the training and combat activities that Dorn believed were inseparable 
functions of command. In a 27 December 1944 Memorandum to Dorn, Wedemeyer laid out his 
reorganization plan, which also called for a reduction of American personnel to be assigned as 
liaison officers when Dorn had recently asked for an increase.
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 A 3 January 1945 letter from 
Wedemeyer to Dorn clearly showed there was a significant disagreement in methods of dealing 
with the Chinese between the two officers. 
  Your note just arrived. I am recuping (sic) after a minor operation and therefore 
 will not be able to see you personally for a few days. General McClure will clarify I 
 hope my plans for reorganization. I must state categorically that I disagree with you and 
 many of the premises embodied in your letter. I am going to separate the Training and 
 Combat Commands. The idea that training is a command function is a cliché to which 
 one might become a slave. Further, I do not feel that the training of recruits, 
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 replacements and that  invisaged (sic) in the various schools, Infantry, Artillery, and 
 General Staff, should be under the same commander. It is just too much for one man to 
 handle. Of course, they are related and they will be carefully coordinated by my 
 headquarters to insure that training is in consonance with combat requirements. 
35
  
 
The last line of this letter is very specific in providing guidance to Dorn. "...I have carefully 
considered all the factors which you have mentioned and have definitely concluded that the plan 
for reorganization which General McClure will explain is my desire and will be fully 
implemented as rapidly as possible."
36
  
 Wedemeyer discounted the advice of a seasoned commander and combat advisor whose 
forces were currently deployed, fighting well, and taking the fight to the Japanese for the first 
time. The month before Wedemeyer took over the China theater in a September 1944 letter to 
Stilwell, Dorn had outlines his views on over thirty Chinese Group Army, Army, and Division 
commanders in the Chinese Expeditionary Army. His desire to replace, demote, and cashier 
Chinese officers was very clearly outlined. Dorn's comments are brutally frank and the vast 
majority were negative. Below are the comments on just the first three entries, a Group Army 
Commander, an Army Commander, and a Division Commander, as examples of Dorn's 
assessments. There are very few favorable remarks on senior Chinese commanders in this 
document. What is also obvious is that Dorn knew these officers and he and his advisors were 
working around their shortcomings.   
  IX Group Army -- Sung Hsi-lien -- professional hero, personally courageous, but 
 a moral coward, one of the really rich generals (made largely during the past two years in 
 Yunnan), plays favorites and military business associates, makes false reports to cover 
 himself, and militarily does not know what he is doing. Might make a good regimental 
 commander.  
  6th Army -- Huang Chieh -- Not even interested in his troops, rarely spends any 
 time with them, spending most of his time in Kunming, famous as a Mah Jong player 
 which is about all he does. One of the stupidest and most incompetent of the lot.    
  New 39th Div -- Hung Hsing -- Looks good, but is not. Very friendly to 
 Americans, but refused to cross the Salween with his troops in the early part of operation 
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 until Americans crossed and thus forced him to do so. Wanted to wear civilian clothes, 
 so he would be safe. He improved some later, but is no commander.
37
  
 
 Dorn, like his mentor Stilwell, was obviously not about to mince words about problems 
in the Chinese forces under his control or the leadership to which they were subjected. The 
ability to speak in detail about virtually all of the Chinese officers in the CEF would only seem to 
be possible with a strong effort to have the information communicated from the American 
advisors and liaison officers in the field. Jiang's desire to limit the number of his units with 
American liaison elements may also be a function of minimizing the embarrassment of keeping 
so many bad officers. There is no reason to believe what was evident to the advisors supporting 
these units was any different in Chinese leadership in the more than 300 divisions that did not 
have American advisors. Given this lack of support and understanding of the most experienced 
American field advisor, it was not long before the relationship between Dorn and Wedemeyer 
further deteriorated. In a 25th of January 1945, "Efficiency Report on a General Officer" for 
Brigadier General Dorn, Wedemeyer makes the following comments after rating his manner of 
performance as "Excellent." 
 "i. Does he render willing and generous support to the plans of his superiors regardless of 
his personal views in the matter: No. 
 j. Of all the general officers personally known to me, I would place in 499 of 500. 
 k. Remark:  This officer is bright, clever, and decisive. He is of questionable loyalty, 
 uncooperative, extremely selfish, of immature judgment, and not dependable"
38
 
 This report set the tone between the senior commander and one of his key subordinate 
engaged in combat at a critical field headquarters. This relationship and the underlying issues 
behind it can be viewed as both a clash of strong personalities and resistance to a change in 
approach. Dorn was not successful in making his new superior officer understand the situation 
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on the ground in terms of the relationship of training and advising in combat. The strategist 
Wedemeyer was looking to the future and the larger effort to train, equip, and support the 
Nationalist Army beyond the currently planned sixty divisions. Dorn was looking at the tactical 
problems of fighting the divisions currently in the field with American advisors. One thing is 
certain; the success of the Allied campaign in Burma had begun to change the flow of equipment 
and war supplies. The successes in Burma also provided the Chinese confidence in their ability 
to prevail on the battlefield. His differences with Stilwell holdovers notwithstanding, as the new 
commander Wedemeyer displayed no lack of confidence and decisiveness in making changes 
and focusing on future efforts in China. 
 The American forces now in theater had also grown significantly. Sufficient numbers 
were now available to maintain the offensive in northern Burma, continue the building of the line 
of communication from India to China, and support defensive operations in China. However, the 
numbers of forces directly involved in each of the new theaters and the types of missions and 
organizations that had to be dealt with by the newly appointed senior American commanders and 
staffs were significantly different. In addition to leading the American effort in Burma, General 
Sultan retained the requirement to provide logistical support to U.S. forces in China and maintain 
the flow of military supplies and equipment for China's forces, in both China and Burma. "In 
November of 1944, Sultan had a total of 183,920 men" in Ceylon, India, or in Burma fighting, 
supporting, or building the road and pipeline.
39
 In contrast, the number of American forces 
physically in China, which Stilwell had kept to the absolute minimum to keep the logistical 
support requirements low, was about 28,000.
40
 The breakdowns of forces assigned to 
Wedemeyer on 30 November 1944 are outlined below: 
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 Organization             Number 
 Total                27,739 
Army Air Forces (less XX Bomber Command and Air Transport Command...   17,723 
Air Transport Command                2,257 
Theater Troops                 5,349 
Services of Supply                 2,410 
 The American military personnel serving as advisors with their Chinese ground combat 
counterparts were a subset of the theater troops. In discussing these numbers and the breakdown 
of the organizations, Romanus and Sutherland, outline the mission and intention of the U.S. 
effort that Wedemeyer inherited. The following quote also briefly outlines the status of the two 
groups of Chinese divisions with supporting headquarters elements and troops of Y-Force and Z-
Force being trained, equipped, and advised by American military personnel in China and 
northern Burma. 
  On assuming command, Wedemeyer found in China U.S. personnel from the 
 Army, Navy, and the Army Air Forces. (Chart 2) Some were engaged in aerial combat 
 against the Japanese; some were giving logistical support to the U.S. air force units and to 
 the other Americans; some were trying to train and advise the Chinese armies; some were 
 gathering intelligence. There were no U.S. ground combat units, for the U.S. effort in 
 China had always been intended by the War Department to help Chinese defend 
 themselves, to which end the War Department and the Joint Chiefs had been willing to 
 give advice and technical support...Most of them were meant to act as technicians or 
 instructors, and so the number of higher commissioned ranks and enlisted grades made 
 China theater top-heavy in rank... 
  Those ground force men who had been training and advising the Chinese had 
 been divided among the operational staff working with the American sponsored divisions 
 in Yunnan Province (Y-Force Operations Staff or Y-FOS) and those doing similar work 
 in east China with the Z-Force divisions. The Japanese occupation of east China 
 disrupted the Z-Force; a rearrangement of U.S. troops on the Z-Force Operational Staff 
 (Z-FOS) was clearly necessary.
41
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 Colonel F.W. Boye, who served as an advisor to a Chinese Army Group in the newly 
reorganized Chinese Combat Command (Wedemeyer did in fact in early 1945 separate the 
training and combat functions into two distinct commands), provides a first person account of 
one of those "ground force men" as Wedemeyer took charge. Boye served with the Third Army 
Group of the Central sector in Guiyang in Guizhou Province situated between Chongqing and 
Kunming.
42
 Boye begins his account with a brief description of how the Chinese and Americans 
dealt with the Japanese offensive. The Japanese, who had been moving south seizing and 
securing the rail and road lines, had been stopped in eastern Guizhou Province as "American 
OSS teams, operating with Chinese delaying columns, had blown bridges and roads sky high 
with American explosives."
43
 Among the forces in the area that were being reorganized and 
trained for future operations was the Third Group Army that consisted of the 13th, 71st, and 94th 
Armies that each had three subordinate divisions. Each Army had approximately 60 Americans 
(30 officers and 30 noncommissioned officers) who were "integrated with the Chinese command 
and staff and conducted the training."
44
  
 In describing some of the idiosyncrasies of working with the Chinese and political 
command influence, Boye discusses a unique Chinese workaround for deactivating a division 
where the unit selected by higher headquarters was not actually deactivated for local political and 
military reasons. "After much thought and fruitless effort to get the high command to change its 
decision the Marshal [Tang En-po, an officer sent to the province to command its defense] 
applied a simple solution to the problem by changing the names of the two divisions and then 
effecting the deactivation. Let no General try that in the U.S. Army?"
45
 His comments supporting 
the decision in the field, indicates the independent nature and power of subordinate regional 
commanders. In areas where their units are involved, they could, and did, ignore or manipulate 
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the national military leadership. After briefly discussing the heroic effort to get more supplies 
and equipment through Burma and moved forward in China to his unit, Boye states that the 
training finally began in January of 1945. "The initial period of our instructor schools, followed 
by individual and small unit training presented few difficulties. Our prestige was high and the 
interest was keen."
46
 At the tactical level, division and below, what the Americans offered was 
both appreciated and needed. The manipulation of the system by the Chinese to keep the better 
unit is also indicative of the recognition and desire of some of the Chinese officers to make 
military rather than political decisions. 
 At the division level, the "training areas were very extensive due to the fact that the 
Chinese billet their troops in all the houses and buildings in the entire area...Billeting was 
accomplished without complaint. The owners or tenants simply crowded their families into 
smaller quarters and appeared to enjoy having the soldiers in their midst."
47
 In terms of training, 
Boye offers that all instruction had to be done through interpreters and highlights the fact that, 
"There are twenty-eight Chinese different dialects employed in China and it is not uncommon to 
find Chinese who cannot understand each other."
48
 He also reconfirmed what Boatner had 
indicated back in Ramgarh in 1942 during the training of the first two Nationalist divisions. The 
Chinese soldiers appreciated education and technical training. "It was through our school system 
that a large part of American influence had been built initially."
49
 He then talks about challenges 
directly related to the unique circumstances and the often-innovative local solutions to providing 
instruction in the areas of field artillery, military engineering, signal, and medical training. While 
American doctors and field hospitals accompanied the training teams, a "research and 
development hospital in Kweiyang [Guiyang]" provided Chinese physicians of high quality. 
Boye also indicates that three American Evacuation Hospitals were "pushed forward" to work 
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alongside their Chinese counterparts. Again, as at Ramgarh when the Chinese soldiers retreated 
from Burma, for some, this was the first real medical care these soldiers had ever received.
50
  
The American advisors controlled several key levers, especially at the tactical level, to influence 
the effort to build competent and capable combat forces. 
 American military medical support was especially important in this theater and started 
from very humble and unique beginnings. A protestant medical missionary, Gordon S. Seagrave, 
himself the son of American missionaries who had worked in Burma, was practicing at 
Namkham in the Shan State in northern Burma when the war began. Caught up in the initial 
1942 battle for Burma he assisted Chennault's American Volunteer Group and then served with 
elements of the Chinese 6th Army. He eventually received a direct commission in the U.S. Army 
and served as General Stilwell's command surgeon during the difficult retreat. Over the next two 
years, he became a close personal friend of Stilwell's and a key staff asset for the medical 
planning of the Allied effort to retake Burma. A passage from his book, Burma Surgeon, 
published in 1943, illustrates both his enthusiasm for his work and his unique contribution to the 
American effort.   
  Was I, perhaps, to be permitted to do some little bit that would help the America I 
 loved and called my own even though most of my life had been spent in a foreign 
 country? If so, all the misery I had gone through would have been worthwhile, for as a 
 result of it, I was the only American doctor in the world who had under his command a 
 group of nurses that could speak Chinese and all the languages of Burma; nurses who had 
 been so trained that they enjoyed nothing so much of hard work and emergencies of all 
 sorts; nurses who fought and went on strike if they were not chosen for the hardest and 
 most dangerous of tasks; nurses who looked upon anything calling himself an American 
 as a sort of tin god! God! Was there a real place for us in this damnable war after all?
51
  
 
 Seagrave eagerly sought to move from his position as a medical missionary in what 
would now be called a Non-governmental organization (NGO) to a key position as a U.S. 
military officer. Given the exigencies of the wartime situation in Burma in 1942, he was able to 
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do just that with a minimum of administrative red tape, and serve at exactly the right time and 
place where he was needed. Over the period of American support, the medical advice and 
assistance provided to the Chinese, by the thousands of American, Allied and contract doctors, 
nurses, corpsmen, technicians and ambulance drivers would play a critical role in raising and 
maintaining the moral of the Chinese fighting forces and the supporting American military 
personnel sent to work with them in this very active combat zone with an unusually unhealthy 
climate. Both the Americans and the Chinese showed an ability to improvise and make do which 
is especially critical in the area of supplying military units both in training and in combat.   
 Boye also discussed the problem of logistics and supporting a Chinese Army-level 
organization in combat. Logistics, and especially the transportation and movement of food and 
ammunition, are critical factors in creating a modern military capable of conducting a mobile 
defense and massing for offensive operations. The situation on the ground in southwestern China 
called for unique solutions. "From an American point of view it was logistically impossible to 
move and supply any Chinese Army in combat."
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 Once again, initiative and innovation are 
mentioned as keys to overcoming serious deficiencies. Despite poor roads, destroyed bridges, 
lack of vehicles and spare parts, no organized transportation units, and the lack of fuel for those 
trucks they did have, Chinese combat units did move on the battlefield. With improvisation, a 
variety of vehicles running on virtually any type of fuel available, heavily loaded troops, and ad 
hoc porter units together made up for the lack of truck and animal transportation companies 
called for in the tables of organization of the various units.  
 While the majority of the Army Group he was assigned to was not committed to combat 
until the summer of 1945, the 94th Army stopped its training program in March of 1945. The 
unit was moved forward to counter a Japanese attack "where they hoped to destroy our last 
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remaining eastern airfield" and, according to Boye, acquitted itself very well against the 
Japanese.
53
 Boye's experience is instructive on what the American advisors and trainers 
encountered and what they did to carry out their mission while the Chinese forces were reacting 
to and making do in what the Chinese saw as normal and the Americans as an emergency 
situation. Again, his experience was in units with American advisors with access to training, 
support and advise. This was not the norm in the Nationalist Army as a whole.  
 The dangerous and sometimes unique situations under which the American advisors like 
Boye served is highlighted in a "Historical Report of Chinese Training and Combat Command" 
for the period 25 Oct 1944 to 31 Dec 1944. The date on the document is 1 January 1944 (the date 
is typed incorrectly on the document and should read 1945).   
  In addition to the Americans still with the Chinese on the Salween and on the 
 Eastern Front, there are Americans of CT&CC operating behind Japanese lines under 
 Colonel Wood King in the 9th War Zone at Chienhsien [Jianshen]. Another group under 
 Colonel Harry M. Spengler is in the 10th War Zone, with headquarters at Chihkiang 
 [Zhijiang]. Still another is operating in the 4th War Zone under Colonel Harwood C. 
 Bowman at Poseh [Bosi].
54
   
 
The focus of American advisor support was to those Chinese units that could more easily be 
moved into Burma, or could be readily shifted to secure Kunming or Chongqing, or potentially 
safeguard or retake key Allied airfields (the 60 divisions and upper level headquarters of the Y- 
and Z- Forces). This effort was never intended to be expanded to the entire Nationalist Army. 
The Americans wanted to reduce the overall number of Chinese divisions, but to make sure these 
were well trained and equipped. These sixty divisions also bounded Jiang's potential political 
liabilities to a relatively small and not very politically or economically important area of China. 
The area was significant to his American partners and their focus on fighting the Japanese first to 
open up Burma and then moving to eastern coastal ports. As he had done with the Russian and 
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German advisors in the 1920s and 1930s, Jiang kept the American effort within certain 
parameters.  
Evaluating the Effort 
 The situation in China in early 1945 is also addressed in three documents that were 
prepared for President Roosevelt in January and February. Roosevelt sent Democratic 
Congressman Mike Mansfield from Montana on a fact-finding mission to China, Burma, and 
India in November and December 1944. Mansfield was the latest of the trusted agents that 
Roosevelt had sent to China to give him a different perspective on the situation. In 1941, he had 
sent Lauchin Currie whose report indirectly led to Magruder's appointment to oversee lend lease. 
In 1944, he sent his Vice President Henry A. Wallace, and then Major General Patrick J. Hurley, 
to assess the situation and make recommendations. Special personal emissaries or observers, 
often with close political connections to the President, were a vehicle that Roosevelt found useful 
at key times to assess or clarify the situation or send a personal message. Mansfield's report to 
the President is dated January 3, 1945. In late February 1945, General Marshall forwarded two 
letters to Roosevelt, one from Sultan, and the second from Wedemeyer surveying the situation on 
the ground in their two areas of responsibility. These two reports generally reinforce Manfield's 
observations. Below are extended excerpts from Mansfield's report that not only provided 
information on what Roosevelt was being told, but also showed the uniformity of American 
assessments of Jiang, the situation in China and the military predicament at that time. 
 One of Stilwell's most loyal supporters, now Major General Frank Merrill who had 
commanded the 5307th (Marauders) in northern Burma met Mansfield in New Delhi. He 
immediately impressed on the congressional representative "that the Chinese soldier was very 
good, if he was given enough to eat, the proper training, adequate material, and competent 
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leadership. In his opinion, much of the difficulties of the Chinese armies could be laid to the 
incompetency of the field commanders."
55
 Merrill then discussed the success of British forces 
and the increase of supplies now being flown over the Hump. Mansfield then was given the 
opportunity to go to Ledo and travel by military vehicle over the newly built road to Myitkyina. 
In Ledo he visited the U.S. 20th General Hospital and favorably commented on the facility with 
its "155 nurses, 80 doctors, and several hundred corpsmen." This is the first of several comments 
praising the American medical effort in India and Burma. "In visiting eight hospitals along the 
Road, I found that the work being done in all of them was outstanding."
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 These hospitals treated 
both American and Chinese combat and support forces. 
 Once in Burma he had the opportunity at Moguang to meet with two of the Chinese 
Army commanders.   
  I had the chance to visit General Liao Yao-hsiang [Liao Yaoshang] of the Chinese 
 6th Army and his American liaison officer, Colonel Philipp. General Liao Yao-hsiang, 
 with his 6th and Lieutenant General Sun Li-jen [Sun Liren was the VMI graduate  who 
 had brought his division to Ramgarh in 1942] of the 1st, were both doing a grand job 
 to the south of the Road and the reason that these two armies had the respect and 
 confidence of the American military was because they were well-fed, well-trained, well-
 equipped, and  well-led. I arrived in Myitkyina that same afternoon and had dinner with 
 Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan that evening...His objectives were (1) to open the 
 road to China by means of Burma and (2) get supplies to China.
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These two combat experienced Chinese Armies and their subordinate units had been refitted 
Ramgarh. Where the American effort could control and concentrate on the advise and assist 
mission the results were truly impressive, but that is not to say problems still did not exist or that 
Chinese units were "Americanized."  
 While at Myitkyina, Mansfield observed the loading of planes headed to China. He also 
made the following observation:   
  The British also clothe the troops of the 1st and 6th Chinese armies but we 
 furnish them with arms. When food is dropped, American liaison personnel attached to 
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 the Chinese armies are there to see that the food is evenly distributed to all concerned.  
 This is very important because otherwise, some of the soldiers would have to do without 
 and the result would be impaired efficiency as is the case so often in China itself.
58
   
 
 The implication of this quote is that after more than two years of war, and within the most 
successful American training program, the Chinese leaders, and their supporting logistics 
formations still could not be trusted to effectively and efficiently feed their own combat troops. 
The situation was without a doubt worse in China where there were not enough American liaison 
officers. In addition, in China, they supplied the food, in India and Burma the food was funded 
and supplied by the British or Americans where this type of leverage could be applied. At his 
next stop, the Congressman received a slightly different appraisal and suggestion for how 
material given to the Chinese was handled. Mansfield flew over the Hump to Kunming and met 
with Chennault. "He expressed great confidence in the Chinese and said they should have their 
own leadership, but that lend-lease should be given direct to Jiang under the supervision of 
Wedemeyer."
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 Chennault had a much different situation in terms of the numbers of officers and 
men he had to train for the Chinese Air Force (CAF) and a significantly reduced number of 
locations where American and Chinese pilots and airmen were working together. 
 Chennault then discussed the number of Japanese being tied down in China, the status of 
the air effort, and his view that the Japanese were moving their heavy industry to the Chinese 
mainland, which would necessitate an Allied landing on the China coast. Chennault's remark to 
Mansfield and his assessment on the Communists was also interesting. "He [Chennault] rates 
them highly, and declares there is no connection between them and Russia, a conclusion that was 
borne out in my conversations during the rest of my stay in China. He is, however, sympathetic 
to Chiang Kai-shek in his dealings with the Communists and thinks he is the one man who 
symbolizes an aggressive China."
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 The difference in strategies to fight the Japanese between 
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Chennault and first Stilwell and now Wedemeyer continue to concentrate on an air centric 
strategy versus building a competent ground force. The young, technically oriented air wing was 
not a politically significant element in the Nationalist forces, and therefore, much less a threat to 
Jiang's leadership. 
 In the next section of the report, Mansfield discussed his meeting with Major General 
G.X. Cheves, the Service of Supply (SOS) Officer in the China Theater. He learned that 90 
percent of the food and building materials being used by U.S, forces in China were being 
supplied by the Chinese. After making comments on the handling of food and corruption in the 
Chinese army officer corps, he offered the following non-sequitur. "When I started on this trip I 
thought that the Chinese problem was supply, but now I am beginning to think it is cooperation 
among the Chinese themselves and that this has always been the case. Conditions in China are 
really bad."
61
  Corruption and malfeasance in the officer corps are symptoms of an army that is 
not centrally controlled and in which there is a lack of unity of command. Mansfield's report then 
makes a very telling remark. "The American military are not too optimistic but are trying to hide 
their feelings."
62
  
 His next meeting was with Wedemeyer with whom he was "favorably impressed." 
Mansfield saw firsthand the importance of the political situation and the regional imperatives 
within the Nationalist government and military that Jiang had to take into account in making 
personnel decisions. Wedemeyer fully understood and took into account Jiang's difficult 
situation. 
  He [Wedemeyer] recognizes the gravity of the situation. He is not fooling himself.  
 He isn't underestimating the abilities of the Japanese nor is he over-estimating the 
 fighting qualities of the Chinese. He wanted to get General Chen Cheng as his  
 field commander against the Japanese, but the Generalissimo appointed Chen Cheng as 
 his Minister of War instead and gave Wedemeyer Hoh Ying-chin [He Yingqin] as his 
 field commander. While this did not look so good at the time, it very likely was a shrewd 
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 move, because Hoh Ying-chin is the Kweichow [Guizhou] warlord and consequently 
 will fight harder to save his province. Hoh Ying-chin, now Chief of Staff of the Chinese 
 Army and Commander of forces in Kweichow and Kwansi [Guangxi] is a  political 
 general. He is anti-communist and has fought a Communist-Kuomintang 
 rapprochement. While he is no longer the Minister of War he is still in a powerful 
 position and is still a key figure in future Chinese policies and politics.
63
  
 
 Mansfield's next meeting was with Major General Hurley, soon to be announced as the 
U.S. Ambassador to China. According to Mansfield, he "informed me that the United States 
objectives were to (1) keep China from collapsing and (2) to unify, replenish and regroup 
Chinese military forces for the purpose of carrying out the struggle and thereby saving American 
lives."
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 Manfield's next comments are on the Communists that Hurley was attempting to work 
with to bring about a revitalized effort toward a united front to fight the Japanese. Hurley's initial 
progress and his abrupt resignation presaged the Marshall Mission and the disparate views of 
what to do about China after the war with Japan. The freedom of movement of Mansfield within 
the theater was also indicative of the progress in the war. The Japanese were decisively defeated 
in northern Burma, the line of communication was open and secure, and Chongqing and 
Kunming were protected. Over the next several months, the situation would continue to improve 
and after nearly three years of effort, Chinese forces were poised to move to the offensive in their 
own country. 
The Alpha Divisions, Chinese Combat Command, & the Mars Task Force  
 Wedemeyer quickly began the reorganization of the theater enlarging the headquarters in 
Chongqing to better support Jiang and the Nationalist military leadership. He also had a forward 
headquarters established in Kunming that was the key location for the training effort in China 
and the terminus for the line of communications through Burma and India. In addition, from late 
1944 through early 1945, he made a series of changes to implement a plan he outlined in 
Kunming in December of 1944. He provided the following simple guidance and clear priorities: 
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"(1) combat, in which the Americans would come very close to operational control; (2) training, 
which they would completely supervise; (3) supply, where Americans would be present at every 
level."
65
 In January 1945, Wedemeyer re-designated Chinese Training and Combat Command 
the Chinese Combat Command (CCC). The Y- and Z-Force units were combined and thereafter 
were known as the Alpha divisions or ALPHA Force. The central focus of the American 
advisory effort was the potentially available sixty divisions of this newly re-designated force.    
 In early 1945, an American ground combat unit was prepared for movement into China to 
train with, and potentially fight alongside, the new Alpha units.
66
 The remnants of Merrill's 
Marauders were withdraw from combat and reorganized with replacement personnel as the 475th 
Infantry Regiment. Along with the newly arrived 124th Cavalry Regiment of the Texas National 
Guard a new unit, the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional) also known as the Mars Task Force, was 
formed under the command of Brigadier General Thomas S. Arms. Stilwell's original concept for 
this unit was for it to be organized and equipped as a light division with a Chinese regiment 
attached.
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 This model of combined operational forces had already proven itself in Chennault's 
program for integrated air units called the Chinese-American Composite Wings that had been 
established very early in the war.
68
  
 The concept of combined units, embedded advisors, and providing key supporting 
elements allowed the Americans to lead, train, and operate by example reducing deficiencies, 
building confidence, and technical capabilities in their counterpart Chinese forces. Providing the 
same forward medical care and evacuation for all deployed forces also significantly improved 
the morale of the Chinese forces. The Americans were able to provide technical expertise for the 
modern weapons and equipment provided that was not yet resident in sufficient numbers in the 
Nationalist Army. The tank and artillery battalions, raised at Ramgarh and that served in Burma, 
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included significant American advisory and maintenance support.
69
 While not particularly well 
suited for use in the jungles of Burma, there were areas of that country where tanks supporting 
the infantry were a key capability. The tanks were a symbol of a modern military and would also 
be useful when the fighting moved into China. 
 As has been covered earlier, when Wedemeyer assumed his position in China, a decision 
was made to take the opportunity to divide the China-Burma-India Theater. However, the 
fighting was not over in Burma and the timing for the redeployment of Chinese and American 
units and advisors to China was problematic. The newly constituted Mars Task Force was 
committed in October of 1944 to operations in northern Burma and remained there until March 
1945 when it was finally moved to China. This force was the first American ground combat 
force actually deployed to China. However, the justification for its movement to China was a 
"most urgent need of all was for remainder of 475th U.S. Infantry Regiment to be transferred to 
China to start training and reorganizing Chinese divisions about to be re-equipped."
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 The history 
of this American unit is provided in Marsmen in Burma by John Randolph published in 1949. 
 The movement of an American ground combat force to China was somewhat 
controversial as the British wanted to maintain this unit under their command for ongoing 
operations in Burma. The elevation of the decision to move one light infantry brigade to the level 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington is indicative of both continued Allied coordination 
problems in theater and the lack of sufficient assets on the ground in Burma given the mission 
and the enemy threat assessments. The interlocking issues of committing, deploying and moving 
forces is indicated in the following quotation:  "The British Chiefs of Staff have now agreed to 
the immediate transfer of the Mars Brigade provided that transport aircraft to move it are 
provided without prejudicing the operations in NCAC [Northern Combat Area Command] and of 
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the 14th Army now in progress."
71
 While officially separated, the China theater was still 
inextricable linked to operations and logistical lines in Burma and India, and would remain so 
until such time that ports on the China coast were recaptured from the Japanese, secured and 
reopened.    
 The Japanese continued to hold areas of southern Burma until August of 1945. However, 
with the control of northern and central Burma by early 1945, the route that became known as 
the Stilwell Road from India to China was finally opened and greater amounts of war materials 
began to flow into China. The first supply convoy arrived in Kunming in February of 1945.
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The logjam of lend-lease supplies in India could now flow to training locations in southern 
China. The long awaited effort to rebuild the Nationalist Army could begin in earnest. However, 
the control of those supplies, their allocation, and distribution continued to be an issue between 
Wedemeyer, Chennault, and Jiang. Predictably, the Allied successes also began to facilitate 
Hump resupply operations and threaten the enemy's hold on Burma; the Japanese reacted by 
pushing further south into China.
73
   
 The Japanese Operation Ichigo had begun back in April of 1944. Among the objectives 
of Japan's first major offensive against the Nationalists since 1941 was the prevention of the use 
of key American bomber and supply airfields in southern China. Another key objective was to 
mitigate the growing threat to its sea lines of communications in the western Pacific and the 
South China Sea. If successful this offensive would link the widely dispersed Japanese ground 
force headquarters, secure a land supply line from Korea to Vietnam, and place significant 
numbers of ground forces in southwestern China. This threat provided the possibility to take 
China out of the war. If the Japanese moved west instead of southwest toward Hanoi, they would 
threaten the logistics hub at Kunming and put at risk the wartime capital at Chongqing.
74
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 This Japanese threat to Kunming and Chongqing and the poor performance of the 
Chinese forces that had not received American equipment, training, and advisors provide an 
opportunity for Wedemeyer. In addition, the loss of some key eastern airfields cast doubt on the 
viability of an air-centric strategy without a ground centric component. On the positive side, the 
opening up of the supply line from Burma, greater tonnages flown over the Hump, and the 
increased effectiveness of the Chennault's 14th Air Force in attacking facilities that were critical 
to maintaining the Japanese offensive were also significant factors in the changing situation on 
the ground. To take advantage of this threat and opportunity Wedemeyer proposed a phased 
comprehensive operational plan to amass, train, and equip forces. They would first defend, and 
then move to the offensive against the Japanese in southern China. With the extensive help of 
American forces in staffing and advising, this plan held promise. He held a series of meetings 
with Jiang and presented his plan that would involve the Chinese Alpha units in southwestern 
China. After extensive negotiations, Jiang decided to allow the United States to train, equip, and 
provide liaison elements to thirty-nine divisions to be called the Alpha Force. This force would 
include the units in Burma when they could be redeployed to China, and selected divisions of the 
rest of the Y and Z forces.
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 Wedemeyer's decision to split the Chinese Training and Combat Command also created 
the opportunity to put his chosen American commanders and key staff officers in place. He 
established a small forward planning group in Chongqing and a larger headquarters was 
collocated with the key training and logistics sites at Kunming. He selected Major General 
Robert McClure to replace Dorn to command Chinese Combat Command and set up a liaison 
system from regimental level all the way to the national level. McClure "summed up the program 
for reform of the Chinese Army in five steps: 1. Feed; 2. Arm and equip; 3. Train; 4. Lead well; 
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and, 5. Indoctrinate.
76
 In order to implement this program there had to be advisors on the ground 
with their Chinese counterparts in significant numbers. He intended to have the liaison officers 
down to regimental level in order to provide leverage over the newly arriving equipment and 
supplies. In the Center for Military History's China Offensive, Theresa L. Kraus briefly 
summaries the support to be provided: 
  Personnel shortages prevented the system from being extended to the regimental 
 level, but eventually all 36 divisions, 12 armies, and 4 group armies of the ALPHA Force 
 received American advisors and liaison personnel, some 3,100 soldiers and airman, all 
 linked by radio. Each advisory team had about twenty-five officers and fifty enlisted 
 men, picked from different arms and services so that qualified technicians from ordnance, 
 logistics, and engineer specialties would be available to help the Chinese. Advisers also 
 furnished technical assistance to the Chinese handling artillery and communications, and 
 American medical personnel worked with Chinese medics, nurses, and doctors that 
 generally lacked formal training. Each advisory team also has an air-ground liaison 
 section, operating its own radio net to provide air support. At the unit level, the 
 American adviser accompanied Chinese forces in the field, supervised local training as 
 best they could and work with Chinese commanders on plans and tactical operations.  
 In no case were the Americans in command, and their influence depended primarily on 
 their own expertise and the willingness of the Chinese commanders to accept foreign 
 advice.
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To support this operational force to oppose the Japanese, Wedemeyer also selected Brigadier 
General John W. Middleton to command the Chinese Training Command to step up the training 
and preparation of the Chinese divisions. The model was very much like what the Americans had 
done at Ramgarh on a smaller scale. He was now able to enhance the system established earlier 
in Kunming under Stilwell's direction.   
 The seven operating centers and schools were improved and enlarged. Chinese fire 
support as a key area of emphasis and "at its peak some one thousand Americans were 
instructing ten thousand Chinese on the use of American supplied artillery.
78
 Wedemeyer also 
wanted to improve and expand opportunities for Chinese officer education with a war college 
and command staff school that would improve direction and planning below regimental level. 
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The need for interpreters was growing and a school to improve the English skills of those 
Chinese assigned for that duty was established.
79
 The improvements to technical schools and 
combat training were an area where there was general agreement between the Chinese and their 
American counterparts. Despite the improvements, allowing Americans to command Chinese 
forces in the field remained a step too far for Jiang and the Nationalist military leadership. 
 One of the prerogatives of command is the freedom to redeploy forces. In terms of 
Wedemeyer's larger plan to be carried out by the Alpha Force, the central focus was to prepare 
this large Chinese force, first to defend Kunming, and ultimately to strike east to the China coast. 
The major problem area was convincing Jiang to move Chinese forces from their normal 
operating areas to mass for defensive or offensive operations. The authority of command of 
Chinese forces in the battle area was also problematic. Jiang and the senior military leadership 
did not accept the idea that tactical forces in contact with the enemy in forward locations could 
not be successfully and efficiently commanded from the headquarters in Chongqing. The 
American advisors continued to advocate for field commanders to be allowed to fight the battles. 
Unlike Stilwell with his ultimatums and condescending attitude, in the Plan Alpha negotiations, 
Wedemeyer and his staff were able to attain a measure of success. However, there were lines that 
Jiang would not cross although there continued to be "a blend of progress, passive acceptance, 
inertia, and outright rejection."
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 Even with the new level of American support and Wedemeyer's desire to increase the 
number of Chinese divisions being trained, this effort only reached 39 of the more than three 
hundred division in the Chinese Army.
81
 The divisions trained in India at Ramgarh and the Y-
Force units trained by Dorn, properly equipped and supplied, had proven capable of defeating the 
Japanese. By the spring of 1945, even with the less than optimal number of forces there was a 
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reasonable expectation that a successful defense of the key approaches to Kunming and 
Chongqing could be mounted. However, the Japanese decided not to continue their offensive 
into southwestern China. Two of the Ramgarh units, the Mars Force, and Y-Force units that had 
been engaged in Burma were brought back to China. A force capable of offensive operations in 
China was now being assembled.  
 During the first three months of 1945, events related to the American efforts in the 
Pacific changed the Japanese strategy in China. The Allied attack on Okinawa in April, and the 
end of the war in Europe in May, played into the Japanese decision to not mount a full offensive 
in southern China. Instead, the IJA slowly retrograded their forces to the east to prepare to 
defend the China coast and northeast China. Nevertheless, the Japanese forces continued to 
maintain significant capabilities in the southwest and continued limited offensives to deny the 
use of key airfields. However, the threat to Kunming and Jiang's governmental capital at 
Chongqing had ended. Wedemeyer, the strategic war planner, presented a campaign concept to 
Jiang in February to take advantage of the Japanese decision to withdraw. This time Jiang was 
less reticent and planning for the organizational changes in training, the make-up of the combat 
forces and logistical units, and increasing the number of American military advisors moved 
forward.
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 In April through June of 1945 the Nationalist forces, with units recently redeployed from 
Burma and newly trained and reorganized elements of Alpha Force with its American advisers, 
conducted a campaign against the Japanese at Chihchiang (Zhijiang). Although the Chinese 
suffered significantly more casualties than they inflicted:  
  The Chihchiang campaign demonstrated that Chinese troops could successfully 
 face the Japanese if they had sufficient strength, coordinated their movements and 
 actions, and received a steady supply of food and ammunition. By aggressive 
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 maneuvering, the Chinese had outflanked a determined foe and forced its retreat.   
 Wedemeyer's ALPHA Force, whatever its shortcomings, had proved its worth.
83
 
 
As the Japanese began to withdraw to the east the Chinese army, supported by General Sultan's 
newly available logistics capabilities in the now quieter Burma-India Theater, offered the Allies 
the capability of large-scale Chinese offensive operations to regain lost territory. The American 
program to improve Chinese ground forces was finally a reality in terms of the long envisioned 
successes on battlefields within China.   
 In addition, the Tenth Air Force that had been in India was now available for employment 
in China alongside Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force. An Army Air Forces China Theater 
headquarters commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer was established. This 
effort significantly increased the American capability to support their Chinese allies. Coupled 
with the Japanese movement to the defensive and the withdrawal of some of its forces to the east, 
there was now an opportunity for an offensive to the China coast. In June and July 1945, Chinese 
forces were massed for an attack to the coastal areas southwest of Hong Kong. However, before 
that objective could be reached, the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
Soviets attacked into Manchuria, the Japanese capitulated, and the war was over. The Japanese 
surrender ceremony in China was held in Nanjing on the 9th of September.
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 With the end of the war, the character and level of support to Jiang and the Nationalist 
military changed significantly. Ironically, the missions and tasks assigned to the military 
personnel that remained in China became even more complex. The United States military 
supported the movement of major elements of Jiang's forces to the eastern part of China to take 
the surrender of Japanese garrisons and assist in the reoccupation of its territory. There were over 
four million Japanese military and civilian personnel to be repatriated from China, Manchuria, 
Taiwan, Hainan, and northern Indochina.
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 As one of the victorious Allies, China was designated 
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to take the Japanese surrender in Indochina north of the 18th Parallel with the British taking the 
surrender of Japanese forces in southern Vietnam.
86
 The Chinese forces that conducted this 
mission were accompanied by an American advisory element supervised by Brigadier General 
Philip E. Gallagher.
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 In August of 1945, as part of the planning for the occupation of Japan and Korea, 
representatives from Wedemeyer's headquarters attended a meeting in Manila to work out the 
plans for the deployment of the III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) to the China Theater. Ironically, it 
is after the war with Japan that the China Theater receives its American ground combat corps. 
The IIIAC with two of its subordinate divisions stayed for over a year in a deployment that 
became more and more controversial as it role in the repatriation of Japanese became more 
obviously supportive of the Nationalists in the internal conflict with the Communists. The 
operations of the approximately fifty thousand Marines in protecting key Chinese ports and 
ground lines of communication in North China was well covered in official USMC histories. 
However, the role of the Army advisory personnel who stayed in China after the Japanese 
surrender to support the negotiations and the Nationalist forces eventually reconstituting a 
training and advisory mission is much less known.  
 The most critical immediate post war issue was Chinese Communists control of key areas 
of eastern and northern China and their demand for a major role in the post war Chinese 
government and military. This situation was exacerbated by the presence in Manchuria of over 
one million Soviet troops who on 8 August attacked the Japanese Kwantung Army and quickly 
moved to consolidate their victory.
88
 The American military observer mission that began in 
August of 1944 with Mao at Yan'an continued briefly under the leadership of David C. Barrett, 
the experienced China hand and old friend of Stilwell's. He was replaced by Colonel Ivan 
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Yeaton, a trusted intelligence officer on Wedemeyer's staff. One of the American advisors who 
served in the mission wrote, "He [Yeaton] had no background on China or the Chinese but styled 
himself an expert on communism. He apparently saw a secret agent behind every tree and around 
every corner. In his seven or eight months at Yenan, he never left the environs of the city.
89
 The 
American bias toward the Jiang and the Nationalists is clearly evident in the opening days of the 
post war period. Yeaton will not be the only official, military or civilian, that will choose sides in 
the next nearly four years of turmoil and change. The post war period for the military advisors 
began in a very dynamic environment and with a very different set of missions and tasks.                          
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CHAPTER 6 
   
THE POST WAR ADVISE AND SUPPORT EFFORT 
 
 
In September 1945, the 60,000 American military personnel in China like their 
compatriots in all the other theaters of the Second World War were eager to begin the process of 
deploying back to the United States.
1
 The long and difficult conflict against Japan, especially in 
the CBI Theater, was over and it was time to go home.
2
 The war in the Asia Pacific Theater 
against the Japanese had taken on its own special nature and characteristics as described by John 
Dower in his study War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.
3
 The war in China 
between two Asian peoples also developed its own distinct character and legacy. The Rape of 
Nanjing, the bombing campaign against the virtually defenseless China's cities, and the 
staggering battlefield losses of the Nationalist forces estimated to be up to ten million, helped 
characterize that theater of war.  
During this conflict, "the Chinese people lived with the horrors of war more than eight 
years as their nation was torn asunder."
4
 The "kill all, burn all, loot all"
5
 reprisals against the 
civilians in northern China in the area of Mao's August 1940 Hundred Regiments Campaign was 
indicative of the great human costs of the Japanese occupation and Chinese resistance. The dire 
humanitarian circumstances at the beginning of the post war in parts of China compared with or 
exceeded the suffering of any other participant in the Second World War. Unfortunately, for the 
Chinese people, however, the end of the war with Japan did not mean the end of human 
suffering, political and economic crises, or military conflict. The victory over Japan also did not 
mean the end of the American military advisory effort. 
The Communist and Nationalist Chinese forces, with their American counterparts, merely 
entered another phase of a struggle to recover from the ravages of war and occupation, stabilize 
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the nation, and build a competent national military establishment. The internal political-military 
struggle between the two Chinese factions, which had been overshadowed by the more than eight 
years of war against Japan, entered a new stage. Nearly a year before the end of the war with 
Japan, the Roosevelt administration began an effort to assist China in addressing the problems of 
uniting the country politically and preventing a return to civil war.
6
 The American military 
advisors remaining in China after the Japanese surrender played an important supporting role in 
this struggle for military, political, and national unity. This chapter examines their activities 
during this complex, difficult, and ultimately unsuccessful undertaking. From September of 1945 
until the evacuation of the remaining members of the Joint United States Military Assistance 
Group to the Republic of China  (JUSMAGCHINA) in January of 1949, the American military 
personnel in China were tasked to conduct a wide variety of missions in a very politically 
charged, and usually ambiguous, operational environment.   
The post war period of American military support and assistance can be roughly divided 
into two relatively distinct phases on either side of the Marshall Mission that ended in January of 
1947. The following activities characterized the two periods: (1) Repatriation, redeployment and 
reorganization, and negotiation; and, (2) Conditional support, Nationalist overreach, defeat and 
retreat. During the first phase, the United States and the military advisors on the ground were 
committed to deploying the Nationalist forces to reoccupy their sovereign territory and support 
the Allied effort to repatriate the Japanese in China. Concurrently, the United States facilitated 
negotiations for national political and military reconciliation. This effort was led first by 
Ambassador Hurley, and after his abrupt resignation, by General Marshall. The second phase 
began with the breakdown of negotiations and the decision to conditionally support Jiang and 
Nationalists in the escalating civil war. After several months of Nationalist victories in the first 
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half of 1947, the tide began to turn in favor of the Communists with a series of successes in 
northeastern China. The ultimate outcome of this phase was the humiliating defeat of the 
Nationalist forces and their retreat to the island of Taiwan by way of Hong Kong and Chongqing. 
This chapter focuses on the key activities conducted or supported by the military advisors during 
these two phases of continuing American involvement in China's post war struggle.  
 
           Repatriation 
During the first phase of the post war period, the initial task was the collection and return 
of Japanese military and civilian personnel to their home islands. This operation took place in a 
very ambiguous global strategic situation. This was especially true in Asia where the end of the 
war came earlier than expected with little chance for advanced planning. The Allies had to 
negotiate the details of the surrender procedures and areas of responsibilities in Japan, Korea, 
and Southeast Asia among themselves as the situation developed. The relationship between the 
Chinese Nationalists and the Communists was complicated by the late arriving Soviet forces 
attack into Manchuria during the last month of the war. In addition, selected Japanese forces 
remained armed or were rearmed to maintain stability in the chaos of the post-war in several 
countries, including China.
7
 Although it could not be known at the time, the seeds of two major 
conflicts in Asia were sown in the post war machinations of the winning powers.  
Managing the surrender of the Japanese military forces and their supporting civilian 
bureaucracies and businesses at home and overseas was a huge task. There were an estimated 
2,575,000 troops to be demobilized in Japan and another 3,395,000 overseas including 1,750,000 
in China, Taiwan, and Manchuria.
8
 The problems of repatriating nearly 4,000,000 Japanese 
military and civilian personnel from China had less to do with security issues, although 
retaliation against Japanese citizens did take place, than with the logistics of such an undertaking. 
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There were significant practical problems inherent in the collection, care and feeding, and 
overland transportation to ports of debarkation of millions of people, some of whom had lived in 
China for decades. The availability of transportation assets for this number of people within the 
theater competed with the ships and planes needed to return servicemen to the United States. The 
scale of the problem of repatriating Japanese forces and civilians from overseas locations was a 
larger and more difficult problem than the demobilization the troops in the home islands. The 
large-scale movement back to Japan could not begin until early 1946 as shipping became 
available and facilities to handle the people at the ports had been established.
9
  
The Japanese, with their puppet Chinese government officials and troops, had controlled 
Manchuria since the early 1930's and the urban areas and lines of communication in much of 
eastern China for eight years. The functions they performed had to be assumed by the Nationalist 
authorities as early as possible. Further complicating the situation, the Communists had 
infiltrated significant areas of northern and eastern China and were prepared to take control when 
an administrative and security vacuum developed. The Nationalist government and its best 
military forces were located far to the southwest of China and unprepared for the work ahead. To 
assist in this daunting task and to facilitate the coordination between the United States and China, 
the American wartime support structure was kept in place virtually unchanged. Ambassador 
Hurley and General Wedemeyer, who had established and maintained good working 
relationships with the Nationalist government, and the Communists at Yan'an, remained in China 
to oversee this new effort. The American military advisors were uniquely postured to assist in 
this endeavor. 
Until a new post war organization for military advisory support could be established, 
Wedemeyer's United States Forces China Theater (USFCT), first organized in October of 1944, 
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remained in place as the senior American military headquarters. This meant all army units and 
most American supporting security organizations in China, including the advisory personnel in 
Chinese Combat Command, continued under his direct supervision. These personnel were 
generally co-located with their Nationalist counterparts in southern and central China or in the 
major headquarters in Kunming and Chongqing. Wedemeyer did not have command authority 
over naval units, strategic air force elements, the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA) or 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). There was still an important role for these organizations 
in collecting intelligence on the emerging situation, maintaining liaisons, and conducting covert 
or low visibility missions in post war China. One of these missions was support for the 
repatriation of American prisoners of war who had been held in Japanese camps in Manchuria.
10
 
These other elements continued to report to the Joint Staff or their higher service headquarters in 
Washington while coordinating with the Hurley and Wedemeyer.
11
  
The desire for a post-war unity of effort was part of a debate in Washington generated by 
a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) paper of 28 May 1945 on the extent of 
commitments to China after the war. As the end of the war approached, the Assistant Secretary 
of War circulated a study and asked for the answers to the following questions: 
(1) what would be done about the 39-division army; 
(2) what kind of air force, if any, would the United States support; 
(3) what was to be done about a military mission to China; and, 
(4) what was to be done about surplus military equipment in the China Theater?
12
         
The discussion of the road ahead for military advice and assistance to China continued through 
the rest of the year as the immediate task of repatriation demanded immediate attention. How 
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well this task was done by the Nationalists and how the situation in China developed over the 
next several months mattered in terms of America's strategic goals in Asia.                                     
The Chinese national leadership, the governmental bureaucracy, and the best Nationalist 
divisions trained, equipped, and advised by the American advisors were still in central and 
southern China at the end of the war. Redeploying these units to supervise the surrender and 
repatriation meant supporting the relocation of Jiang and his government back to Nanjing as well 
as the movement of large numbers of Nationalist forces. The scale and complexity of the 
problems faced by the Nationalist regime in conducting this type of operation was significant. 
The timely implementation of the terms of the Japanese surrender required significant numbers 
of forces and the ability to deploy, command and control, and logistically support them over a 
large land area. Nationalist forces did not possess these capabilities. The possibility of further 
fighting also could not be discounted. Wedemeyer warned Marshall about the potentially 
"explosive" situation in China. Conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists, and 
possibly against some Japanese units that refused to surrender, had to be considered in the initial 
planning.
13
   
To meet the challenges Wedemeyer requested five U.S. Army divisions be sent to China 
to assist in the repatriation mission. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), General 
Douglas MacArthur, who was the senior American and Allied commander in the Pacific area of 
operation, turned down this request. However, the III Marine Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) with 
two divisions was offered and accepted.
14
 On the 22nd of August, now Brigadier General 
Hayden Boatner, who had been the senior liaison to the Chinese at the training center in 
Ramgarh in 1942, represented Wedemeyer and USFCT at a conference in Guam to coordinate 
this deployment.
15
 The mission of the nearly fifty thousand Marines was to secure key ports and 
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internal lines of communication in north China. These tasks were directly related to the Allies 
shared administrative and logistical requirements to facilitate the Japanese surrender as directed 
in a 10 August 1945 message to Wedemeyer from the Joint Staff. In an admonition that 
significantly constrained American forces for the next four years, Wedemeyer was warned not to 
"prejudice the basic principle that the United States will not support the Central Government in 
China in fratricidal war," in the conduct of the enumerated tasks. These tasks included; "secure 
control of key ports and communication points"....continue "military assistance...for the purpose 
of supporting Chinese military operations essential to the reoccupation"... and directed that..."the 
surrender of Japanese forces in China, whether complete or piecemeal, will be to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek or his representative." Wedemeyer was also directed to "assist the Central 
Government in the rapid transport of Chinese Central Government forces to key areas of 
China..."
16
    
In directing support to the Central Government of China, internationally recognized as 
the Nationalist regime of Jiang Jieshi, the American die was cast. This support was inextricably 
linked to the emerging political and military crisis between the Nationalists and the Communists 
as they vied for control of key areas of the country. The missions given to Wedemeyer were 
essentially providing direct support to one faction in a civil war that had been going on for 
decades. The IIIAC had an Allied mandate to oversee the Japanese surrender in the name of 
Jiang and the Nationalist government. The control of the key ports and the movement of 
Nationalist forces were to be carried out concurrently with ongoing talks between the 
Nationalists and the Communists in Chongqing facilitated by Ambassador Hurley. The 
deployment of the IIIAC and American assistance to the Nationalist movement east, from the 
Communist perspective could hardly be seen as the actions of a neutral. The ultimate outcome of 
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the occupation of Japan and Korea, and the actions in China had a direct impact on the post war 
American goal of a sovereign, independent China, friendly to the United States, able to play a 
leading role in Asia.
17
  
The deployment of a large American ground force to China in September 1945 appeared 
to signal a strong commitment to remain involved in post war China. However, the fact that the 
priority of assignment of U.S. Army units was to Japan and Korea, not China, should also not be 
overlooked. The debate within the U.S. government, between the joint staff and the services, and 
with key members and blocs of the Congress over what to do about military support to China 
continued for the next four years and beyond. American policy appeared to be ambiguous and 
reactive. That approach will not change as the advisors attempted to carry out their assigned 
post-war tasks. 
Despite apprehension about the potential for combat operations by the commander of the 
force, Major General Keller E. Rockey, the IIIAC landed unopposed into areas of China still 
controlled by the Japanese forces.
18
 A strong and capable military presence under an Allied 
mandate forestalled early tentative moves by the Communists to move into Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Qingdao. This success was less by force of arms than by the legitimacy of the IIIAC deployment 
to support the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese under the orders of General MacArthur, 
the senior Allied commander in the theater. Therefore, this force under the direct command of 
General Wedemeyer, worked for Generalissimo Jiang in his role as the senior Allied commander 
in China. Among the American officers, there were those who knew the language, the culture, 
and the geography of eastern China. They developed relationships with each other and key 
Chinese leaders facilitated this effort.  
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The Marine Corps, like the U.S. Army, had a long history of service in Asia. Two senior 
officers assigned to the IIIAC had extensive backgrounds in China. The unit's chief of staff, 
Brigadier General William A. Worton, and the senior intelligence officer, Colonel C.C. Brown, 
were both China hands who could speak the language and had served there extensively before 
the war.
19
 In addition, there was a Marine-Army connection. Worton and Boatner served together 
as students in Beijing and were part of the "close fraternity among language officers."
20
 This 
relationship undoubtedly assisted in the inter-service coordination for this mission. Another 
relationship that proved to be of value was Brown's friendship with Dai Li, Jiang's head of the 
Nationalist secret police and the counterpart to Captain Milton E. Miles who headed the Navy's 
SACO and the OSS in China.
21
   
Worton related a story of meeting with the Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Commander-in-
Chief of Pacific Command, as the planning was going forward for the IIIAC deployment to 
China. Nimitz told Worton "it's very unusual that Washington does the right thing. Here you are 
a former language officer. You served in Peiping in 1923 to '26, in Tientsin and Shanghai '27 to 
'29, and Peiping from '31 to '36, and again in Shanghai in '36 and '37. They are sending you to 
China. Usually if you can speak Chinese and are familiar with the China situation, they'd send 
you to Arabia."
22
 That Nimitz knew Worton's background, met with him personally, and spoke 
with him about the task ahead argues for the senior military leadership's understanding of the 
importance of this mission. Worton was selected to lead the advanced party for the newly 
established military headquarters. This task not only called for area and language expertise, but 
military and diplomatic skills as well. In addition to these two senior officers, four Chinese-born 
college students that had attended college in the United States served with IIIAC as civilian 
interpreters. Worton also learned early in the deployment that between three and four hundred of 
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the USMC personnel in the subordinate divisions had previously served in China.
23
 The marines 
selected for this critical mission were veterans of combat in the South Pacific with a cadre of key 
officers and men who had served previously in China. 
In mid September, Worton flew first to "chaotic" Shanghai and met with a U.S. Army 
Brigadier General Douglas L. Weart who had recently deployed there with a small Nationalist 
army element. After receiving an update on his orders relayed from Wedemeyer, Worton and his 
small advanced party flew to Tianjin to prepare for the deployment of the main force at the end 
of the month.
24
 The IIIAC's initial mission was "to seize the ports of Tientsin [Tianjin], Tangku 
[Dagu], Chinwangtao [Qinhuangdao], Tsingtao [Qingdao], and such other places as might be 
necessary to maintain the line of communications."
25
 When he arrived in Tianjin, he was met and 
treated properly by the Japanese military leadership who indicated their willingness to accede to 
the surrender terms and support his advanced party preparatory mission. There would be no 
Nationalist troops in this area for months and the Japanese continued to secure the key cities and 
lines of communications until relieved by the Americans of IIIAC. In contrast to other areas of 
China, "North China was quiet when we landed. Food was abundant. Railroads were running. 
Merchants were operating. Frankly, I could have imagined that it could have been 1935 rather 
than 1945."
26
 The deployments of the units of the 1st Marine Division in the Tianjin/Beijing area 
and the 6th Marine Division at Qingdao were accomplished quickly and control of the key ports, 
airfields and lines of communications firmly established.
27
  
 The IIIAC was under the operational command of USFCT and would remain so until 
May of the following year when it reverted to control of the U.S. Navy. Worton's view of 
working for Wedemeyer was very positive. "The commanding general of the China Theater was 
an extremely capable man who knew China and knew how to handle the Chinese. General 
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Wedemeyer was very, very fair in his dealings with the Third Amphibious Corps."
28
 The official 
Victory and Occupation Volume V of the History of the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II by 
Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw documents this unique mission. China Marine: An 
Infantryman's Life After World War II by E.B. Sledge provides a personal view of a serviceman 
on the ground during this deployment and provides a very interesting complementary account 
from a very difference perspective. Sledge is the author of a classic work on men in combat, 
With the Old Breed At Peleliu and Okinawa, whose story served as the basis of the recent Home 
Box Office television series, The Pacific. There is also a novel China Marine written by retired 
USMC Colonel Paul E. Wilson purportedly based on the real life story of a young Marine in 
China during this time that discusses the difficulties of the situation with the Communists in the 
area around Beijing.  
 Sledge chronicles the daily life of the enlisted Marines who served in China in 1945 and 
1946 after the war with Japan and at the very beginning of the Cold War. Sledge describes the 
boredom, danger, responsibilities, and opportunities working among the Chinese people and 
warring factions in the chaotic immediate post war period. He also provides his views on the 
professionalism of the Japanese military and the confusion of working with and against the 
Chinese Nationalist, Communist, puppet, and warlord elements. The landing of the Marine 
divisions began on 30 September 1945 in the vicinity of Dagu in the area east of Tianjin with a 
follow-on landing at Qingdao on the Shandong peninsula. Major elements moved to the vicinity 
of Beijing and these three cities became the key areas held by this force. Although there were 
Marines still on the ground in China to protect American citizens through the evacuation in early 
1949 their major tasks of protecting these ports and key areas of north China was greatly reduced 
in July of 1947 at the end of the Marshall Mission.
29
 It should be noted that the U.S. Navy with 
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its USMC contingent attempted to hold the key base at Qingdao and remained there in force until 
December of 1948.
30
 
 Because of the secure situation in north China in the IIIAC area of responsibility, the 
repatriation of the Japanese began from that region first. It was not until 25 October that a 
meeting of the key headquarters involved in conducted detailed planning for this operation was 
held in Shanghai. USFCT was the lead planning organization. However, staff officers from 
MacArthur's headquarters, the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, as well as Chinese representatives 
from the government and Headquarters, Chinese Ground Forces and their American liaisons 
from the Chinese Combat Command attended the meeting. There were more than twenty-five 
ports and camps to be prepared to support this effort. The planners called for the repatriation of 
over 300,000 per month beginning in January of 1946. The United States Navy controlled 
merchant vessels and former Japanese navy and civilian shipping had to be marshaled for this 
task. A subordinate headquarters was established in Shanghai under Wedemeyer and USFCT. 
The evacuation of the Japanese military was the highest priority and the USMC supplied the 
guard forces aboard each ship.
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Redeployment 
In addition to the IIIAC deployments, Nationalist forces had to be moved to eastern 
China as quickly as possible. The key to long-term success for a stable and united China was to 
have Jiang's forces assume the new post war tasks and thereby reoccupy their country. The key 
was not losing the momentum that had been gained in building the Nationalist armed forces 
since the beginning of the war. The effort to train and equip the 13 armies and 39 divisions of the 
Alpha force had gone well. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, some of the units still required at 
least three months to complete their planned training program.
32
 The American supported 
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military school system, first established in Ramgarh and now fully functioning in the Kunming 
area, showed great promise in continuing to build the future Nationalist army. General Henry H. 
"Hap" Arnold, the Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), pushed for continuing 
to build the Chinese Air Force after the war with about 2,000 American trainers.
33
 In addition, 
the elements of a competent and efficient Chinese Service of Supply (SOS) to support these 
forces logistically, was being built, guided by a significant numbers of American trainers and 
advisors.   
Romanus and Sunderland offered this insight into "Wedemeyer's experiment" at the close 
of the war: "Adequate resources were at hand or in sight. If Japan fought on long enough, and 
well enough, that paradoxically, might be the salvation of the Generalissimo's government."
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Wedemeyer, the planner and strategist, was now looking ahead at continuing and expanding the 
advise and assist mission to prepare for future contingencies. A key part of that effort was to 
significantly reduce the number of divisions in the Nationalist force structure from over 300 to 
around 100 divisions. One American study concluded that about 120 divisions could be 
supported by China's post war economy. The plan was to train and equip an additional 40 
division to the standards of the Alpha units. This potentially meant doubling the number of 
American advisors, from about 4,000 to 8,000 to accomplish this task. This would allow the 
continuation of the liaison elements at the army and division headquarters and provide the 
leadership and technical specialists needed at the training establishment to support a force of 
eighty divisions.
35
 The problem was the Japanese did not fight on long enough, the number of 
American advisors would not be increased, and the Chinese military would not be reduced in 
size. The two elements that are consistently mentioned in terms of the building of an effective 
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Chinese military force were the reduction in size and maintaining the American liaison teams 
with the units on combat operations. 
To build the ground and air forces necessary with a supporting logistics system would 
have required keeping from 10,000-12,000 American trainers and advisors in China. In 
September of 1945, Jiang requested an American military advisory effort for China of about 
3,500 personnel. State, War, and Navy offices in Washington considered this issue; however, a 
proposal to keep about 1,000 personnel divided into ground, air, and naval contingents was 
eventually forwarded for a decision. Truman did not approve this plan until February of 1946. 
This plan included a reduction in the number of America military personnel assigned as 
operational level advisors at division and regimental levels. The new focus was on higher 
organizational level headquarters and training assistance.
36
 However, the removal of combat 
advisors down to regimental level was a key decision given the continuing command and 
logistics problems endemic in the Nationalist Army. The one area that did receive consistent 
approval from Washington was support for redeploying the Nationalist forces to eastern and 
northeastern China. This assistance was coupled with requests to withdraw the USMC units from 
north China at the earliest opportunity.
37
  
Fully prepared or not, the Nationalist forces had to be moved to northern and eastern 
China as quickly as possible to participate in the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese and to 
facilitate the process of  recovering  and controlling formerly occupied territory. Over the 
following months, the American military moved nearly one-half a million troops by boat and 
plane. The USFCT headquarters, in conjunction with their Chinese counterparts, planned and 
conducted the airlift of forces that included three armies with their subordinate divisions. These 
units were airlifted to Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai respectively.
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 Colonel F.W. Boye, an 
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advisor with the Chinese 94th Army relates how "The Third Army Group bundled the 94th Army 
into C-54 airplanes for the 900 mile flight to Shanghai where General T'ang [Tang] assumed the 
area command. Under American control the army of 36,000 men was transported without 
incident."
39
  
American military advisers that had been serving with these units helped plan, and then 
accompanied and supervised, the transport of these units.
40
 As was discussed at the end of 
chapter 5, one of the Nationalist group armies from southern China with its American advisors 
was deployed to northern Vietnam to take the Japanese surrender in that location. By the late fall 
of 1945, the situation in China and on its periphery was rapidly being transformed. Strong 
American and Nationalist Chinese forces were in place in the north and east of China. However, 
the situation with the Soviets in Manchuria was still an issue for the Allies and significantly 
complicated the situation between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists.   
 
     Negotiation 
 As part of the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, to which the Chinese were not a 
signatory, several concessions in Asia were made to the Soviets as a quid pro quo for their 
entering the conflict with Japan. Two provisions specifically dealt with Chinese sovereign 
territory. The first was the internationalization of the port of Darien (Dalian) at the end of the 
Liaodong peninsula long fought over by the Japanese and the Russians.
41
 The second provision 
called for the establishment of a joint Chinese-Soviet company to operate the Chinese-Eastern 
and South-Manchuria Railroad that connected the Soviet Union to the year-round port of Dalian. 
The Soviets also agreed to "conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship 
and alliance...."
42
 In June of 1945 under instructions from President Truman, Ambassador Hurley 
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advised Jiang of the Yalta provisions. In July and August, Nationalist government officials and 
their Soviets counterparts held talks on this issue in Moscow.  
On August 14th, 1945, a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed that 
essentially formalized the Yalta agreement. In addition, both sides agreed to mutual respect for 
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each state. "The Soviet Union 
promised moral and military aid to the 'National Government as the central government in China' 
and recognized Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria."
43
 This treaty and subordinate agreements put 
the Chinese and Soviets where they had been diplomatically in the late 1930s before Germany 
attacked, and Japan and the U.S.S.R. signed their non-aggression pact. The stage seemed to be 
set for Jiang to be in a strong bargaining position with Mao and the Chinese Communists. The 
Soviets appeared to be supporting the Nationalists. However, ceding control of sovereign 
Chinese territory was controversial domestically and was an issue for future negotiations and 
long-term Sino-Soviet relations.
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When the war with Japan ended in China in September 1945, negotiations were already 
ongoing between the leadership of the Nationalists and Communists mediated by Ambassador 
Patrick J. Hurley as the senior American representative.
45
 In August of 1945, he had flown to 
Yan'an and accompanied Mao back to Chongqing who stayed for over a month of high-level 
negotiations. These talks stalled over a range of disagreements and impasses including the mix of 
Communist and Nationalist forces in the future national army and the numbers of officials each 
party would appoint in national, provincial, and regional offices. Hurley abruptly resigned in 
November 1945 as the talks faltered.
46
 President Truman quickly replaced him with George C. 
Marshall who spent most of the next year trying to keep both sides from further escalating their 
conflict. Marshall strove for both verified truces in the fighting, a reduction of military force 
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levels, and to find common ground for political accommodation. One of the controversial 
measures used by Marshall as leverage was the suspension of military aid to the Nationalist 
forces.
47
 This decision was especially awkward for the advisors serving with Nationalist 
headquarters in terms of the range and scope of duties they could perform. In August of 1945, a 
directive that had been in place from the very beginning of the advisory mission was 
reemphasized. Americans military personnel in China were told again to avoid involvement in 
China's internal conflict.
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A detailed account of the controversial Marshall Mission to China is beyond the scope of 
this study, as is any judgment of the potential changes for its success.
49
 That said, it is difficult to 
imagine that a soldier, diplomat, and statesman of Marshall's status, who had lived and served in 
China, would have undertaken this difficult task if the possibility of success did not exist. If he 
did undertake the mission knowing of the chances of success were slim, that would indicate the 
importance he placed in bringing the Chinese factions together. There are several excellent 
accounts of the Marshall Mission and its aftermath including the fourth volume of a George C. 
Marshall biography by Forrest C. Pogue. This study, by the preeminent Marshall scholar, 
provides a detailed account of his activities in Washington and in China from 1945-1949. From 
December of 1946 through January of 1947, Marshall attempted to bring both the Nationalists 
and the Communist to an agreement on a mutually acceptable way forward in China.  
There are two other works that specifically cover this mission in some detail. The 
interesting 1998 work, George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China, December 1945-
January 1947, edited by Larry I. Bland, provides a large number of short chapters looking at the 
mission from many different perspectives written by both American and Chinese scholars. This 
work includes a "Military Aspects" section that looks at two activities of this mission. Separate 
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chapters address the attempt to join the Communist and Nationalist armies and the effect of the 
loss of key ports in China on the U.S. Navy. In an excellent reference for researchers, Lyman 
Van Slyke provides a useful introduction to Marshall's multi-chapter report to the president that 
has a second volume that includes a collection of the key documents in Marshall's Mission To 
China compiled by University Publications of America.   
The Hurley and Marshall negotiations were a bridge between the training and actual 
combat advising conducted during the war with Japan and the more restricted missions and 
activities conducted in the post war years. There are two key examples of the American advisors 
being tasked to play important roles in supporting the Marshall negotiations. One of the most 
innovative missions was for some of the advisors to serve as members of the Executive 
Headquarters in Beijing under the direction of Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade. This 
organization provided ceasefire monitoring teams, or truce teams that included Chinese 
Communist, Nationalist, and American officers.
50
 Another planned mission in support of the 
Marshall Mission was for an American team of advisors to train and equip Communist divisions 
prior to their integration into a national army. Both of these unique missions were unique tasks 
that emerged with little warning or opportunity for detailed prior planning. However, these two 
tasks supported Marshall's attempt to put a lasting cease-fire in place, build an integrated national 
army, and maintain a role for the United States military in China.  
The Executive Headquarters was established by agreement of the Communist, 
Nationalist, and American representatives in January of 1946 as part of the Marshall-led 
negotiations. This body's function was to "ensure implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities 
Order." Three Commissioners were appointed to oversee the administration of any agreements 
made by the parties. The implementing arm of this agency was the Operations Section that had 
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an American Army officer as its director.
51
 "It was made clear that American participation in the 
headquarters was solely for the purpose of assisting the Chinese members in implementing the 
cease-fire order."
52
 For the next year, these field teams of 10-15 people, normally led by an 
American colonel or lieutenant colonel, moved out across the disputed areas of north and east 
China to monitor and report on violations and incidents. Since the Soviets still occupied 
Manchuria, this area was especially challenging.
53
 
A Military Intelligence Department report published in November of 1946 recaps the 
truce activities conducted from the initial agreements in January of 1946 through the date of the 
report. The January ceasefire that called for the establishment of this activity was never 
"officially abrogated," although both sides conducted unauthorized military deployments and 
there were numerous violations. These "cease-fire teams sent out by the Peiping executive 
headquarters to enforce the truces generally proved ineffective."
54
 Nevertheless, this organization 
kept dozens of teams in the field for over a year attempting to implement, first the January 1946 
ceasefire truce, two regional truces announced in May, a June truce for Manchuria, and an 
August truce.  
These elements adapted quickly to the changing circumstances and conducted their 
operations under often dangerous and ambiguous circumstances. One analytical line of the report 
is especially telling. "It is worth noting that, whenever a truce, whether large or small, has been 
effective, this is only because it has been to the advantage of both parties."
55
 This mission could 
not succeed because neither side wanted a ceasefire nor there was no enforcement mechanism 
associated with this mission. The teams had no leverage over the warring factions. There were no 
sticks, and there were few carrots--only the promise of the delivery of military equipment and 
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training. The American members of these teams may not have been particularly successful as 
"peacekeepers" but they were the eyes and ears of Marshall and the American effort in China.
56
 
One key aspect of Marshall's negotiations was the reduction of the Nationalist and 
Communist forces and the establishment of a unified national army. American advisors 
continued to work with the Nationalist forces and were reorganized under the Nanjing Command 
Headquarters in February of 1946 with the planned closing of the USFCT. These officers 
continued to work with higher-level Nationalist headquarters focused primarily on fulfilling past 
lend-lease agreements and earlier negotiated arms sales contracts. In late February of 1946, a 
national military reorganization agreement was reached. This pact called for a two-phased 
arrangement where after 12 months there would be 90 Nationalist divisions and 18 Communist 
divisions. At the end of 18 months, the national army would consist of 50 Nationalist and 10 
Communist divisions. Five regional areas were designated with headquarters and numbers of 
subordinate divisions specified to enable the administrative demobilization and redeployment of 
forces. The Nationalist-Communist ratio of 5 to 1 was to be maintained as further political 
agreements and accommodations were implemented.
57
 The Executive Headquarters was to 
monitory the demobilization and reorganization.   
Another unique aspect of the negotiations also under the aegis of the Executive 
Headquarters was the provision to put together an American team to train and equip the 
Communist forces of 10 divisions for this reorganized army.
58
 Called the Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) 
School, this site was a Communist held area astride an historic pass north of the Great Wall. The 
objective was to use American officers as trainers to conduct a three month program to bring 
Communist units up to par with the Nationalist formations so they would not  "lose face" when 
the formations were integrated. The Ground Forces Section of the Nanjing Headquarters 
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Command was tasked with this mission and 90 officers and 20 enlisted personnel were sent to 
Nanjing in May of 1946 to prepare for this mission. These newly arrived advisors were given 
courses on methods of instruction and weapons in addition to language and cultural orientations. 
They also prepared and had translated lessons and doctrinal materials. The establishment of this 
school suffered a series of delays. These military personnel were eventually integrated into either 
the Executive Headquarters truce teams or the Nanjing Headquarters Command. This planned 
and partially resourced program was never established.
59
    
Executive Headquarters was terminated soon after January of 1947 when Marshall gave 
up on further negotiations and returned to Washington, D.C. to report to President Truman on the 
situation in China. As with the Hurley mission the year before, by December of 1946 the 
Marshall-led negotiations had again clearly failed to end the conflict and bring about national 
political and military unity. Marshall returned to Washington ostensibly for deliberations, 
however, on January 7th, 1947, President Truman nominated him to be the Secretary of State.
60
  
What to do about China in the aftermath of the failed negotiations was a key issue for the 
Truman administration. The United States had little choice, but to support Jiang and the 
Nationalists. The problem was to decide the parameters of that support. There was no clarity in 
either Washington or in the American advisory headquarters in China on the scope or scale of 
this effort. 
 
              Conditional Support and Nationalist Overreach, Defeat and Retreat 
The second phase of the post-war period began in January of 1947 with the official end of 
the Marshall Mission and the widespread outbreak of fighting between the two factions. The 
United States now unambiguously chose sides, but the extent and nature of future support to 
Jiang and the Nationalists was still not decided. Those military and State Department personnel 
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in the "Dixie Mission" with Mao at Yan'an were withdrawn. The nearly three-year long liaison 
and observer mission with the Communists ended officially in February of 1947, but it was not 
until March that the remaining Americans finally left.
61
 In the middle of March 1947, Nationalist 
forces attacked and captured Mao's wartime headquarters in Yan'an where the Communists had 
fled to after the Long March in 1935.
62
 This campaign was the turning point in the civil war and 
was prime example of the poor strategic and logistical planning of the Nationalists. Beginning in 
June of 1947, the Nationalist forces suffered a series of defeats until they lost the northeast, were 
driven south of the Yangzi, and began the retreat to Taiwan. The definitive military history of the 
Chinese Civil War has not yet been written. The studies that have been written have traditionally 
suffered from lack of access to objective and detailed accounts from both the Communist and the 
Nationalist sides.  
Since 2000, two military surveys that detail the battles and campaigns of the Chinese 
Civil War have been published that were used in preparation for this study along with selected 
contemporaneous official Military Intelligence Division weekly reports. The Third Chinese 
Revolutionary Civil War, 1945-1949: An Analysis of Communist strategy and leadership by 
Christopher R. Lews was published in 2009 and provides an excellent overview. Odd Arne 
Westad's Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 primarily provides an 
examination of the political and the military aspects of the conflict. He researched archives in 
both China and on Taiwan for his very useful account. This study of American advisors does not 
focus on the fighting since they only trained and equipped Nationalist units and did not 
accompany them into combat. The broad trends of the conduct of the war are sufficient in terms 
of setting the context for key American decisions and the activities of the advisors that remained 
in China during the civil war. That said, the reduced level of support provided by the Truman 
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administration, advised by the China specialists in the State Department and the military 
departments during this period, is still a controversial topic. Once the number of advisors was 
drawn down, a process that began in the fall of 1945, it was difficult to significantly increase the 
numbers or commit forces to combat in China. 
 
Conditional support and Nationalist overreach 
At the beginning of this phase with the withdrawal of the Marshall Mission, the 
Nationalist forces conducted very successful operations against Communist occupied areas in 
eastern and northern China. Widespread fighting gradually escalated as both sides attempted to 
secure control of key territory. Nationalist forces, including the Alpha force units trained, 
equipped, and advised by Americans in India, Burma, and southwest China continued to conduct 
operations in northeastern China. In July of 1945, sixteen armies and over fifty divisions of the 
Nationalist Army had American military advisors assigned.
63
 From that time until January of 
1947, there was a steady reduction of American military advisory personnel as part of a plan to 
reorganize the effort that began in early 1946 with the formation of separate service (army, air 
force, navy, and marine) advisory groups. As has been mentioned previously, American military 
personnel were not allowed to act as combat advisors with front line forces. They were limited to 
predominantly liaison functions at the higher-level headquarters. They also did not plan major 
campaigns and operations at senior level headquarters. American influence on the war was 
essentially limited to logistics support and continued low level manning of the now extensive 
Nationalist military training establishment. The conduct of the war against the Communist was 
clearly under the purview of Jiang and his generals. 
 In early 1947, Jiang ordered the execution of the "6th" Extermination Campaign that had 
not occurred in 1936 in northwest China. After extensive negotiations, Mao and Jiang had agreed 
242 
 
to the formation of the second United Front in the negotiations after the Xian incident.
64
 In 1947, 
Yan'an was still an important psychological target as this location had served as the Communist 
headquarters for over a decade. However, the 1947 victory wasted men and resources in 
capturing and holding an area of the country far from the decisive fight for control of China. 
Jiang appeared to be fighting an earlier iteration of the civil war. The capture of Yan'an was 
understandable as an important political and psychological goal for Jiang, but it was not a 
decisive military objective, as it no longer functioned as Mao's main headquarters and the base of 
the Red Army. The Chinese civil war of the late 1940s, unlike that of the 1930s, would be won 
or lost first in the northeast and then in the area from Beijing to Shanghai, the demographic, 
political, and economic heartland of the country. The strategic and operational circumstances of 
the Chinese Civil War had changed dramatically during the war with Japan and in the opening 
year of the post war period. The maintenance of a large, political military was not only expensive 
it was inefficient and not responsive in a war where the enemy had mobility, initiative, and 
experience in fighting both guerrilla and mobile warfare. Other significant problems were the 
failure to reorganize, practice sound logistics, and select competent military leaders.  
The tide began to turn for the worse for the Nationalist in the summer of 1947 as the 
political-military struggle turned in favor of the Communist forces.
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 The Chinese people and the 
Nationalist army had now been at war for more than a decade. They had borne the brunt of the 
fighting against the Japanese, had quickly redeployed to the east to exert control, and were once 
again engaged in large-scale combat operations. Despite some early successes in northwest and 
eastern China, the long and costly effort in the northeast and Manchuria against the Communists 
took its toll. By the end of the summer, the Nationalist forces had lost the initiative. They were 
now forced to react to both Communist large unit maneuvers and guerrilla operations along the 
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long lines of communication necessary for adequate logistical support to their widely deployed 
forces. By the fall of 1947, the combination of economic, political, and military factors 
weakened Jiang's ability to provide the Nationalist Army with sufficient logistical support, 
recruits, and reserve forces.
66
  
In addition, in terms of an overall capabilities, the Nationalists on paper outnumbered the 
Communist regulars more than two-to-one and were better equipped than the Communist 
including an air force. However, the adage the he who defends everywhere defends nowhere 
came into play.
67
 The Communists were now able to out-maneuver the Nationalists whose 
transportation assets, air, and ground, had deteriorated and were no longer adequate to Jiang's 
strategy. In addition, the Communists could and did cut and harass the vital rail links.
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 The Red 
Army could avoid decisive combat if outnumbered and concentrate to attack when advantageous, 
especially against smaller units defending key logistics sites. The Communists also could revert 
to guerrilla war to destroy, disrupt, and interdict the flow of supplies and ammunition throughout 
the long and vulnerable lines of communication. In the summer of 1947, Wedemeyer was 
dispatched to China to conduct an in-depth study of the situation on the ground.   
On July 9, 1947, Wedemeyer was instructed by President Truman to travel to China and 
Korea to undertake an "appraisal of the political, economic, psychological, and military 
situation--current and projected."
69
 Three key Wedemeyer recommendations are outlined below: 
"That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic 
reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to reduction of budgetary deficits... 
 
That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military 
reforms are being implemented... 
 
That China accept American advisors as responsible representatives of the U.S. 
government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing U.S. aid in the 
manner for which it is intended."
70
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This report again does not call for the use of advisors in a direct combat role to serve 
alongside Nationalist troops in the field. The American advisor mission was to remain 
predominately training, education, and advice on organization, logistics, and administration. 
There is no call for the United States to recommit its own combat forces to this conflict or to 
reconsider the decade long policy of avoiding entanglement in China's internal conflict. The 
reality of Wedemeyer's recommendations was America would continue military and economic 
support but Jiang and the Nationalists must solve their own problems. Economic, political, and 
military reforms were all required for a Nationalist victory. The legacy of a decade of American 
aid was clear. Any assistance would come with strings attached and the advisors were there to 
make sure the aid must be used in an appropriate manner.   
The American advisory effort during this period is outlined below in an extended excerpt 
from The Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of 
China. This reference hereafter is cited as the "Barr Report." This report of over 1,000 pages 
provides a detailed situation report at the end of the post-war advise and assist mission. Much of 
the document is section-by-section detailed reports on the various supporting headquarters, the 
training organizations, and the minutia of developing a large and complex military force.  
3.     Historical 
 a. General -- JUSMAGCHINA was the last of a series of United States military 
 organizations in China. The organizations preceding the formation of the Army Advisory 
 Group (AAG) influenced the operation and mission of that Group in that they prepared 
 detailed plans for an advisory organization and left behind them large theater stocks and 
 various residual tasks for their successors. 
 b. Army Advisory Group -- The Army Advisory Group was formed from the 
 Nanking Headquarters Command in November 1946. It included Air, Ground, and 
 Combined Services Divisions in addition to necessary staff and administrative personnel. 
 In early 1947, following inactivation of the Peiping Executive Headquarters, it became 
 the only United States Army and Air Force headquarters in China, had the status, 
 responsibilities, and functions of a theater headquarters and became responsible for the 
 settlement of residual tasks of previous headquarters, including disposition of excessive 
 theater stocks.  
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 c. Naval Advisory Group Survey Board -- The Naval Advisory Group Survey 
 Board (NAGSB) was formed in November 1945. It was part of Naval Forces Western 
 Pacific and, though it operated in close liaison with the AAG, was entirely independent of 
 it. The Headquarters of the NAGSB was in Nanking, but most of its detailed advisory 
 activities were conducted in Tsingtao.
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The substance of the above quotation is that the 1000 or so advisors in China from early 
1946 through the writing of this report in February of 1949 conducted mostly administrative and 
training tasks with the Nationalist forces. They also managed those equipping programs 
authorized by Congress and the President including surplus military equipment, ammunition, and 
supplies. An official Joint Chiefs of Staff history covering this period provides a complete table 
of "Foreign Economic and Military Aid Authorized for China from V-J Day to 31 March 1949. 
This reference indicates there was $2 Billion in military supplies and equipment provided and 
that does not include another $1 Billion worth of surplus sold to the Nationalist for $232 
million.
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An argument can certainly be made that despite the temporary suspension of aid by 
Marshall, a significant amount was provided to the Nationalist forces who did not lack military 
supplies and equipment for the war--had it been used more efficiently and effectively. That said, 
not allowing combat advisors down to regimental level, provided in the numbers requested, after 
the war with Japan, prematurely stopped the progress and ongoing success in modernizing the 
Nationalist Army. By not providing significant numbers of advisors to division and regimental 
levels for the long term as requested by Jiang in September of 1945 was an opportunity lost. The 
redeployment of the USMC IIIAC with its two subordinate divisions further exacerbated the 
situation in terms of control of key areas of north China and ability to react to the dynamic 
situation the evolved in China. In early 1947, American policy and the extent to which it was 
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willing to commit to the Nationalist cause was clear. The Chinese Civil War was Jiang's to win 
or lose. 
                                                    Defeat and Retreat 
The officers most loyal to Jiang, trained at Huangpu Military Academy under the German 
advisors in the 1920s, had now been fighting for more than twenty years. The Nationalist 
military was wearing out in a country weary of war and exhausted by the seemingly never-
ending combat. Jiang was still struggling to bring about political unity even within his own party 
and the economic situation in China continued to deteriorate.
73
 Jiang either had not, or could not, 
make the comprehensive changes needed in senior leadership selection; military size and 
organization; armaments procurement and logistics systems; officer training; and in recruiting 
and the fair treatment of soldiers. Jiang acknowledged the needs for changes, some of which the 
American advisors had been advocating since the AMMISCA mission in 1941.
74
  
As late as the summer of 1948, American senior advisors were advocating Nationalist 
acceptance of organizational and operational changes for the Nationalist military that looked 
remarkable like those not implemented under Magruder, Stilwell and Wedemeyer in the war with 
Japan.
75
 Now that it was too late, Jiang seemed more receptive to the suggestions of his 
American advisors. This phase of American support ended with the evacuation of the military 
advisors from National training bases north of the Yangzi, then from Nanjing, and eventually, 
the final evacuation of the remaining personnel out of Shanghai. The Nationalist's series of 
defeats from late 1947 to Mao's announcement of the People's Republic of China in October of 
1949 was a period of blame and recriminations in terms of what the Truman administration 
might have done to assist Jiang and the Nationalists in avoiding this defeat. This chapter ends 
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with a brief, but telling assessment of the senior American advisors that remained on the ground 
until early 1949, and is found in the "Future Plans section of the "Barr Report."
76
  
 JUSMAGCHINA was forced to leave China long before its mission was 
 accomplished. Whether the mission, to create a modern armed force in keeping with the 
 needs and resources of China, could ever be accomplished is questionable. Even with 
 considerable outlay of American personnel and large supplies of military aid over a long 
 period of years, an armed force comparable in effectiveness to that of even mediocre 
 United States troops probably cannot be produced within a decade.
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From Stilwell at Ramgarh in 1942 to Major General David C. Barr, the Director of the 
Joint United States Military Advisor Group China in 1949 one salient and telling observation 
stands out. The best units in the Nationalist Chinese Army were trained and equipped by the 
American army. The Alpha force units proved themselves in combat in Burma and southwestern 
China. However, their American advisors under the direction of old China hands like Boatner 
and Dorn and thousands of Americans who had never been in Asia accompanied them into 
combat. U.S. ground and air forces including medical, transport, and logistical units also enable 
these forces. These same forces were transported to eastern China in September and October of 
1945 to reestablish Chinese sovereignty, again under American direction and with extensive air 
and naval support. Thereafter, these forces fought independent of advisor support nearly 
continuously for three additional years before they became combat ineffective.  
The American trained and equipped Alpha units were the model for a modernized and 
capable Chinese ground forces. These units had proven themselves in combat from Myitkyina to 
Manchuria. A September 1948 report in the classified weekly Intelligence Review produced by 
the United States Army G-2 provided their obituary. By the fall of 1948 these 39 divisions had 
been reduced, reorganized, and reconfigured and were now on par with the rest of the Nationalist 
Army. Rather than improve the vast majority of the Nationalist army forces as recommended, the 
best units were used up and worn out. Rather than a model to maintain and build on, they were 
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now in the same poor condition of the rest of the exhausted force that faced the Red Army.
78
 The 
American advisors produced a force that could win. However, it appears it could not be 
reproduced or maintained without a major continuing advise and assist effort.   
Juxtaposed to Barr's report and the Alpha force obituary are the sentiments of a Chinese 
Nationalist Army Captain who had attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
and upon returning to China wrote an "Letter from Nanjing" that was published in the Military 
Review in December of 1948 as the JUSMAGCHINA was in the process of standing down and 
leaving the country. Below are excerpted some telling remarks that in many ways portrays both 
how much had been accomplished in China over the nearly decade of U.S. assistance and what 
had not been done in the complementary actions of the "yin" and the "yank." 
 My Captain's pay has been raised to Chinese $13,000,000 a month...it does not 
 suffice to buy a pair of decent shoes.... 
 My Colonel has four children and his entire family lives in one room sixteen by 
 twenty feet.... 
 ...our generals overestimated the advantage of these favorable conditions, came 
 up with the conclusion that victory would be easy for us and that the war with the 
 Communists would be ended in a few short months.... 
 To simple, uneducated, hungry people, food is of far more concern than any 
 political conception. It is indeed difficult to teach the difference between Communism 
 and Democracy when their stomachs are empty.... 
 
Captain Huang then turns more optimistic. 
 ...the people are beginning to comprehend the suppression of Communism.... 
 The suicidal doctrine of defending every position at any cost has been   
 abandoned....    
 More freedom in operations now enables our field commanders to gain the 
 initiative.... 
 Two years ago only a few of our people understood that in addition to military 
 operations, political, economical, and psychological warfare are also necessary to 
 guarantee victory.... 
 In short, things in China cannot be gauged by Western industrial standards.... 
 Civil war is always a bitter, cruel struggle.... 
 Can we win the final victory? That depends on how fast we think, how fast we 
 can organize, and how fast we can perform....it is up to us. 
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The concluding chapter of this study examines the American effort "to change China"
79
 
from the 1941 advise and assist mission to the evacuation of its remaining advisory personnel to 
Japan, as China was lost. The end of this study includes a postscript briefly outlining the new 
beginning of military advisory support in May of 1951 when, Jiang and the Republic of China 
and the United States of American now at war with Mao's People's Liberation Army on the 
Korea peninsula, once again have sufficient complementary national interests to drive military 
cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
  We have finished our second ghastly war in a generation. Our current relations 
 with other nations are far from satisfactory and are in some cases highly dangerous. Our 
 old methods of education and directions of research proved unequal to either maintaining 
 the peace or most effectively winning the wars. Were the wars more ghastly than they 
 might have been had we known more of our enemies and allies? Were these wars 
 inevitable or could wiser national policy and action prevented them, if  based upon an 
 early and full understanding of the conditions of life and aspirations of the people with 
 whom we came into conflict? Could we arrive more quickly at a durable peace and 
 maintain it more securely, if we knew better the nations and peoples with whom we must 
 deal? There are implications of hope as well as responsibilities for American scholarship 
 in these questions.
1
   
 
        Thousands of Americans, business people, missionaries, journalists, and military 
personnel, had lived and worked in China for a hundred years or more before World War II. 
Some had literally spent their entire lives there, yet how well can anyone really understand the 
culture of another country? American military personnel had served in China for over forty years 
prior to Pearl Harbor. Both the United States Army and the Marine Corps had programs to 
educate a small number of officers each year starting in 1912 in the language and the culture. An 
assignment working as an attaché in the embassy whose duties were to travel and report on that 
nation's military situation normally followed.  
 These officers, with considerable expertise gained by living, studying, and working in 
China, were placed in key positions in the American advisory effort during the decade covered 
by this study. Thousands of other officers and enlisted personnel went to China with little or no 
language or cultural preparation. They received additional formal training and education in 
country to augment their pre-deployment military and technical skills preparation. The 
testimonies of several Chinese officers and enlisted personnel trained by Americans discussed in 
earlier chapters also attests to the close relationships that often grew between the trainers and 
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advisors and their counterparts. These advisors trained, equipped, and accompanied into combat 
nearly sixty competent divisions and senior headquarters that fought well against the Japanese. 
Many of these same units later served as the backbone of the Nationalist forces in the civil war. 
The conclusion of this study briefly summaries the current and emerging scholarship on the 
American effort to aid China's military and then examines how the American advisors actions 
and activities support or cast doubt on these views.    
 Hans van de Ven in a chapter of the recently published The Battle for China: Essays on 
the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 entitled "The Sino-Japanese War in 
History" outlines the current historiography of this period. He argues that by the 1970s a 
consensus had emerged that continues to be widely accepted. The Nationalist government during 
these eight years had shown itself to be an "incompetent, corrupt, militarist regime that had been 
unable to mobilize Chinese society against Japanese aggression."
2
 He further argues the 
scholarship attributes the American military effort to build the Nationalist armed forces as a 
"supreme try," as exemplified by the "patriotic, honest, modern, and rational" General “Vinegar 
Joe” Stilwell.
3
 Chennault, Stilwell, Wedemeyer all attempted to build a modern Chinese military 
and take the war to the Japanese. Jiang and the Nationalist regime, trying to prepare for the war 
against the Communist that was sure to follow, wasted the effort by the Americans. The works of 
a diverse set of noted scholars such as Barbara Tuchman, Lloyd Eastman, and Hsi-sheng Chi, 
and others, like soldier-participant Frank Dorn of Chinese Combat Command, all developed 
complementary and generally supporting views that are variants of that basic theme.
4
 Later 
scholarship on this period has focused more on the social and economic aspects as they related to 
the military and political failures of Jiang and his followers. These studies also supported the 
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military and cultural themes of a weak and fatally flawed Nationalist regime squandering 
America's best efforts.   
Van de Ven also argues that this theme was supported by the work of Harvard's dean of 
American China studies, John K. Fairbank, who served in the Office of War Information in 
China during this period. His view was of a Nationalist ruling group "held back by Confucian 
habits, patterns of rule in the dynastic past, and landlord elites."
5
 Van de Ven finishes his section 
on this "Western Consensus" in the chapter by describing how tenacious this set of 
interpretations have been in studies of this period.
6
 The overwhelming agreement of such noted 
scholars in the academic community supporting this line of scholarship has also made it less 
compelling to re-open studies on the Nationalists and Jiang Jieshi. A focus remains on examining 
the Communist adversaries and the social conditions that fostered their military victory and 
ultimate rise to power.
7
 This negative view of Jiang and the Nationalists ran counter to a range of 
conservative political actors in both the government and the media in the United States looking 
for scapegoats in those who had “lost China.”   
This politically contentious argument was that the Truman administration abandoned 
Jiang and the Nationalists in the time of greatest need. The senior military and diplomatic 
personnel, as well as those in the American media who served in China during this time, were 
the prime targets in this search for who to blame. Much of the official diplomatic, military, and 
press reporting was generally critical of the Nationalists regime, and supportive of the 
Communist efforts. Some argue the war in Korea supported by both Mao and Stalin was proof of 
Truman's failed policies and a direct result of his lack of support to the Nationalist cause after the 
war with Japan. America's failure to bring about an accommodation between the Nationalists and 
the Communists, the withholding of arms and equipment from the Nationalists during the 
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negotiations, the haggling over the number and role of advisors after January of 1945, all played 
into a sense that Truman had failed to act decisively and resolutely at the end of the war with 
Japan. This was reinforced, mostly in hindsight, when the Chinese People's Volunteers began 
their participation in the war in Korea. For the first time Chinese Communist and American 
forces were engaged in direct major combat operations. Faced with Soviet and Chinese 
Communist support for a hot war in Asia, by May of 1951, an American military advisory 
mission to the Republic of China on Taiwan was reestablished. A new era of military advice and 
assistance began between the United States and the Republic of China.  
 The most comprehensive study of foreign advisors in China is Jonathan Spence's To 
Change China: Western Advisors in China, 1620-1960. He devotes one chapter to Chennault, 
Stilwell, and Wedemeyer. He states, that when Roosevelt demanded Stilwell command all 
Chinese forces "the stage was set for the most ambitious and most arrogant attempt by Western 
advisers in China to gain power." He further argues, "For anyone with any knowledge of Chinese 
history and politics it should have been clearly inconceivable that the Chinese would voluntarily 
put a Westerner in command of all their armed forces on their own soil, when so doing would 
bring about the fall of Chiang Kai-shek."
8
 His analysis helps inform an imperialist narrative 
where the outside intervener is doomed to failure in any clash of cultures, interests, and jealously 
guarded sovereignty. In contravention of the political anti-Truman bloc, Spence provides a 
strong argument there was nothing the United States could have done to save their Chinese ally. 
No matter how strong or weak the shared threat perception of Jiang, his American advisors, and 
supporters, there were limits to what could be done by an outside power.  
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 Spence especially singled out the American as is obvious in the following quotation. 
 
 
  As we look back at the cycle from 1620 to 1960, we can observe the standpoint of 
 superiority from which the Western advisers approached China. This superiority sprang 
 from two elements: the possession of advanced technical skills and the sense of moral 
 rightness. Convinced that their goals were good and that their advice was sorely needed, 
 the Westerners adopted a proprietary air toward China; Chinese refusal to accept the 
 validity of their goals, and the Chinese rejection of advice, were met with Western 
 bewilderment or anger. Driven on by their varying visions, most Western advisers 
 developed some degree of emotional involvement with China; they demanded more from 
 China than payment for services rendered. They did not see that the Chinese had a 
 contractual view of the relationship and maintained as nominal employers the right to 
 terminate the agreements when they saw fit. The repercussions of this misunderstanding 
 could be serious and among Americans, for instance, once so active as advisors during 
 the late Ch'ing (Qing) and the Republican periods, there emerged theories of betrayal and 
 of "loss" of China. Americans had not been betrayed, however, they had failed no more 
 than others had failed in the past, and they had lost no more that others had lost--money, 
 life's work, hopes. China had not been America's to lose.
9
 
 
 Spence published his work on foreign advisors in China in 1969 as the United States 
embarked on its Vietnamization program in Indochina. Spence's historical and cultural warnings 
were obvious, and well timed. Negotiations were ongoing between the United States and North 
Vietnam. The planned systematic withdrawal of American combat units was part of the 
negotiated agreement. The main effort was focused on American advisory teams and on air 
support, logistics, and other enablers to assist the forces of South Vietnam until they could stand 
on their own. The question of whether or not the United State could have won the Vietnam War 
was a more direct sequel to "Who Lost China," than the Korean War where the American ally 
survived and the 1953 armistice held a stalemate in place.      
This study is fully cognizant of the accepted scholarship, the bitter domestic partisan 
politics engendered, and the legacy of the loss of China that emerged over the intervening years 
since the PRC was established. The direct confrontation between the PLA and the United States 
on the Korea peninsula and the mostly indirect military interactions in other venues in Asia 
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including the Taiwan straits all influenced the direction of this scholarship. This study provides a 
more nuanced refinement of the established "truths" that have emerged to explain this period of 
modern Chinese history. It reexamines these scholarly trends through the lens of the American 
military advisors and to a lesser degree their Chinese counterparts. By looking broadly at nearly 
a century of American military involvement and influence in China, and focusing on about a 
decade of advising during both external and internal conflicts, this study looks for potential flaws 
and fissures, not tears and holes in the dominant narrative of foreign involvement in China 
during this important and turbulent period. There are excellent biographies of only the most 
senior military leaders who served in China during this period, Marshall, Stilwell, Wedemeyer, 
and Chennault. There are works by, and new biographies of, two of the diplomats who served 
with the military as close advisors, John S. "Jack" Service and John Patton Davies.
10
 Their works 
and stories certainly inform the narrative. 
In term of China's civil war, a lot has been written on the rise of the Communists, 
especially on Mao and his peasant-based movement. However, there are few comprehensive 
works on the overarching military strategy, operational campaigns, and tactics of the conflict 
between the Communists and the Nationalist militaries between 1937 and 1949. There remains 
no real consensus detailing how the Communists militarily defeated the Nationalists who 
outnumbered them over three-to-one or more through 1947 and two-to-one as late as May of 
1948.
11
 That Jiang was corrupt and militarily inept, and Truman duped by military, diplomatic, 
and media pro-Communist "China hands" would seem to be insufficient on its face, no matter 
how well supported by the past and current scholarship attempting to explain the Nationalist 
defeat. Were Jiang and the Chinese Nationalist leadership really so corrupt, culture bound, and 
backward looking that they could not successfully adapt to deal with the foreign and domestic 
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threats to their positions of power, their military establishment, and their government? Were the 
Americans military officers, many of whom had spent the key and formative parts of their 
careers studying and serving in China, so modern, western-centric, and filled with industrial-age 
martial hubris that they could not understand and adapt to the requirements of the political- 
military culture, history, and yet-to-fully-modernize trends of their Chinese counterparts? The 
United States military had spent a lot of time in China, and in Asia. Had it learned nothing? 
Max Boot, in his Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, 
argues that Americans are good at small wars, working with indigenous militaries and "nation 
building." In his chapter on American forces in China, he covers the period from 1900 to 1941. 
In support of the American effort he says, "What is most striking is how long the American 
military stayed in China--and how successfully."
12
 In 1942, with America's entrance into the war 
with Japan, the potentially mortal external drivers for change and accommodation in the Chinese 
military could not have been stronger. The converging of national interests was as obvious for 
Jiang and the Nationalists as for the American political leadership and its military and diplomatic 
personnel serving in China. The fate of China and the opportunities possible with a modern, 
capable Chinese ally were too important to ignore given the mutual threat both countries faced. If 
Jiang had only wanted personal power as China's senior warlord, he could have negotiated for a 
position of leadership in the Japanese East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. He was more than first 
among warlords. He was the leader of China, a country that was and would be an important 
player in Asia. 
 The Allied effort in the CBI Theater against Japan did evolve into a sideshow of the war 
in the Asia-Pacific Theater. However, that was as much a matter of timing, military geography, 
the weakness of the Japanese Navy, and the Imperial Japanese Army's overextension. The United 
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States may have had a strategy of Europe first, but in reality, the American military effort across 
the Pacific and from the Southwest Pacific began before the North Africa campaign and was 
more of a co-equal element of the United States global war strategy. The Japanese military assets 
confronted and held in China and in Southeast Asia were significant. The American advisors on 
the ground in China helped organize, train, and equip the 39 best divisions in the Nationalist 
Chinese army in support of that strategy. 
The Japanese forces that remained in China at the end of the war were formidable. The 
Allies' request for the Soviet Union's forces to attack into Manchuria attests to that belief even 
late in the conflict. As the previous chapters in this study have shown, much went right in this 
long and difficult relationship between the United States and China. In the war with Japan and in 
the civil war that followed, the American advisors and their counterparts built a force that was 
able to retake northern Burma, successfully mount a defense of central and southwest China, 
prepare for an offensive against the Japanese, and execute a difficult reoccupation and 
repatriation of the eastern third of China. Looking back after more than fifty years have passed, 
corruption, a clash of cultures, and modernist technical and imperialist hubris seem too simple to 
be convincing explanations of this complex relationship. The issue is how China and the United 
States dealt with the challenges they faced in the war with Japan and in the civil war that 
followed as the Cold War emerged to challenge America's post World War II dominance.     
 The thesis of this study is that the American military personnel, from the most senior 
officers to junior enlisted service members, endured, persevered, and despite tremendous 
obstacles, made steady progress in their efforts to improve the operational military capability of 
China's armed forces. It was neither a wasted nor a squandered effort. The Nationalist Chinese 
regime in the first half of the twentieth century was a complex political-military institution with a 
262 
 
national culture and historical tradition very different from the United States. However, for 
almost a century the Chinese had embarked on an effort to modernize and Westernize their 
armed forces. These forces had suffered humiliating defeats fighting the Europeans, the 
Americans and the Japanese, but they had also won some battles and campaign, giving the 
invaders pause. China's armed forces had adopted Western military weapons, techniques, and 
organizations, and sent many of its sons abroad to study military and technical subjects in Japan 
and the West.   
 Through the 19th century and the first four decades of the 20th century, some of the best 
militaries in the world at the time advised and equipped Chinese forces. Britain, France, Italy, 
Germany, Japan, Russia, and the Soviet Union had all both fought against and supported the 
Chinese during some part of the period from 1839 to 1941. Jiang Jieshi's effort to build a new 
Chinese national military, beginning with his own schooling in Japan and with his establishment 
of the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou with German advisers in the 1920s, casts doubt 
on his culture bound and backward approach to building modernized defense forces and warfare. 
The fact that his deputy commandant and political officer was Zhou Enlai, destined to be Mao's 
second-in-command through his death in 1976, casts doubt on Jiang's inability to understand his 
Communist foe. His triumphant Northern Expedition against powerful warlords and factions that 
ended with his establishment of a national government in Nanjing also speaks to strength and not 
weakness.    
 The Nationalist successes over the Communists during the Fifth Extermination campaign 
that ended with the Communists remnants isolated in China vast northwest at the end of the Long 
March victory also speaks to Jiang's military prowess, organizational skills, improving tactics 
and developing capabilities. His forces had learned how to fight the Communists over nearly a 
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decade of conflict. The Nationalist forces with their warlord allies had emerged in a position to 
continue offensive operations against a greatly weakened foe, even if they now occupied a 
sanctuary with the Soviet Union and the vast expanse of Xinjiang to its back and flank. The 
ensuing Xian Incident precipitated by Jiang's own subordinates temporarily suspended the war 
between the Nationalists and the Communists. Jiang's release and resumption of China's political 
and military leadership was an acknowledgement of his growing national prestige and 
international recognition. China was now on the verge of a full-scale war with Japan and an 
alliance with major global powers. 
 The contingency of a very new and dangerous situation now confronted China's very 
sovereign existence. The Japanese continued anew their steady encroachment of Chinese 
territory that had first begun in 1894-1895 with the First Sino-Japanese War. China had lost of 
Manchuria by the early 1930s, had been humiliated with the bombings in Shanghai, and by the 
mid 1930 no longer controlled Beijing. In the aftermath of the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge 
outside of Beijing in July of 1937, a state of war existed between China and Japan. Was this a 
greater advantage for Mao or for Jiang? From 1927 to 1937, two Chinese armies, organized, 
recruited, equipped, prepared, and conducted war against each other on a grand scale. These 
activities, despite the national political divisions are evidence of a Chinese military in the midst 
of fundamental change and on the march to becoming a more capable, foreign-emulating armed 
forces. 
 The Chinese militaries, both Nationalist and Communist, of 1941 had come a long way 
from the days of the Manchu Bannermen and the Green Standard Army of the Qing Dynasty. 
The Chinese armed forces the United States began to advise and assist in the fall of 1941, had 
been soundly defeated by the Japanese, but had not capitulated and were holding on to a tenuous, 
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but difficult to assail defensive strategic position in southwestern and central China. Losing to 
the Japanese Imperial Army was not unique to China's forces. The Chinese military's personnel 
losses in the 1937-38 Shanghai and Nanjing campaigns were four to five times those of the 
Japanese. While there were certainly flaws in the Nationalist's tactics and command structures, 
lack of airpower, artillery and maneuverability help account for the losses in the opening days of 
China's full scale modern warfare against a well-armed and capable force.  
 By 1938, a stalemate existed with very little fighting going on.
13
 This situation arguably 
contributed to the perception that until the end of the war, the Nationalists were content to sit 
back and wait for the Allies to deal with Japan. China would have been foolish to continue to 
fight the Japanese with loss rates expected to be similar to those suffered in the first year of the 
war when some of its best German trained and equipped units had been defeated. Jiang was 
certainly aware of the incomplete transformation of his forces, their readiness status, and the risk 
of further combat against Japan's superior forces. These ground forces, like his air forces that 
were reforming under Chennault's guidance in southwestern China, needed a respite and a time 
to reform and refit. Only a modern Western power could provide the equipment and technical 
training needed to accomplish this task. 
 Before the conflict, China's war industries were located predominately in eastern China. 
With few exceptions, it was impossible to move these plants and manufacturing facilities west to 
support the military's new locations. China had virtually no indigenous capability to recover in 
terms of modern weapons and equipment capable of opposing those possessed by Japan. Not 
only were the Japanese well-equipped and organized for modern combat, they were well led and 
confident having develop a Western-style military over the last more than fifty years. Any 
thought of the Japanese being a second-class force was dispelled in the early 1940s. Within six 
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months of the establishment of the AMMISCA, the British had suffered some of their worst 
military defeats in their history in Hong Kong Malaya, and Singapore. For the United States, 
General Douglas MacArthur had been ordered out of the Philippines and General Wainwright 
left to surrender with the failed American-Filipino defense of Bataan. By early 1942, when 
Stilwell arrived in China, the Japanese were at the height of their power and geographic conquest 
in Asia.  
 A relationship between the Chinese military and their American advisors was forged 
beginning with the loss of Burma, Stilwell's retreat, and the establishment of the training school 
at Ramgarh, India; one of the most dangerous times in modern Chinese history. The very fate of 
China’s national survival was at stake, with its core territory being held by a foreign invader and 
its military defeated and driven to the interior of the country. The China-Burma-India Theater 
was an operational environment of formidable opposing enemy forces, forbidding geography and 
terrain, and conflicting and dynamic international, alliance, and national strategic policies and 
politics. The very real accomplishments of these American military personnel and their Chinese 
counterparts over the next nearly eight years, and the lessons of their successes, shortcoming, 
and failures have been obscured by the timing and circumstances of the Japanese surrender and 
the Nationalist military's ultimate defeat in the civil war that followed.   
 The story of the development of the Chinese armed forces across this decade does 
salvage some of its reputation in the following decade with the defense of Taiwan and its 
survival as a Cold War ally of the United States. Somewhat ironically, the war in Korea provided 
evidence that Jiang had fought a very capable and well-led adversary from 1945-1949. The 
Communist Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea fought the United States and is United 
Nation's allies for over two years to gain a stalemate in 1953 on the peninsula. The Nationalists 
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survived and Jiang was able to revive and rebuild his regime on the island of Taiwan. Today, his 
Nationalist party governs the Republic of China with its modern and professional armed forces. 
They still receive military training and education in the United States. In addition, its primary 
sources of armaments are those either indigenously produced or purchased from American 
manufacturers. 
 The United States showed its agility and flexibility, reliability, and modesty and realism 
in dealing with the problems in China, Burma, and India from the fall of 1941 through the 
reestablishment in May of 1951 of the military advisory group on Taiwan. The American 
military advisors adapted to complex and dynamic changes in the situation. When looked at over 
the ten years of the study, although there were notable exceptions, the American advisors were 
reliable and their actions predictable. Perhaps most importantly, the American military had 
gained considerable experience serving in China and working with the Chinese military. By the 
end of the war with Japan, both sides knew what to expect of the other and were realistic about 
the possibilities. An alternative view of this decade is that the American advisors and their 
Chinese counterparts failed at an impossible set of tasks, contingencies, and contradictions. They 
were defeated by the difficulty and enormity of the task and the exigencies of the situation. 
Maybe it was not an insurmountable clash of cultures, flawed and single-minded leaders, and the 
asymmetrical pace and acceptability of modernity that explains the loss of China. The 
convergence of strategic, geographic, political, and military circumstances beyond the control of 
any of the agents has the potential to provide a more nuanced and balanced explanation.  
 For an American military officer or noncommissioned officer, an efficient and effective 
military has its own, unique culture, neither American nor Chinese. There are objective standards 
to evaluate military forces and their performance. Either the tank starts or it does not. The 
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artillery shell bursts where it was aimed or it does not. The hill is taken, the enemy defeated, and 
a defense consolidated or it is not. How one gets to that point of military success, through 
interpreters, under American or Chinese officers, and at what cost remains to a great extent the 
domain of the advisors and their relationship to their counterparts. The enemies they are fighting 
also get a vote in the outcome of any battle, campaign, or strategy. There are limits to the cultural 
adaptations that are acceptable, however, when the performance in combat, in life and death 
situations, is the measure of success and failure. Boatner's initial guidance to be American, but 
not too American and to let the Chinese be Chinese, but not too Chinese was excellent advice. 
When the ten years of the advisory effort are looked at comprehensively, the opposites of Yin 
and Yank, despite all of the challenges, together formed a functioning and capable whole. The 
forces trained, equipped, and advised by the American advisors became the best units in Chinese 
military. The Chinese consistently performed well in the field, with American advisors and 
enabling capabilities against the Japanese and under their own officer against the Communists. 
Neither side was sufficient alone to accomplish the tasks assigned and gain the victories given 
the enemies and the circumstances that they faced; together they gave it a good shot.   
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Postscript 
 United States policy -- The policy of the United States has been to oppose 
 Communism. If this policy is continued on the mainland of Asia, the present Chinese 
 Nationalist Government or a non-Communist successor, with all its weaknesses, is the 
 only possible agent. There is no alternative short of armed intervention. Active military 
 support of this Government by the United States will require advisors who can, for all 
 practical purposes, command the Chinese Armed Forces, and will require a large amount 
 of aid in the form of arms, ammunition, and materials. The cost of this will be great, 
 perhaps excessive; whether too great is beyond the scope of this report. Regardless of 
 United States policies, desires, and willingness, no advisory group can accomplish much 
 unless actively desired by the Chinese and fully supported by them.
1
 
          "The Barr Report" 
The story of the American advisory mission to China, 1941-1951 ends very much as it began. A 
small group of Americans began an advise and assist mission to a beleaguered and defeated ally 
that has been displaced from its capital by a better and more capable armed force. The reasons 
for the Nationalist's defeat are complex and continue to be controversial. There are both intrinsic 
and extrinsic reasons for the poor performance of the Nationalist Chinese forces.  
 Some of these weaknesses and shortcomings the American military advisors might have 
been able to fix, others might have been improved, and still others were beyond their capability 
given the time, geography, political, and economic circumstances. As the quote from the 
JUSMAG Final Report in February of 1949 above indicates, despite the problems encountered, 
the senior advisor and his staff still believed if American forces conducted "armed intervention" 
and were given "for all practical purposes, command of Chinese Armed Forces," this assistance 
might have produced a positive outcome. Not unlike Captain Huang's comments at the end of 
chapter 6, there was hope and optimism for a way forward informed by the mistakes and the 
successes of the past. Later in his report, Barr outlined the minimum requirements necessary to 
restart a mission at a future time. The report reads like a reprint of the 1941 AMMISCA 
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assessment, and focuses on a smaller, reorganized, adequately trained and equipped military 
force. The American's faith in the average Chinese soldier never wavered. 
 On 1 May 1951, an American Military Assistance Advisory Group to the Republic of 
China was re-established on the island of Taiwan as the United States battled Communist 
Chinese forces on the Korean peninsula. On December 1, 1951, an article was published in 
Collier's magazine titled "Pacific Report: Free China Must Be Saved Now--or Never" by 
Thomas E. Dewey. The article chronicled Dewey's visit to Taiwan, a Republican who ran against 
Truman in 1948. One of the pictures included with the article shows Dewey and Major General 
William C. Chase standing beside General Sun Liren at a training event. Sun, a graduate of the 
Virginia Military Institute, a decade before had commanded one of the divisions trained at 
Ramgarh after its retreat from Burma in the spring of 1942. Sun and Chase, who had previously 
served in China, are tangible examples of the continuity of the American effort. The emerging 
strategic situation in Asia had once again made allies of culture opposites. The argument of 
Dewey's article is that the United States must support Jiang and the Nationalist forces on Taiwan. 
The consolidation of power on the mainland by Mao's Communist government could not be 
allowed to stand. The Americans and their Nationalist Chinese allies were once again in need of 
one another's assistance. Nevertheless, the Nationalist record of the past decade was not off 
limits, for American politicians or the press. The Americans were too American and the Chinese 
were too Chinese. 
 The article offers this assessment: "There are grave defects in the military and 
governmental picture. Just by way of comparison, all the officers of the rank of general or 
admiral in the whole American Army, Navy and Air Force number about 1,100. On Formosa 
there are 1,700 generals!"
2
 Dewey goes on to state that "too many of them are not fighting 
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generals. And too many are engaged primarily in intrigue and political activity."
3
 Perhaps most 
revealing is Dewey's answer to his own question-- why does Jiang not make the necessary and 
"obvious" changes. "He cannot--he is a prisoner of his past successes."
4
 The American military 
advisors to China during the decade covered in this study are much like Jiang; they were 
prisoners of their own successes. The melding of the talents and skills of both sides into a 
workable whole was the only potentially viable solution. Beginning in 1951 and continuing until 
the writing of this study American advisors and security assistance personnel have worked 
together with their Chinese counterparts to build a competent, capable, and modern military to 
support and protect the government on Taiwan. This military-to-military relationship has 
continued even after the official recognition of the People's Republic of China by the United 
States in 1979. Military missions to advise and assist an allied or friendly nation, despite all the 
difficulties of language, culture, and history, remains a viable strategic option that cannot and 
should not be overlooked, nor oversold. 
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